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Abstract
Tlie thesis has two overarching objectives. One is to understand monetary policy in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia during 1990s and early 2000s; the other 
to use these findings to shed light on monetary policy in less developed, but highly open 
and financially integrated market economies. In order to achieve its aims, it analyses 
specific factors with significant influence on the conduct or outcomes of monetary policy 
in these countries; it analyses the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Central 
Eur ope, based on a teclmique called vector autoregression; and examines use of principal 
types of constraints on policy discretion, such as central bank independence, exchange 
rate commitments and domestic targets for monetary policy, in countries of the sample. 
The thesis finds that strong internal and external pressures, together with frequent bouts 
of fiscal UTesponsibility and sizeable additive and parametric uncertainty regarding the 
working of the economy, led, in all four countries, to pronounced macroeconomic 
vulnerability and a need for periodic adjustment to dangerous fiscal and external 
imbalances. Reaction of policy-makers in countries of the sample to this environment can 
be characterized as discretion constrained by a strong nominal anchor and real exchange 
rate considerations. Experience of Central European countries shows that various 
elements of a commitment by monetary authorities are not duplicatory or contradictory, 
but interdependent in contributing to the goal of constraining discretion. During the 
period studied, the two key overall developments in policy were the gradual shift of 
emphasis from exchange rate targets to domestic targets and (within domestic targets) a
sliift from monetary targets to inflation targets. This approach has been largely 
successful.
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Introduction
The thesis has two overarching objectives. The first one is to understand 
monetary policy, its results and luiderpmnings in a group of coimtries (Czech 
Republic, Hungaiy, Poland and Slovakia) undergoing, during 1990s and early 
2000s, a unique shift from command economies to countiies on the eve of EU 
accession. The second aim is to use these findings to shed some light on 
economic tlieoiy on monetaiy policy in less developed, but highly open and 
financially integrated market economies.
In otlier words, it is our aim to understand what happened and why and what 
lessons can be drawn from these developments. This might be relevant not only 
for other transition countries, but also in the debate between economists 
specialising in different clusters of emerging market economies -  e.g. Latin 
America or Southeast Asia.
To be able to arrange our thoughts in a clear and comprehensive manner, an 
analytical framework is necessary. The tliesis uses, as such a framework, tlie 
view espoused by Mishkin and Savastano (2001) tliat tlie debate about monetary 
policy and monetaiy policy frameworks in emerging market countries “should be 
over what is tlie best way to constrain discretion over monetary policy”, (p. 45)
In order to answer this question for Central European countries, the tliesis is 
going to examine tlie following issues related to tlie overall philosophy of 
constraining discretion over monetary policy:
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® does an independent central bank remove a need for otlier constraints on 
discretion and, if not. how does it interact with otlier constraints?
® what are the costs, consequences and effectiveness of an exchange rate 
commitment as a constraint on discretionary policy?
® what is the experience with commitment expressed in domestic monetary 
variables, i.e. monetary and inflation taigets?
The literature provides a number of hypotheses in this regard that the thesis will 
specifically test by an in-depth analysis of a small sample, in tradition of Berger 
and de Haan (1999) or Mishkin and Savastano (2001).
The thesis is concerned with lour neighbouring coimtries, providing it with 
sample of much similarity, but also of many differences. The initial conditions 
and policy responses chosen by macroeconomic policy-makers often differed 
substantially. The metliodology is based on using the sample for case studies and 
then drawing some generalised conclusions. A sample of four avoids many 
pitfalls of studying just one countiy, but it also allows an in-deptli look at 
individual countries, something not possible in a cross-countiy study dealing 
with 20 or more countries.
This is particularly valuable when tlie working of monetary institutions is 
studied. As the thesis will show. the actual state of central bank independence or 
a foreign exchange-rate regime can rarely be fitted mto simple quantitative 
evaluations. On the other hand, having foin cases instead of one or two goes a
18
significant way towards making sure tliat individual idiosyncrasies are not 
transformed into general truths.
The thesis is structured into sc\ cn chapters.
Chapter 1 reviews existing literature in areas most relevant for tlie findings 
presented here -  objectives, frameworks and institutions of monetary policy. Its 
emphasis is on small open economies, especially tlie ones in transition.
Chapter 2 turns to an empirical investigation of the Central European coimtries, 
witli the focus on specific factors tliat have had significant influence on the 
conduct or outcomes of monetaiy policy during the 1990s and early 2000s in tlie 
Czech Republic, Hungaiy. Poland and Slovakia. It examines issues such as 
fragility, shallowness and monopolistic structure of financial markets, 
imbalances in the relationship between the real economy and the financial sector, 
difficulty of controlling inllation, its reasons and consequences, as well as 
expectations and pressures of futme EMU membership. In addition to four 
country case studies, it summarises tlie findings that can be generalised for the 
whole sample.
Chapter 3 analyses the transmission mechanism of monetaiy policy in Central 
Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s. It contains an econometric analysis of tlie 
transmission mechanism indii idually for all four countries concerned, based on a 
technique called vector autoregression (VAR). It demonstrates that while policy­
makers could count on some robust channels of transmission, many of tlie
19
channels identified for economically and financially more developed economies 
have been erratic or are difficult to spot at all.
The mtroducloiy chapters set the stage for an examination, in tlie following tluee 
chapters, of principal types ol' constraints on policy discretion -  central bank 
independence, exchange rate commitments and domestic targets for monetaiy 
policy.
Chapter 4 conducts an in-depth analysis of central bank independence in the 
countries concerned in order to expand our understanding not only of what 
happened there, but also what implications tliis has for the tlieoiy in general. To 
this piupose, it explores not only the well-known indices of legal independence 
of central banks and their deficiencies, but tries to look beyond to other 
detenninants of actual central bank independence. It focuses, in particular, on 
constitutional factors affecting independence of cential banks, as well as the rule 
of law, personal independence and political role of central banks, central bank 
autonomy in exchange rate policy and exogenous factors contributing to effective 
central bank independence.
Chapter 5 looks at developments of nominal and real exchange rates and their 
role in monetary policy of Central European coimtries. It brings together various 
empirical results to form a unified explanation of tlie role of the exchange rate in 
monetaiy policy of small open economies, witli emphasis on actual behaviour of 
monetary aiitliorities. This framework involves trade-offs between real exchange
20
rate misalignment, nominal prcdictabilit)' and swift disinflation and paths of 
progression along various combinations of these tiade-ofts.
Chapter 6 turns to domestic targets -  targets for monetary policy expressed in 
terms of domestic var iables such as growth of monetary or price aggregates. It 
analyses their role in two sections; one dealing with issues of monetary^ targeting, 
the other with inflation targeting. The analysis is linked to exchange rate 
considerations and the analysis of central bank independence.
Chapter 7 summarises findings of the tliesis and brings them together hi the form 
of the two strands presented in the begiiuiing - what happened in Central Einope 
and what is its relevance.
The first strand, focusing on explaining monetary policy hi Central Europe, looks 
at factors underpinning monetary policy, their consequences for policy-makers 
and reactions thereof. Its conclusion is that despite different initial conditions and 
expectations in individual countries, all countries had tlie ability to achieve 
overall rapid structural adjustment and successful tiansitioii. Therefore, despite 
problems and crises, the Central European story is essentially a story of success.
During transition, the countries of the region were affected both by internal and 
external pressures. Internally, inftationary pressiues unrelated to monetaiy and 
fiscal policies as such and dysfunctional structure of tlie financial sector and 
peculiarities in relationship between the real economy and tlie financial sector 
presented particular challenges for policy-makers. On tlie external front, the
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policy was shaped primarily by expectations of future EU/EMU membership, 
high level of trade and financial opemiess and limited instruments of adjustment 
to external shocks.
These factors, together with frequent bouts of fiscal irresponsibility and sizeable 
additive and parametric uncertainty regarding the working of tlie economy, led, 
in all fbiu coimtries, to pronounced macroeconomic vulnerability and a need for 
periodic adjustment to dangerous fiscal and external imbalances. The adjustment 
took place either through a financial/currency crisis or an austerity package prior 
to a potential crisis.
Reaction of policy-makers in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
to tliis environment can be characterised as “discretion constrained by a strong 
nominal anchor and real exchange rate considerations” - flexible monetaiy policy 
strategies that, however, impose limitations by use of an explicit and visible 
nominal anchor and pay attention to developments in tlie real exchange rate. 
Approach of Central Eiu opean countries was consistently based on high levels of 
central bank independence and avoidance of hard pegs. At the same time, tliey 
have not practiced true exchange rate flexibility. Countercyclical policy was 
generally not a part of the package.
The second strand of the thesis has the ambition to develop further existing 
theoiy of monetaiy; policy in less developed, but highly open and financially 
integrated market economies. Experience of Central Einopean countries provides 
some answers to the question of how to constrain discretion in monetary policy
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pursued in such economies, about tlie role of the external constraint in policy­
making and about tlie relevance of domestic policy co-ordination and credibility.
The thesis shows that the \arious elements of a commitment by monetary 
authorities are not duplicatory or contradictory, but interdependent in 
contributhig to the goal of constraining discretion. It provides an instrument for 
analysis of effectiveness of \ arious combinations by making tlieir objective -  
constraining discretion -  explicit and showing that various combinations can 
achieve similar results.
The experience of Central Europe shows tliat the combination of institutions 
aimed at constraining discretion is not a simple, two-dimensional, discrete matrix 
of a given level of central bank independence and publicly amioiuiced targets. A 
set of feasible combinations develops in line with development of financial and 
factor markets and their integration with global markets
Witliin such a framework, it is much easier to understand changes in targets 
publicly aimounced and pursued by policy-makers in Central Europe. The two 
key overall developments were the gradual shift of emphasis from exchange rate 
targets to domestic targets and (within domestic targets) a shift from monetary 
targets to inflation targets. Eicn though each comitiy had its idiosyncrasies, two 
combinations proved to be popular and successful. One is a combination of high 
central bank independence and an exchange rate commitment complemented by 
monetary or inflation indicators of supplementary value; it is suitable in periods 
of limited financial integration and earlier stages of development towards market
23
economy. The other one brings together high central bank independence and 
inflation targeting with limited role for exchange rate commitments or targets 
related to monetary aggiegatcs. It has been used in tlie latter stages of transition. 
In both cases, tine exchange rate ilexibility is imacceptable for policy-makers.
24
Chapter 1: Literature review
1,1 Introduction
The first chapter reviews existing literature dealing with monetaiy policy in order to 
set the stage for the rest o f the thesis. It focuses on those areas o f monetaiy policy 
research tliat are most relevant for tlie findings presented here -  objectives, 
frameworks and institutions o f monetaiy policy -  with emphasis on empirical 
research on small open economics, especially tlie ones in transition.
It is clear from the literature on monetaiy policy targets and central bank autonomy 
that tlie foreign exchange rate regime, money targeting and inflation targeting are 
widely perceived as alternative instruments policy-nialcers can use as intermediate 
targets/nominal anchors to achie\ e the final target o f non-inflationaiy economic 
growth and are frequently analysed with a view to their mutual interaction and/or 
substitution in these roles.
On the other hand, the interaction between these instruments and central bank 
independence was largely ignored until recently and central bank independence 
tends to be analysed separate 1\ as an institutional device that can (or cannot, 
according to some) bring about low inflation regardless o f  the monetary policy 
framework. A possible exception to this aile concerns the relationship between an
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exchange rate regime and central bank autonomy, which has been analysed quite 
extensively since the early 1990s.
Fischer (1994) pointed out that monetary and exchange rate policies cannot be 
independent, especially under a fi.xed exchange rate, where the independent ability 
o f the central bank ‘to  determine the rate o f  inflation and interest rates is sharply 
curtailed” , (p. 304) Empirical research confinned this a priori assumption, with 
Anyadike-Danes (1995) showing that for countries with fixed exchange rates, the 
connection between central bank independence and the inflation performance was 
much weaker than in countries w here no such rule was in place. Wyatt (1999) also 
found that while central bank independence was significant for inflation 
perfomiance even in countries w ith a fixed exchange rate, it was much less so than 
in countries with flexible framew orks.
Alogoskoufis et al. (1992) and Hadri et al. (1998) claim, based on empirical studies, 
that while a  pegged exchange rale cannot substitute for an independent central bank 
when it comes to stopping governments from instituting a shoit-mii election boom, it 
is a partial substitute for central bank independence (CBI) in stopping governments 
from indulging their preferences in the long mn.
A more recent literature betra\ s an increasing awareness that central bank 
independence, tlie foreign exchange rate regime and so-called domestic taigets 
(money/inflation targets), particularly in a  small open economy, all interact together
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in constraining the discretion o f policy-makers and assuring their continuing 
commitment to low inflation. Despite approaching the issue from different 
perspectives, Cukierman (1994). Freytag (2001), Hayo and Hefeker (2001), Kuttner 
and Posen (2001) as well as Mishkin and Savastano (2001) all agree that in order to 
analyse the choices made by policy-makers with regard to monetaiy policy, an 
integrated analysis o f central bank independence and traditional intemiediate targets 
is necessaiy,
Hayo and Hefeker (2001) argue that “societies have to make two decisions about 
monetary policy. First, tliey decide on the importance being attached to fighting 
inflation as an important objecti \ c. Then the second decision has to be made on what 
is the best institutional arrangement to achieve the objective o f price stability, given 
the existing political, legal and economic framework”, (p. 22)
Cukiemian (1994), Freytag (2001) and Hayo and Hefeker (2001), based on research 
focusing on central bank autonom y  conclude tliat while delegation o f  authority to an 
independent central bank, together with an unequivocal mandate to focus on price 
stability, is an important institutional device for committing monetary policy, 
alternatives, such as inflation targets, fixed exchange rates and inflation contracts 
exist. In otlier words, an independent central bank is neither a necessary, nor a 
sufficient instrument for low inflation. (Hayo and Hefeker, 2001)
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Mishkin and Savastano (2001) start from an analysis o f exchange rate regimes in 
emerging market economies, but come to a similar conclusion that the debate over 
monetary policy regimes in emerging market countries should not be about 
flexibility o f  the exchange rale, but about what is tlie best way to constrain 
discretion over monetaiy p o lic \. Even though an increasing though small number o f 
monetaiy^ economists pose this question, few have attempted to answer it explicitly 
and empirically.
Kuttner and Posen (2001). based on their empirical study, state that domestically 
based monetary constraints like inflation targeting or central bank independence 
confer nearly the same benefits as an intemiediate exchange rate regime, but without 
large discrete depreciations. The>’ conclude that a “combination o f inflation 
targeting plus exchange rate float (and central bank autonomy) would appear to be 
a f ill  substitute for a hard exchange rate conimitiiient in tenus o f inflation level and 
exchange rate depreciation with an improvement in both exchange rate volatility and 
inflation persistence”, (pp. 3-4)
Based on a  review of the situation in Latin American countries, Mishkin and 
Savastano (2001) conclude that "there are some emerging market countries which 
may not have the political and other institutions to constrain monetary policy if  it is 
allowed some discretion. In these countries there is a strong argument for hard pegs, 
including full dollarisation, which allow little or no discretion to the monetaiy 
authorities. On the other hand, there are many emerging maiicet countries that seem
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to have the ability to constrain discretion, witii Chile being tlie clearest example, and 
for tliese cases we believe that inflation targeting is likely to produce a  monetary 
policy which keeps inflation low and yet appropriately copes with domestic and 
foreign shocks” , (pp. 45-7) On the other hand, Eichengreen and Hausniann (1999) 
are skeptical about the ability o f developing countries to develop institutions which 
would promote good monetaiy policy and prefer a currency board or full 
dollarisation.
1.2 M onetary  policy objectives and fram ew orks
This section will briefly review the literature defining key tenus used in discussion 
o f  the topic such as final targets o f monetaiy policy, intemiediate and operational 
targets and nominal anchor. The section is predicated on tlie emerging consensus in 
macroeconomic policy identified by Allsopp and Vines (2000), which points to two 
nonnative lynchpiiis o f  monetaiy policy -  clear and unequivocal commitment to the 
medium-temi control o f inflation and a  view that the commitment should be 
honoured at minimum cost in terms o f fluctuations in output and inflation, (Allsopp 
and Vines, 2000, pp. 27-8) Similarly, Ball (1997) defines an efficient mle for 
monetaiy policy as one that minimises an appropriately weighted sum o f  output 
variance and inflation variance, w ith the weights decided by the political process.
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Tlie tentative consensus is based on two assumptions. The first, which has become 
nearly universally shared during the last 25 years, is that while expansionary 
monetary policy cannot expand output in tlie long-mn, it is very likely to decrease it. 
A relaxed and expaiisioiiaiy monetaiy policy does not induce long-term growth 
(Friedman, 1968). On the contraiy, there is a solid body o f  evidence that high 
inflation caused by a relaxed monetaiy policy damages economic growth. Barro 
(1995) and Ghosh and Phillips (1998) come to a conclusion tliat tlie negative 
relationship between inflation and growth is statistically significant at all but the 
lowest levels. Sinclair (2000) and Brault (1995) conclude that the result is not as 
clear-cut, but conclude that even though faster inflation can botli increase or 
decrease the rate o f growth, the balance o f arguments points strongly to a  negative 
effect (Sinclair, 2000); well-run economies tend to exliibit both low inflation and 
high growth. (Briault, 1995)
King (2002) summarises principal costs o f botli anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation. Even an anticipated increase in prices causes front-end loading o f debt 
burdens and distortions to cash balances, decreases savings due to incomplete 
indexation o f the tax system and involves costs of changing price lists. 
Unanticipated inflation, in addition to all these problems, increases aversion to long­
term contracts, induces devotion o f excessive resources to hedging inflation risks 
and is accompanied by distortions to production and investment resulting from 
mistakes in distinguishing betw een relative and absolute price changes, as well as by 
redistribution o f wealtli between debtors and creditors.
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Tlie economic case is supported by political-economic arguments and self- 
reinforcing expectations. Because o f an increasing belief that a  stable currency, i.e. a 
currency with low inflation, is the best contribution that a central banker can make 
to long-temi prosperity, central banks have been gradually abandoning targets otlier 
tlian monetary ones and this has been reflected in their statutes -  particularly in the 
nm-up to the creation o f EMU in Europe. Also, as Scheve (2001) documents, public 
opinion is highly concerned with inflation even in low-inflation countries and the 
concern increases sharply as actual inflation grows. O’Flalierty (1990) argues that if  
someone is hired to mend the plumbing and instead balces a  cake, she would not be 
hired again regardless o f whether the employer desired, after hiring the plumber, that 
he had acquired the services o f a cook. Therefore, price stability as the principal goal 
o f  central banks reinforces the anti-inflationary role o f central banks even in 
situations when the electorate might ex post have different short-run inflation-output 
preferences than before.
A price stability target does not represent an effort to achieve zero measured 
inflation. In developed economics, price stability is typically understood to mean 
price increases at about 1-2% per year. (Begg, Halpem and Wyplosz, 1999) Hie 
measured and published inflation rate usually overestimates actual price growfti. 
Altliough there are no relevant studies available in the transition economies, research 
shows that in certain cases the actual rate o f inflation overestimates reality by as 
much as 5% (Skreb, 1998). Price stability/ can be inteipreted in various ways;
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nevertheless, all these Inteiprelations are concerned not only with consumer prices, 
but also with the prices o f industrial producers and asset prices. The exchange rate 
(which expresses the price o f one type o f asset -  foreign exchange) is thereby 
connected, too. In practice, price stability is usually seen as the stability o f consumer 
prices. It is an index tliat reflects the type o f inflation which is strongly felt by 
consumers/citizens/the electorate. Producer prices and the exchange rate are 
ultimately reflected in consumer prices.
This nomiative view o f price stability as the final target o f monetary policy can, in 
practice, be replaced by any positive inflation target set by policy-makers, while still 
resting on tlie assiuiiption that induencing the price level is the only thing a central 
bank can and should do in the medium- to long-run.
The second assiuiiption underpinning the emerging consensus identified by Allsopp 
and Vines (2000) is that monetaiy policy can and should have a short-run 
stabilisation role. Medium-term commitment to price stability certainly does not 
exclude a short-run objective o f minimising the variance o f output.
In order to successfully achiex e the ultimate target o f price stability or a  given 
inflation target, all policy-makers face several challenges related to controllability 
and credibility. The relationship between instmments o f monetary policy (usually 
a short-teim interest rate) and inflation outcomes is tenuous and fraught witli lags 
and imcertainties. At the same time, inflation expectations o f economic agents and
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their beliefs about tlie development o f nominal variables have a  powerful role in 
detemiining the success o f monetary policy in achieving the final tai'get.
Therefore, monetaiy policy-makers often have, in addition to a final target o f  
inflation, an intemiediate target - an economic variable, which is closely related to 
the ultimate goal, but can be at the same time relatively well influenced by the 
instmments o f monetaiy policy.
Monetary policy also tends to rely on a nominal anchor - an economic variable 
capable o f stabilising the expectations o f economic agents with respect to fiiture 
inflation. (Bozo, 2000) A nominal anchor can coordinate the anti-inflationary forces 
ill society around a specific numerical value, making it easier for the central bank to 
build credibility. (Wagner, 2000) Mishkin (1999) ai'gues tliat a nominal anchor is 
needed because it both provides conditions tliat make the price level uniquely 
detemiined and sei*ves as a constraint on discretionary policy tliat helps weaken tlie 
time-inconsistency problem.
It is generally the case that the variable chosen as the intermediate target o f 
monetary policy and the variable chosen as the nominal anchor are identical in a 
given monetaiy/ policy framcxvork and some authors seem to implicitly assume the 
equivalence. However, such equivalence is not inevitable though, in case o f 
separation, conflict can easih' arise between efforts to preseiwe/achieve nominal 
anchor and intemiediate targets. This is not a theoretical problem - as Fry et al.
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(2000) note, central banks announce, on average, targets for 1.5 variables. 
Additionally, some central banks focus policy on a variable for which they do not 
announce an explicit target and virtually all countries that classify tliemselves as 
money targeters also publish inflation targets, guidelines or reference values.
Until recently, monetaiy policx used two kinds o f intermediate targets/nominal 
anchors: exchange rate and monetaiy aggregates. Tlie fonner entails commitment to 
a  pre-specified/pre-announced path for tlie nominal exchange rate, which can take 
many fomis. The latter means coniniitnieiit to a pre-specified/pre-announced growth 
paüi o f  tlie chosen nionetaiy aggregate and adjustment o f monetary policy 
instruments to this effect.*
More recently, inflation targeting was added as the fourth option. Inflation targeting 
can be seen as dispensing with an intemiediate target (though not with a nominal 
anchor) altogether by announcing specific targets for inflation. Tliis, however, raises 
the question o f how policy-makers achieve the target given the difficulties o f 
controlling inflation outlined above. Tlie alternative view therefore states that even 
inflation targeting has an intermediate target in the form o f the inflation forecast 
produced by the central bank based on all the information available at any given 
moment. (Svensson, 1998)
 ^ Anotiier -  tliird -  possible appioach is targeting nominal income. It has been discussed in the 
literature (e.g. Bean, 1983; Britlnn, 1981 and Meade, 1978), but it has not been implemented in 
practice.
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Finally, monetaiy policy generally also has a formally defined operating target -  
a variable that has “a  direct relationship with the available instmments o f the central 
banlc, so monetaiy policy steps are immediately reflected in the values o f the 
operating target variables” . (Bozo, 2000, pp. 56-7) In industrial countries, the 
operating target has almost unix orsally been narrowed down to a short-tenn interest 
rate. In tlie emerging market economies, the shift towards interest rate targeting has 
been less widespread and many countries continue to target bank reserves or the 
somewhat broader concept o f  the monetary/ base. (Van’t Dack, 1999)
1.3 C entral bank  independence -  literatur e review
L 3 ,l  Sources and consirainis o f  central bank independence
There is an extensive literature on the effectiveness o f central bank independence to 
which we are going to turn shortlx. An issue that has received less attention and with 
which the review starts is the question; what are the sources and constraints o f 
central bank independence? Whx are central banks independent in some countries 
and not in others? As Goodman (1991) and McCallum (1995) explain, independence 
can be taken away by the same body that granted it, be it government or parliament. 
Can central banks tliat are axx arc o f this limitation really be considered independent? 
Can these two questions be conceptually separated?
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Overall, most o f  tlie literature takes the view tliat the establishment and maintenance 
o f  independent central banks arc driven by similar pressures. Hypotheses on 
detemiinants o f central bank independence usually focus on the need for wider 
social and political support for low inflation. Granting independence makes a 
difference since there is usually a political cost o f  reversal. (Goodman, 1991)
Cukierman and Webb (1995) state that if  “parties alternating in power share a 
consensus on many basic tenets o f economic policy, tiien the parties might agree to 
grant the central bank considerable autonomy to pursue price stability so that the 
aspect o f economic policy on which they agree would not suffer from political 
contests over other issues” , (p. 399) Bagheri and Habibi (1998) confimi tliat party 
political instability leads to a higher level o f CBI.
Cobham et al. (1999) show/ for three EU countries that even if  fomial independence 
is limited, infomial independence o f tlie central bank can be high if  tiiere is a general 
acceptance o f monetaiy/ policy as the business o f the central bank and its expertise in 
this respect as well as widespread social consensus about objectives and instruments 
o f macroeconomic policy.
Hayo (1998) hypothesises that independence o f central banks can be related to 
public attitudes toxvards inflation via a “historical feedback process that has led to an 
anti-inflation culture and public consensus on monetary stability in countries w/ith 
low inflation rates” . He finds empirical support for tlie existence o f  a  stability
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culture in low-inflation countries and higher electoral sensitivity to an increase in 
tlie actual inflation rate in such countries.
Posen (1995), Maxfield (1997) and McNamara (2002) argue that central bank 
independence is a reflection o f the streiigtli and preferences o f  a more narrowly 
defined financial conimunitx. Posen (1995) claims that CBI levels reflect national 
differences in effective financial opposition to inflation and based on data from 
developed countries rejects the assumption that the pattern o f CBI seen prior to 1989 
was random: “both CBI and a coalition in society committed to protecting that 
independence are necessaiy to achieve the low inflation” , (p. 271) However, De 
Haan and V an’t  Hag (1995) show that the results hold only if  CBI indices developed 
by Cukierman (1992) are used.
Maxfield (1997) hypothesises that politicians use central bank independence to 
signal creditwoithiness to foreign investors and counteipaits and McNamara (2002) 
presents a sociological argument that delegation is based on symbolic properties o f 
CBI -  “signalling agreement with a broader series o f economic management 
principles and conveying credibility to external audiences about the economic and 
political character o f  a government” , (p. 67) This view is shared by Cukierman et al.
(2001) as a reason for the high level o f  CBI granted by transition countries to tlieir 
monetary policy-makers.
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At tlie other end o f the spectriinn but surprisingly in a  similar vein, Hetzel (1990) 
argues that the degree o f central bank independence depends on the country’s 
commitment to a  free market economy based on voluntaiy exchange coordinated by 
the price system, open competition for control over resources and a  stable set o f 
property rights. An independent central bank is, in this view/, a bulwark o f the 
market economy and limited government involvement.
The literature thus generally sets an identical analytical framework for granting as 
well as maintaining central bank independence. A small body o f research, however, 
distinguishes, at least implicitlx. between conditions necessary for the establishment 
and for the maintenance o f CBI b> emphasising the role o f checks and balances.
Moser (1999) finds that CBI is correlated to the strength o f checks and balances in 
the political system, specifically that the legal independence o f central banks is 
significantly higher in those OECD countries with checks and balances and that 
these central banks are also bchaviourally more independent as documented by the 
stronger negative conelation in these countries between legal CBI and inflation. 
Keefer and Stasavage (1999) concur that central banks are associated wiüi better 
inflation outcomes in the presence o f checks and balances and find that the turnover 
o f  governors is reduced when tenure is protected by checks and balances.
An interesting catch is the possibility o f a reverse influence from central banking on 
politics, which is going to receive some attention in tlie thesis. Research on tlie topic
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has been meagre, with Sieg (1997) presenting a model showing how central banks 
may create political cycles to suit their partisan preferences and Vaubel (1997) 
finding econometric evidence that the Bundesbank tries to improve the electoral 
prospects o f the government if the government commands a partisan majority in the 
central bank council and it tries to prevent the government from being reelected if 
tlie opposition parties have a partisan majority in the central bank council.
1.3,2 Central bank independence does it matter and why?
The theoretical case for an independent central bank is usually based on seminal 
papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Backus and 
Driffill (1983) and Rogoff (1985). Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) pointed out that a welfare-maximising policy-maker would be 
tempted to inflate unexpected 1\ . after inflation expectations and wages have been 
set, to achieve higher growth and employment -  the so-called time-inconsistency 
problem. Economic agents with rational expectations, being awaie o f this 
temptation, would factor it into their inflation expectations, leading to an inflation 
bias witliout higher employment or growth.
Barro and Gordon (1983), Backus and Driffil (1983) and Rogoff (1985) showed how 
such a problem might be resolved by adhering to a strict policy rule, reputation- 
building or delegating policy to an independent central banker wiüi more 
conservative (inflation-averse) preferences than the median voter. However, the
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policy-rule and reputation-building approaches are subject to time-inconsistency 
problems as the temptation to renege on them raises identical issues. Therefore, 
delegation to an independent central bank remained as the dominant theoretical 
paradigm for solving the time-inconsistency problem.
However, this view has been subject to serious criticism on two fronts. McCallum 
(1995) argued that inflation bias is not inevitable: “All that is needed for avoidance 
o f the inflation bias is for the central bank to recognise the fiitility o f continually 
exploiting expectations that arc given this month while planning not to do so in the 
fliture and to recognise tliat its objectives would be more flilly achieved on average 
if  it were to abstain from attempts to exploit tliese temporarily given expectations”, 
(p. 208-9) Goodhart and Huang ( 1998) cast doubt on the intellectual framework for 
time-inconsistency arguments by pointing out that in many economies, frequency o f 
wage-setting and the transmission lag for policy are such as to allow tlie setting o f 
wages after inflation has been determined rather than the other way around.
However, acknowledgement o f validity o f  these counterpoints does not mean that 
the theoretical case for central bank independence is invalid. Bean (1998) provides 
an alternative view o f how inflation bias emerges and how it can be resolved. In his 
view, governments are inclined to push output above the natural rate because the 
electorate expects them to deliver a high level o f output through tlie whole range o f 
their policies, with the level of economic activity becoming a signal o f government 
competence. As the rate o f potential output growth and tlie natural rate o f
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unemployment is not known with any certainty, it is not surprising that governments 
are frequently willing to risk a more expansionary monetaiy policy tlian is really 
prudent. Policy-malcers can argue that such a policy is not likely to be inflationary, 
but is rather consistent with their successfiil efforts to raise tlie output potential o f 
tlie economy. Through delegation to a genuinely independent central bank, this 
problem disappears. Bean show s both an alternative mechanism o f  how inflation 
bias is generated and how an autonomous central bank can resolve it.
A similar view is espoused by Forder (1998b), who argues that inflation bias can be 
generated by a “combination o f policy-makers with short time horizons and 
economic agents with backward looking expectations formation” , (p. 330) In tliat 
case, central bank independence can provide a  benefit if it reduces the policy 
maker’s discount rate.
Beginning in the late 1970s, but particularly since the end o f the 1980s, a plethora o f 
empirical studies have attempted to determine whether central bank independence 
has a measurable impact on inflation. In order to test hypotheses about central bank 
independence, it is necessary to quantify central bank independence in individual 
countries and then compare it w ith various macroeconomic variables.
Quaritrfr cation o f central bank independence has usually been based on two pillars:
® reliance on analysis o f central bank statutes, i.e. on legal detemiinants o f 
central bank independence
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# use o f  statutes to construct an index o f central bank independence with 
multiple criteria and weights determined by the autliors
Parkin and Bade (1978), Gril I i et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992) and Alesina and 
Summers (1993) are generally seen as the seminal studies, all confimiing that central 
bank independence is negatively correlated with inflation, but not with output. Tlie 
most important findings conceniing tlie relationship between central bank 
independence and inflation were confinned for a variety o f country samples by 
Banaian et al. (1995), Bru mm (2000), De Haan and Kooi (2000), Eijffinger et al. 
(1997), Eijffinger et al. (1998), Franzese (1999a, 1999b), Froyen and Waud (1995), 
Hall and Franzese (1998), Jonsson (1995) and Kilponen (1999).
Tlie literature differs significantly on xvhat actually constitutes the element o f central 
bank independence that is associated with lower inflation. In the most complex 
indices -  Cukiennan (1992) or Grilli et al. (1991) -  tliere is a multiplicity o f 
questions concerning appointment and recall procedures o f central bank officials, 
setting o f monetary policy targets and lending conditions enjoyed by governments 
when borrowing from a central bank. On the other end o f tlie spectrum, Banaian et 
al. (1995) use a simple independence dummy based on absence o f government 
override for monetaiy policy decisions and find tliat it is significant in inflation 
equations when controlling for other variables.
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De Haan and Kooi (1997) disaggregate traditional central bank indices into two 
elements -  conservativeness (av ersion to inflation) and independence (autonomy to 
use instruments to achieve given ends). Using data for OECD countries over the 
periods 1972-89, they show that instrument independence matters while 
conservativeness does not, a conclusion shared by Kilponen (1999), but disputed by 
Iversen (1998a, 1998b) who finds that it is consei*vativeness tliat decreases inflation.
Tlie re is a strand in tlie literature asserting that the empirical relationship between 
inflation and central bank independence exists, but is weak or barely significant -  
e.g. Dolmas et al. (2000), Fujiki (1996), or Walsh (1997). Alternatively, central bank 
independence is shown to be negatively associated with inflation, but only under 
certain circiuiistances - during disinflation (Jordan, 1997) or if periods o f high 
inflations are included in the sample. (Sturm and De Haan, 2000) In a similar vein, 
Cukiennan (1994) argues that CBI works mostly as a  safeguard against the onset o f 
high inflation, but is less important as a remedial device. Kaltenhalter and Anderson 
(2000) claim that the importance o f CBI for inflation diminished significantly during 
the 1980s and hypothesise that the reason is that, in the 1980s, fighting inflation 
became a political priority for governments and independence o f  central banks 
became much less relevant.
The empirical literature propounding the importance o f central bank independence 
for inflation peifomiance has provoked a large body o f comprehensive criticism. 
H ie criticism focuses on three areas. First o f all, critics o f the central bank
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independence literature allege that existing indices and indicators do not measure 
actual independence, which cannot be deduced from central bank statutes, and 
illustrate the point by various examples from the real world. (Forder, 1996) Walsh 
(1993) points out that if  the implicit basis for the assessment o f tlie quality o f central 
bank independence indices is w hether they show association with inflation, they can 
hardly be said to prove the link with inflation. Cobham et al. (1999), while 
emphasising the importance o f central bank independence for monetary policy, show 
that legal independence in developed countries provides limits, wnthiii which 
infomial independence can both \ aiy widely and be extremely important.
Berger et al. (2001) answer the criticism by pointing out that legal CBI indices serve 
as proxies for actual independence, but they acknowdedge tlieir noisiness in this 
respect. Nonetheless, they claim that an exhaustive sui*vey o f research shows that 
such indices are quite robust in OECD countries. Cukiemian (1994) malces a subtly 
different point when he states that legal independence is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for actual independence.
Uncertainty about the robustness o f  legal indices led to attempts to evaluate central 
bank independence not by analx sis o f  law, but by measuring turnover o f governors 
based on tlie assumption tliat more stability indicates higher independence. H ie 
tumover o f govemors as measured by Cukiennan (1992) is significantly and 
positively related to inflation in developing countries while legal indices are not,
44
leading to a hypothesis that where the rule o f law is weaker, legal indices largely 
lose their meaning.
Tlie second type o f criticism concentrates on the actual methodology used in tlie 
construction o f individual indices and on points assigned to individual countries. 
Mangano (1998), based on a detailed analysis o f  indices constructed by Grilli et al.
(1991) and Cukiennan (1992). shows that the authors diverged on 30% o f the 
legislation consulted to construct the indices, rising to 50% in some countries. They 
also disagreed on what criteria to include, sharing only nine out o f  15-16 criteria 
used in the two indices. He also finds that if  ranking is used instead o f quantitative 
values, die statistical relationship between CBI and macroeconomic variables 
becomes largely insignificant. However Berger et al. (2001) claim that the 
methodology used by Mangano in nonnalisation is controversial and not 
straightforward.
Forder (1998a) claims that if the factual mistakes in Parkin and Bade (1978), 
Alesina (1989) and Emerson ct al. (1992) are corrected, tlie relationship between 
central bank independence and inflation largely disappears. Cargill (1995) comes to 
tlie same conclusion, though he claims only tliat the link between CBI and inflation 
becomes much weaker if  major flaws in measurement concerning certain countries 
are corrected.
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The third group o f doubts concerning the measurement o f the relationship between 
central bank independence and inflation is based on empirical studies disproving the 
existence o f the relationship. Canipillo and Miron (1997) claim that their results 
prove conclusively that CBI is not a substantial causal factor in inflation 
perfomiance and that institutional arrangements do not by themselves seem to be o f 
much help in achieving low inflation. Akhand (1998) and Banaian et al. (1998) find 
the relationship between independence and inflation fragile and largely inconclusive. 
Comwall and Cornwall (1998) and Führer (1997) go even further, demonstrating 
that central bank independence is insignificant for inflation, but has negative 
consequences for growth and unemployment.
A similar though subtly different point is made by Posen (1998) who claims there is 
no evidence to support the hypothesis that “the mechanism by which central bank 
independence leads to low inflation is the enhancement o f credibility o f 
commitments to price stability... Disinflations cost more, rather than less, and tal<e 
just as long in countries with relatively high central bank independence”, (pp. 355-6) 
Tlie finding is confinned partially by Jordan (1997) who concludes that CBI is 
significant during disinflation, but involves higher sacrifice ratios. Froyen and Waud
(1995) argue to the contraiy -  according to their findings, CBI generally improves 
the Phillips curve for developed countries.
Tlie most significant and most frequently discussed determinant o f  effectiveness o f 
central bank policy is fiscal policy. Tliere is a  widespread agreement tliat, following
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the logic o f the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic o f Sargent and Wallace (1981), 
even an independent central bank can be overwhelmed by a sufficiently excessive 
fiscal policy into monetisation of budgetaiy deficits. The issue o f  the relationship 
between central bank independence, fiscal policy and inflation is not clear-cut for 
less extreme situations -  both theoretically and empirically -  and raises issues o f 
causality and mutual influence.
In a  simplified model, two regimes can be discerned: fiscal dominance and monetary 
dominance, depending on whether monetary/ policy can detennine the price level by 
its decisions or not. (Caiizoneri and Diba, 1996) Competition for dominance can 
lead to strategic behavior by monetary/ and fiscal authorities to test the other one, 
resulting in suboptimal outcomes. (Alesina, 1988, 1989) This Tiigh-stake game of 
chicken’ (Forder, 1998a) can be \c iy  dramatic indeed.
Barnhart and DaiTat (1988), Brown and Yousefi (1996), Giamiaros and Kolluri 
(1985), Karras (1994) and Protopapadakis and Siegel (1987) find no or little 
evidence o f monetisation o f budget deficits, while Burdekin and Laney (1988), 
Burdekin and Wohar (1990). De Haan and Zelhorst (1990), Demopoulos et al. 
(1987) and Dombusch and Fischer (1981) find that fiscal deficits do indeed tend to 
be monetised.
Regarding the influence o f central bank independence on monetary expansion, 
research by De Haan and Sturm (1992), Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al
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(1992) indicates that CBI is negatively correlated either witli the budget deficit or 
central bank cred it/ On the other hand, Fiy (1998), Grilli et al. (1991), Masciandaro 
and Tabellini (1988) and Sikken and de Haan (1998) do not find significant 
relationships between these variables.
There is an apparent consensus that central bank independence attenuates the 
political business cycle and tends to reduce partisan effects on tlie economy^ -  see, 
for example, Alesina et al. (1992), Alesina et al. (1993), Alesina and Roubini (1993), 
Clark et al. (1998) and Hadri ct al. (1998).
The importance o f fiscal policy for inflation and effective central bank independence 
is magnified in developing and transition economies. Fiy (1998) goes so far as to 
argue tliat in tliese countries, central bank independence is determined by both the 
size o f the fiscal deficit and the methods by which it is financed.
Mas (1994, pp. 11-18) describes the potential channels o f influence:
“consider a case of a govenuncnl sustaining large fiscal deficits which the ICB [independent 
central bank] is reluctant to monetise. In an LDC with shallow capital maikets and limited 
access to foreign savings, substantial domestic debt financing o f  deficits might induce 
inordinately high real interest rates and crowd out credit to tlie private sector. By claiming 
tliat these are monetaiy problems, tlie government might be able to shift political
 ^Central bank credit is a better measure of tlie fiscal deficit and its monetisation in many developing 
countries, where quasi fiscal liabilities often dwarf tlie official fiscal deficit and tlie budget imbalance 
is a key driver o f money creation.
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responsibility for its fiscal actions to tlie ICB... tlie limiting case is where tlie size of tlie 
financial sector is so small relative to budget deficits tliat the central bank has no choice but 
to monetise deficits... if fiscal dominance applies, tlie anti-inflation stance o f the ICB will 
not be credible and institutional CBI does not translate into independence o f monetary 
policy... ICB will not generate any credibility in economic policies if  tlie country faces 
fiscal dominance, the banking sector is in a precarious financial condition or if  tliere are no 
clear iiiechaiiisms to resolve conflicts between monetary and fiscal policies”.
In other words, developing countries are subject to the same problems as developed 
coimtries, but to a much higher degree.
The importance o f actual fiscal policy for effective central bank independence is 
furtlier confirmed by Cukierman's (1994) observation that compliance with legal 
limitations on lending indicates that it is generally poor in developing and transition 
economies, so tliat even formal legal commitment by government is not enough in 
the absence o f commensurate budgetary action.
Fiscal policy is not the only factor interacting with central bank independence and 
inflation, even though it is the one tliat is most frequently discussed. The structure o f 
labour markets has received grow ing attention in late 1990s tliough with diverging 
results. Franzese (1999a, 1999b) and Hall and Franzese (1998) claim that central 
bank independence is significantly related to inflation on average, but the magnitude 
o f  importance in a given countiy depends on the level o f central wage bargaining. 
Cukiemian and Lippi (1999) also find a  hump-shaped relationship between central
‘ Partisan effects refer to different maci'oecouomic effects o f left-wing and right-wing governments.
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bank independence and centralised wage bargaining. Jenkins (1996) finds that 
“nations with the highest inflation rates tended to be the least corporatist economies 
and nations with the best inflation performance tended to have the most corporatist 
economies” , (pp. 262-3)
Tire relationship between central bank independence, inflation and responsibility for 
banlcing supervision remains under-researched. Cukiemian (1994) mentions in 
passing tliat “when deposit insurance and other prudential functions are allocated to 
the central bank, large-scale bank failures risk being monetised more easily than 
when those functions are performed outside the central bank” (p. 1445) and Jenkins
(1996) supports this conjecture by findings that countries where central banks 
carried the heavy regulaton' burden o f the banking industiy have had the worst 
inflation records. On the other hand, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) argue that 
even though a fonnal separation o f fimction o f monetaiy policy and banking 
supervision can be justified because taxpayers’ flmds are generally used in bank 
rescues, tliey are doubtful whether central banks can be effectively disentangled 
from the financial system due to their lender o f  last resort functions and tlieir 
concern for tlie systemic stability of the financial system. Indeed, it is “possible to 
argue that where such conflicts really become important (...) , tliey have to be 
internalised within a single authority to obtain an efficient solution” , (p. 547)
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1.3.2 Central bank independence in transition
Studies focusing on central bank independence and its effects on monetary policy 
emerged surprisingly soon after the actual transition began, given that new central 
bank laws were passed even in the most advanced Central European countries only 
in 1991 and 1992. As Pospisil (1997) argues, there is no point in analysing pre-1989 
laws as these were communist law s for a communist economy, generally based on a 
monobank system,
Silclos (1994) and Eijffinger and Van Keulen (1995) present early studies on the role 
o f newly created central banks in an emerging market economy o f  transition 
coimtries, followed later by Knight (1997), Loungani and Sheets (1997), Pospisil
(1997), Radzyner and Riesingcr (1997) and Abel et al. (1998). Lybek (1999), 
Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000). Maliszewski (2000) and Cukiennan et al. (2001) 
complete the first decade o f transition studies on central bank independence with 
more sophisticated and extensive analyses o f the topic.
Knight (1997), Pospisil (1997) and Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) are purely 
descriptive witliout attempts to quantify central bank independence in the sample o f 
countries or to estimate effects o f CBI on inflation. The papers focus, respectively, 
on countries o f the former Soviet Union, the Czech Republic and five Central 
European countries. Nonetheless, they present an interesting source o f tliinking on
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‘softer’ aspects o f  central bank independence, particularly on political interplays 
between central bank leadership and governments.
Silclos (1994) - slightly modified in Abel et al. (1998) - and Dvorsky (2000) got 
furtlier in quantifying central bank independence, relying on existing indices with 
some modifications to reflect what the authors perceived as the idiosyncrasies o f 
coimtries in transition. Silclos ( 1994) bases his analysis o f four countries o f Central 
Europe (Czech Republic, Hungaiy, Poland and Slovakia) on a modified index by 
Cukiemian (1992). Instead o f testing for the relationship between CBI and inflation, 
he studies the relationship between the monetaiy policy reaction function and CBI, 
finding a fragile relationship. In Abel et al. (1998), the previous research is 
extended to Bulgaria.
Dvorsky (2000) focuses on a detailed assessment o f central bank independence in 
five Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungaiy, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia), estimating both Cukiemian (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991) indices and 
then verbally analysing their impact on inflation developments. Her assessment is 
wrong ill at least in one respect, by claiming tliat banking supervision in Czech 
Republic and Slovalcia is not a sole responsibility o f  the central bank. She also has 
explicit disagreements with Maliszewski (2000), another ambitious and detailed 
assessment. Tlie indices as compiled by Dvorsky are shown in table 1.1
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T able 1,1; Legal CBI in the C EEC  -  5 M easured by the C ukierm an Index
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
1 .Chief executive 
officer (CEO) 
tenu o f office 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
appoiiitaent procedure 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50
conditions o f dismissal 0.83 (k83 0.83 (183 1.0
incompatibility clause 1.0 0.50 1.0 1.0 0
2, Policy fonnulation 
■(PF)
policy autonomy 1.0 1,0 1.0 1.0 1.0
conflict resolution 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
involvement in budget 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
3. Central bank 
objectives (OBJ) 
statutory objective 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6
4. Limitations on 
lending (LL) 
limits on advances n.a 0.66 1.0 n.a 0.66
limits on securities 0.66 1.0 1.0 0.66 n.a
limits on decision 1.0 0.66 n.a 1.0 0.66
limits on borrowers 0,66 1.0 n.a 0.66 0.66
type o f limits on credit 0.33 0.33 n.a 0.33 0.33
limits on maturity 1.0 1.0 n.a 1.0 0.66
limits on interest rate 0.25 0.75 n.a 0.25 0.25
limits on primary mkt. 0 1.0 n.a 0 0
Index 1 (LVAU, 
unweighted) 0.6907 0.7841 0.9140 0.6818 0.6004
Index 2 (LVAW, 
weighted) 0.7000 0.7485 0.8987 0.6853 0.6044
Siklos(1994) 0.56 0.39 0.46 0.33 n.a
Cukiennan et al. 
2001 (LVAW) 0.69 0.67 0.46 0.62 0.6
Source: Dvorsky (2000)
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Table 1.2: Legal CBI in the C EEC  -  5 M easured by the G M T Index for 
T ransition  Economies
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
Political Independence
Governor
G l ** * NtK! *4 **
G2 $ * * *
Board
B3 $ * 6 *
B4 * * *
B5^ » * * *
Relationship witli govennneiit * * *
R6 * * * * *
R7 * »
Constitution
C8 * $ * * «
09
Index P.L 9 7 9 6 8
Economic Independence
Direct credit to tlie govennneiit
D1 * * * *
D2’ * *
D3 * * * *
D4 » * * * *
D5 * *
M onetaiy Instruments
M6 =■- * * * $
M7 *
Index E.I. 4 8 7 5 4
Overall Index O.I. 13 15 16 11 12
O.I. Maliszewski (1997) 14 9 12 12 12
Source: Dvorsky (2000)
Definitions:
Gl: governor not appointed by the go\’cnunent (*) and not appointed by the parliament only (**)
G2: governor appointed for more then five years
B3; no board member appointed by the government
B4: board appointed for more tlien five years
R6: no mandatory government representative on the board
R7: goveniment/parliamentary approval o f monetary policy is not required
C8: statutory responsibility to pursue monetary policy
C9; presence o f legal provision supporting the Bank in conflicts witlr tlie govermnent 
D1 : direct credit facility is not automatic
D2: direct credit facility is at tlie market interest rate (or at the basic CB rate)
D3: direct credit facility is tempoi aiy 
D4: direct credit facility is o f limited amount
Maliszewski assigns no asterisks to Slovakia on item G l.
 ^This is not a criterion originally used by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, so it is not used in 
furtlier analysis.
® In contrast to Maliszewski, no asterisks is assigned to Slovakia on item B4.
’ In contrast to Maliszewski, no asterisks is assigned to tlie Czech Republic and Slovakia on item D2.
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D5: tlie bank does not paiticipate in the |irimaiy market for public dept 
M6; tlie discount rate is set by the central bank
M7: supervision o f commercial banks is not entrusted to tlie central bank (**) or not entrusted to the 
central bank alone (*)
Dvorsky (2000) also follows Cukiemian (1992) by calculating the turnover o f 
governors as an alternative prox> o f CBI in countries where the mle o f law is weak, 
but shows that the results depend critically on the length o f period used and the 
interpretation o f individual appointments. She also asserts that inflation at the early 
stage o f reform was typicalh' fuelled by factors specific to the transition and often 
beyond the direct control o f the central bank and that the role o f  CBI in both early 
and advanced stages o f transition for central bank independence was rather limited.
Tlie third and most ambitious body o f  literature not only quantifies central bank 
independence in transition countries, but also tries to empirically test its influence on 
inflation. Eijffinger and Van Keulen (1995) analyse the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland witliin a sample o f 11 developed and transition countries, using several 
indices, including the one by Grilli et al (1991), shown in table 1.3 For the whole 
sample, the findings are rather ambiguous.
Table 1.3: GMT Index of political independence as measured by Eijffinger and
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Czech
Republic
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Hungary 1 1 1 3
Poland 1 Camiot 
be det.
1 1 3
Source: Eijffinger and Van Keulen ( 1995 )
Note:
1; governor not appointed by tiie government (*) and not appointed by tlie parliament only (**) 
2: governor appointed for more then five years
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3: no board member appointed by Ihc government
4: board appointed for more then five years
5: no mandatory govemment represenuuive on tlie board
6: govemment/parliamentary' approval o f monetary policy is not required
7: statutory responsibility to pursue monetaiy policy
8; presence o f  legal provision supporting the Bank in conflicts with the govermnent
Lybek (1999) creates a new iticlcx o f autonomy for central banks o f tlie former 
Soviet Union and calculates simple correlations for the period o f  the mid-1990s. 
Higher autonomy is correlated w ith low^er inflation and higher growth, but the paper 
sees the overall commitment to refonn as the reason behind both rather than 
assigning any specific role to central bank independence as such.
Loungani and Sheets (1997) also come up with their own index and test it on 12 
transition countries and find a negative correlation between legal CBI emerging 
between 1989 and 1992 and inflation in 1993 even after they control for fiscal 
policy, overall refonn efforts and turnover o f governors.
Maliszewski (2000) studies 20 transition countries using a modified Grilli et al. 
(1991) index. Despite differences with Dvorsky (2000) on several indications, he 
makes the same mistal<e o f  stating that Slovakia has banking supervision outside the 
centml bank. Tlie results are show n in table 1.4
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Table 1.4; Elements of political (PI) and economic (El) central bank 
independence as measured by Maliszewski (2000)
G G G B4 B5 R R C C D D D D D D M M
1 2 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Czech * * » * * * * * * * * *
Rep 92
Hungary
91
* * * * * * * * *
Hungary
97
* * * * * * * * * *
Poland 89 * * * * * $ *
Poland 92 * * * * $ * * * *
Poland 97 * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Slovak * * * * * $ * * * *
Rep 92
Source: Maliszewski (2000)
Notes:
Gl: Governor not appointed by llic government.
G2: Governor appointed for more than live years.
G3: Provisions for governor's dismissal non-political only.
B4: None o f tire board appointed by the govemment.
B5: Board appointed for more llian live years.
R6: No mandatory government represenialive in the board.
R7: Govemment approval of monetary policy is not required.
C8: Statutory responsibility to pursue monetary stability.
C9: Presence o f legal provision supporting bank in conflicts witlr the govemment.
DIO: Direct credit facility is not automatic.
D l l :  Direct credit facility is at the market interest rate.
D12; Direct credit facility is temporary.
D13: Direct credit facility is of limited amount.
D14: CENTRAL BANK does not participate in the primary market.
D15: All direct credit is securitised.
M16: Discount rate is set by the central bank.
M17: Supervision o f conunercial banks is not entrusted to tire central bank (**) or not entrusted to 
tire central bank alone (*).
Maliszewski (2000) finds that inflation in the year after enactment o f  a central bank 
law is negatively correlated to central bank independence, but that central bank 
independence is not a substitute for other elements o f stabilisation programs and 
exerts a downward pressure on inflation only at tlie high level o f  liberalisation after 
tlie initial price shock has been contained. Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000) look at 
the issue from a  slightly different perspective -  tlieir research confirms tlie
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importance o f central bank financing o f fiscal deficits for inflation and stability in 
transition countries.
Cukiemian et al. (2001) provide the most ambitious and sophisticated assessment o f 
effects o f central bank independence in countries o f transition based on their 
assessment o f legal and actual independence and their interaction with other factors 
contributing to inflation developments. They find tliat postcommunist economies 
created central banks with levels o f legal independence that are substantially higher, 
on average, tliaii those o f developed economies during the eighties. A weaker mle o f 
law as well as the unique circumstances o f  early transition probably negated much o f 
this legal accomplishment as (controlling for other variables) CBI was unrelated to 
inflation during the early phases o f liberalisation. However, once liberalisation is 
high and sustained and abstracting from wars and price liberalisation, Cukiennan et 
al. (2001) find tliat legal CBI and inflation are usually significantly and negatively 
related. Since the countries studied in the thesis are tlie ones witli rapid, high and 
sustained liberalisation, the paper implies, contrary to Dvorsky (2000), that CBI 
played an important role indeed in their inflation developments during transition.
1.3.4 Conclusions
Gartner (2000) warns against premature policy recommendations based on research 
into political macroeconomics -  in his view, the area is still under such a rapid 
development that there are no certain truths yet. Norietlieless, two recent surveys
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attempted to settle the issue o f central bank independence and its relationship with 
monetary policy and inflation. Berger et al. (2001) conclude that the negative 
relationship between central bank independence and inflation is quite robust, while 
Hayo and Hefeker (2001) argue that central bank independence is neither necessary/ 
nor sufficient for low inflation.
In terms o f necessity, it was already argued in the review o f the literature that there 
are other instruments to achieve low inflation and there is no reason to assume that 
even proponents o f CBI would disagree with that. In terms o f sufficiency, Hayo and 
Hefeker (2001) go on to argue the familiar case that CBI unsustainable without 
wider social and political support, which again seems to be shared by those who 
believe in the importance o f CBI. Overall, this view is not mutually exclusive with 
the view that central bank independence is robustly related to low inflation. There 
are other ways o f achieving low inflation, but central bank independence, embedded 
in a supportive socioeconomic enviroimient, is certainly one ofürem.
1.4 Experience with domestic targets of monetary policy
This section reviews the empirical evidence on the so-called domestic targets o f 
monetary policy (Kuttner and Posen, 2001) -  money and inflation targets. 
Implemented individually, together or in conjunction with other mechanisms o f 
constraining discretionary policy, money and inflation targets continue to be among
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the most important tools o f monetary policy despite the apparent worldwide shift 
from targeting money to direct!) targeting inflation.
Several notes o f caution arc in order though before reviewing tlie existing literature 
on the advantages, disadvantages and implementation o f various domestic targets, 
irst o f  all, as Muscatelli and Trccroci (2000) note, research on the relationship 
between actual observed reaction functions o f monetary policy and formal policy 
frameworks indicates that formal institutional reform is neither sufficient nor 
necessary to achieve change in the actual conduct o f policy. Tliis seems to be 
particularly valid for shifts and changes between money and inflation targeting, 
where Fry et al. (2000) argue that differences between money and inflation targeting 
do not necessarily reflect differences in a central bank reaction function since even 
money targeters usually defer to inflation considerations in face o f  velocity shocks. 
They note tliat central banks on average announce target for 1.5 variables and that 
virtually all countries that classify themselves as money targeters also publish 
inflation targets, guidelines or reference values. As Mishkin and Savastano (2001) 
write, inflation targeting is in the c \e  o f the beholder.
Secondly, even central banks focusing solely on domestic targets usually take into 
account the development o f asset prices including tlie foreign exchange rate. 
Wadhwani (2000) Cecchetti et at. (2001) argue that the central bank “is likely to 
achieve superior performance in inflation by adjusting instruments to asset prices as 
well... and policy-nialcers should watch for asset price misalignment... asset prices
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contain information about future inflation”, (pp. 2-3) Divorcing domestic and 
foreign targets is therefore difficult both in conceptual and practical terms.
1.4.1 Monetary targeting
Use o f monetary targeting by central banks attempting to achieve their final inflation 
targets is predicated on two assumptions:
® the relationship between growth o f  a chosen monetaiy aggregate and the 
growtli o f the price level is stable and/or predictable 
« monetary policy is able to control tlie development o f  the monetary target 
chosen as the intermediate target o f monetaiy policy
Until the 1970s, both theoiy and reality seemed to validate the two assumptions, 
explaining why monetary targeting was adopted by many industrial countries in the 
1970s after the Bretton-Woods s\ stem o f  fixed exchange rates broke down. The 
theoretical case rested on the modern quantity theory o f money, which assumed a 
stable money velocity, leading to a direct relationship between the growth of money 
and the growth o f nominal income. Consequently, controlling the growth o f money 
meant control o f the nominal income in the short mn and o f inflation in the medium 
run. (Goodhart et al., 1994) Provided real income developments could be predicted, 
the relationship between money and prices becomes proportional and predictable.
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Empirically, this seemed also to be the case. Since the central bank was seen as 
effectively controlling the monc> supply, controllability/ was a technical issue.
However, money targets were formally abandoned or lost their key position in 
decision-making during the 1980s because the promises they held out had not been 
flilfiled in any countiy. (Goodhart et al., 1994; Mishkin and Savastano, 2001; 
Oliver, 2001)Tlie relationship between money and prices proved to be highly 
unstable. De Grauwe and Polan (2001) in their analysis o f 160 coimtries over the 
last thirty years show that a strong positive relation between the long-run inflation 
and money growtli rate is due to the presence o f high (or hyper-) inflation countries 
in the sample. On the otlier hand, the relationship between inflation and money 
growth is weak for low inflation countries - defined as less than 10% per annum on 
average over tlie last 30 years.
Tlie issue o f controllability also proved to be much more problematic tlian originally 
thought -  the central bank can closely control narrow monetary aggregates, 
particularly MO (monetaiy base), but in practice only at a prohibitive cost in tenus o f 
extreme interest rate instabilily. which policy-makers were unwilling to accept. Even 
if  they had been willing to do so. the relationship between narrow aggregates and 
inflation is less certain tlian that for broader aggregates (M2 or M3).
For M2 or M3, capital niobilih and rapidly changing financial markets (new 
financial instruments, technolog). financial globalisation) caused unpredictable
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shifts in velocity. (Goodhart 1994: Coats, 2000) So arose a  combination o f uncertain 
effects on inflation and weak controllability (particularly for small open economies 
where capital flows are an important contribution to money creation, which camiot 
be fine tuned by small movements in the interest rate).
As Mizen (2000) points out. money targeting seems to be, more than other regimes, 
subject to Goodhart’s law -  an\ observed statistical relationship in monetaiy policy 
breaks down once that relationship is used as a transmission/targeting mechanism. 
Even in Gemiany, often perceived as the principal money targeter, the targets were 
not adhered to completeh’ and were achieved only about 50% o f the time (Oliver, 
2001). Despite Gemiany and Switzerland remaining officially money targeters at 
least until the start o f EMU in 1999, Bemaiike et al, (1999) claim that it would be 
more apt to describe them as proto-inflation targeters.
Generally, money targets can hardly be expected to serve as anchors for expectations 
o f  economic agents due to their apparent obscurity and technical complexity. As 
mentioned already, nearly all money targeters also announce some sort o f inflation 
target or reference value to alleviate the problem.
All o f the problems o f mone>’ targeting tend to be even more acute during transition 
and reduce its suitability as an intermediate target. (Coats, 2000) It might, tlierefore, 
seem surprising that a high number o f postcommunist economies, especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe, formally subscribed to money targeting for an extended
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period o f  time. However, a closer look reveals that money targets were often used 
together with exchange rate targets and, when in conflict, the foreign exchange rate 
target prevailed. This is true not only for countries tliat formally pegged tlieir 
currencies, but also for those with officially floating currencies and money-based 
stabilisation programs -  e.g. Slovenia. (Wagner, 2000) Tlie same experience is true 
for Latin America, where “no country has truly followed a monetary targeting 
strategy, and those that have tried or have been regarded as trying, have instead 
conducted a  highly discretionaiy monetaiy policy which is, o f  necessity, non­
transparent and has the potential o f breaking down at any point”. (Mishkin and 
Savastano, 2001, pp. 45-7)
1.4.2hiflation targeting
Inflation targeting dispenses with a fonnal iiitemiediate target and attempts to target 
inflation directly. The boundaiy between inflation targeting and other monetary 
policy frameworks (such as money targeting and discretionaiy policy with an 
implicit anchor) is highly uncertain and frequently in tlie eye o f  the beholder. 
(Mishkin and Savastano, 2001)
As outlined in Almeida and Goodhart (1998), inflation targeting in developed 
countries has usually been adopted under one o f the following two circumstances:
« collapse o f  a fixed exchange rate regime
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® after a period o f discretionaiy policy with unsatisfactory results.
After several developed economics -  e.g. Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Spain, Finland and Australia - adopted inflation targeting in the early to 
mid-1990s and early evaluations indicated tlie relative merits o f tlie new framework 
(see Brunila and Lahdenpera. 1995 and Leidemian and Svensson, 1995), it was 
rapidly instituted by many developing and transitional economies, which either 
voluntarily or under duress ga\ c up their fixed exchange rate. Among more recent 
inflation targeting converts arc Brazil, tlie Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mexico 
and Poland (e.g. Bogdanski et al.. 1999; Carsteiis and Werner, 1999, Leidemian and 
Bar-Or, 2000).
Green (1996), Benianke and Mishkin (1997) and Bemanke et al. (1999), assert that 
tlie switch to inflation targets should contain more tlian just a straightfoiward 
announcement o f the precommitment to achieving a given quantitative target for 
inflation. Even though the experiences o f  individual countries differ significantly, 
tlie introduction o f inflation targeting usually means:
® the announcement o f an explicit, quantitative target for inflation. Such a 
target specifies the price index, the target level, the tolerance interval, the 
time frame and situations under which the target might not be adhered to 
(Almeida and Goodhart. 1998; Leidemian and Svensson, 1995)
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® the absence o f other monetary policy targets or, at least, if  tliere is a conflict, 
the clear subordination o f other targets to (achieving) inflation aims (ibid.)
® an institutional commitment to price stability as die primary, long-temi goal 
o f  monetaiy policy and increased communication with the public about the 
plans and objectives o f policymakers (Bemanke and Mishkin, 1997, p. 97)
® increased transparency o f monetary/ policy (Benianke et al., 1999, pp. 297-8)
® increased discipline o f monetaiy policymakers and dieir accountability for 
achieving inflation objectives. (Bemanke et al., 1999, pp. 24-5, 296-7)
If  tiiese conditions are met, announced inflation targets can become credible nominal 
anchors and stabilise the inflation expectations o f agents. Tlie remaining problem is 
the missing iiitemiediate target and the ability o f policy-makers to achieve die direct 
inflation targets. Since the monetaiy policy lag is substantial and estimated to last 
usually between one and two \ cars, this is usually resolved by setting targets for the 
horizon which is believed to be most influenced by current policy decisions. 
Additionally, many countries produce fonnal inflation forecasts for this horizon and 
by changing policy instmnients to hit the target within the forecast framework 
effectively set the inflation forecast as an intermediate target.
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1.5 Foreign exchange ra te  regim e and exchange ra te  targeting
Monetaiy policy eveiywherc has to deal with the choice o f foreign exchange rate 
regime and its consequences for monetaiy/ policy as a whole. Foreign exchange rate 
developments are an important policy transmission channel for any country, but 
particularly so for small open economies. Since all tlie countries studied in the thesis 
are small and veiy open, the discussion o f the foreign exchange rate in this section, 
indeed in the whole diesis, will focus on small open economies unless explicitly 
stated otherwise.
Exchange rate targets are among several kinds o f iiitemiediate targets o f  monetaiy 
policy, entailing commitment to a pre-specified path for the nominal exchange rate, 
which can take many forms. E \cn though discussion o f exchange rates is often 
simplified to a fixed vs. flexible dichotomy (Caraniazza and Aziz, 1998), with fixed 
exchange rates associated with exchange rate targeting, Frankel (1999) points out 
that die actual range is much more diverse, containing at least nine official foreign 
exchange rate regimes;
® cunency union -  sharing currency with another country 
® currency board -  exchange rate fixed by law and domestic currency issued 
only to extent backed b\- foreign assets 
» tmly fixed exchange rate -  peg with an ostensibly pemianent parity 
® adjustable peg -  peg with a declared option to realign
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© crawling peg -  regular resetting o f exchange rate -  daily, weekly, monthly 
© basket peg -  exchange rate is fixed in terms o f a weighted basket o f 
cuirencies
© target zone or band -  pledge to inteivene when the exchange rate hits pre­
announced margins on either side o f a central parit}/
© managed float -  readiness to intervene witliout defending any particular 
parity
© free float -  no intervention in tlie foreign exchange market
W ith tlie exception o f the free float, all involve a degree o f exchange rate targeting 
though the currency union and currency board are much more than that, involving 
both formal and actual renuncia tion o f almost any monetary policy independence.
As Reinhart (2000), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), Bofinger and Wollmersliaeuser 
(2001) and Yeyati and Sturzcnegger (1999) recognise, official exchange rate 
regimes can be quite misleading as they often are in conflict with the actual 
observed behaviour o f central banks in exchange rate management. Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (1999), for example, define four regimes - flexible, dirty float, 
crawling peg and fixed - based on observed movements in exchange rate volatility,^ 
volatility o f exchange rate changes''’ and volatility o f resei*ves.^°
® Tlie average o f tlie absolute monthly percentage changes in tlie nominal exchange rate during the 
year.
® The standard deviation o f the monthly percentage changes in tlie exchange rate.
Hie average of (lie absolute monthly change in international reserves relative to the monetary base 
in the previous month.
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In small, open and/or developing economies, the foreign exchange rate channel has 
historically been one o f the most frequent and strongest monetary policy channels 
used in tlie control o f inflation. In a small open economy, the sustainable change in 
domestic prices o f tradables is. ceteris paribus, equivalent to the change in the 
foreign exchange rate and foreign inflation. This led some authors to declare tliat the 
foreign exchange rate polic)' is the monetary policy in small, open developing 
coimtries (e.g. WoiTell, 2000). especially since an oveivvhelniing number o f these 
coimtries have some sort o f  exchange-rate target, (see Fry/ et al., 2000)
In transition coimtries, the importance o f the foreign exchange rate channel o f 
monetary policy has been reinforced by tlie low reliability o f other channels. In most 
developing countries and particularly in transition countries, the banking system is 
often an unreliable transmission mechanism for monetary policy due to its strongly 
oligopolistic stmcture, insolvenc) or at least the heavy burden o f non-performing 
loans and other stmctural rigidities. Other asset markets (stock market, real estate, 
commodities) are underdeveloped and often uiiinipoitant. In such an environment, 
the foreign exchange rate channel is often not only more inipoitant, but also more 
direct and controllable than other channels o f monetaiy policy (Kaiiiin, Turner, and 
Van’tD ack, 1997).
Tlie nominal foreign exchange rate is also crucial for inflation expectations and as a 
potential nominal anchor. This is particularly true in economies with a high level o f
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foreign exposure in trade and investment flows, a histoiy o f political and/or 
economic upheaval or low credibility/ o f domestic economic policy in general. 
However, it is not only the nominal exchange rate which matters for inflation. As 
Fischer (2001) points out “there is almost certainly a short-run trade-off between the 
real exchange rate and inflation” , (p. 12)
At the same time, the nominal and paiticulai'ly the real exchange rate are closely 
associated not only with internal balance (inflation), but also with external balance 
as represented by the current and capital accounts o f the balance o f payments. There 
is an extensive literature on external imbalances, foreign exchange rate 
misalignment, currency crises and potential policy responses (e.g. Esquivel and 
Larrain, 1998; Flood and Marion. 1998; Dombush, Goldfajn and Valdes, 1995).
It is the cuiTent account o f the balance o f payments that is usually tlie focus o f 
sustainability analysis, particularly with regard to a  given foreign exchange rate. 
(Roubini and Wachtel, 1998) The reason is that capital flows are variable and 
volatile and it is their variability and volatility tliat nialces currencies susceptible to 
sudden crises. (Eichengreen. Rose and Wyplosz, 1996; Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz, 1995; Esquivel and Larrain, 1998; Gerlach and Smets, 1995) Capital 
inflows represent a natural response to investment opportiuiities beyond what can be 
financed by domestic savings and to high potential returns on investment. (Lipschitz, 
Lane and Moumiouras, 2001) On the other hand, capital inflows in Asian countries 
before the 1997 crisis were also regarded as benign, because they coixesponded to a
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high level o f  domestic investment and domestic savings, rapid growth and strong 
fiscal positions." Based on this experience, there is a widespread perception that 
“countries receiving substantial capital inflows [need] to consider carefully the 
reasons for these flows and the appropriate policy response” , (ibid., p. 1)
While foreign direct investment is presumably driven by factors that are not subject 
to rapid change and not subject to rapid outflows, net FDI flows can still change 
dramatically after a major crisis as shown by tlie Russian post-1998 experience. The 
development o f other flows -  particularly portfolio and loan capital inflows -  is 
strongly influenced by tlie perceived risk premium, which can change rapidly based 
botli on external and internal developments and can also be subject to self-fiilfiling 
effects (for analysis o f one or the other, see Drazen, 1998; Cole and Kehoe, 1996; 
Krugman, 1996 and Obstfeld. 1996).
There is no a priori level o f external imbalance that can be considered 
unsustainable. Any current account deficit can be tlieoretically covered by capital 
inflows o f equal size. However, there is a body o f evidence that significant external 
imbalance can be and often is a source o f  a currency crisis, which is an important 
factor ill a wider economic crisis. (Krugman, 1979; Summers, 2000) A currency 
crisis is conventionally defined as a period during which the exchange rate falls 
significantly despite an attempt to prevent the currency depreciation by a sharp 
increase in interest rates and/or an official inteiwention on the currency markets.
This was incidentally true for the C/.ech Republic and Slovakia prior to the 1997 and 1998 crises as 
well.
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Such an imbalance is associated with a certain level o f the real exchange rate 
(holding fiscal policy constant). Such an exchange rate can be considered 
unsustainable given the prevailing economic and policy environment (for a more 
complex discussion, see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). An unsustainable real 
foreign exchange mte can precipitate a crisis or require a painful adjustment process 
to prevent a crisis. Therefore, policy-makers are genemlly expected to have a strong 
incentive to prevent such a situation and to be risk-averse in approaching this issue. 
(Mishkin, 1999; Mussa et al., 2000)
When the foreign exchange rate channel is dominant in monetary policy, it is largely 
responsible for fomiing expectations. As a result, de facto exchange rate stability is 
usually not sufficient for the exchange rate to serve as a nominal anchor and an 
explicit commitment to a fixed exchange rate is seen as a necessary precondition. A 
typical analysis emphasises the importance o f both importing credibility and 
imposing constraint on monetary policy via a fixed exchange rate. (De Grauwe, 
1997; Frankel, 1999; Sachs, 1996) The fixed exchange rate, i f  accompanied by 
appropriate monetary/ policy, should lead to an inflation rate equivalent to that in the 
anchor countiy. Therefore, neither the nominal nor the real exchange rate should 
change (after an initial period o f adjustment in case o f the real exchange rate due to 
a period o f  more or less gradual disinflation). An officially fixed exchange rate also 
imposes a pressure on domestic monetaiy policy to adjust to policy o f  tlie anchor 
country if  the fixed exchange rate is to be sustainable.
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However, as Tomell and Velasco (1998) and Mishkin (1999) warn, based on 
empirical studies, a fixed exchange rate does not impose more fiscal discipline as 
fiscal laxity will undermine a peg only after some time, forcing a discrete 
devaluation in the fiiture. Bleancy (1999) showed that pegging does not reduce 
inflation automatically, but only if persistence o f inflation is particularly low in the 
reserve country/.
Tlie fixed exchange rate significantly decreases the foreign exchange rate risk for 
economic agents in the short term, but it does not necessarily do so in the long term 
as its sustainability/ is not assured. Consequently, pegs nialce it difficult to detemiine 
the proper long-tenii level o f foreign exchange rate risk for agents as it becomes a 
bipolar consideration instead o f a continuum. (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) This 
reinforces tlie overall tendency for risk assessment to focus on short-term horizons. 
Soft pegs are also often trapped by political logic, according to which “when the 
currency is strong, the authorities generally see no reason to move o ff the peg... 
when it is weak, they argue that devaluation or widening o f  the band would be 
counteiproductive”. (Fischer, 2001. p. 18)
Another key issue is the cyclical influence o f  the exchange rate - usually limited to 
discussion o f the exchange rate channel o f  the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, according to which a decline in the value o f domestic currency makes 
domestic goods less expensive than foreign goods, thereby causing a rise in net
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exports and hence in aggregate output. (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) However, as 
M ussa et al. (2000) explain, depreciation, especially a substantial devaluation, has 
usually not been accompanied b\ an export-led boom in developing countries. On 
the contrary, devaluation and depreciation are usually associated with economic 
downturns or crisis. An explanation is provided by the exchange-rate version o f the 
so-called balance-sheet effect.
H ie general balance-sheet effect is described in Mishkin (1995) and Bemanke and 
Gertler (1995). According to this view, a contractionaiy monetary policy increases 
costs o f debt seiwice and decreases equity prices, leading to a lower net worüi o f 
firms, increasing moral hazard and adverse selection (collateral), thus decreasing 
investment and aggregate demand (tliis is tme for households as well). 
Contractionary monetaiy policy also decreases the prices o f financial assets, 
increasing the likelihood o f financial distress, decreasing consumer durable and 
housing expenditure and aggregate demand. In the case o f the foreign exchange rate, 
the cause o f change in the balance sheet is a change in the value o f the currency. 
Nonfinancial fimis, banks and governments in emerging market countries issue 
much o f  tlieir debt in foreign currencies. On the other hand, assets are typically 
denominated in domestic currency. Tlierefore, cunency depreciation causes ceteris 
paribus deterioration in tlieir balance sheets, causing an economic contraction.
This problem exists with both fixed and flexible intermediate foreign exchange 
rates. However, its effects are much more dramatic under a fixed exchange rate
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regime. Its stability means that the net worth o f agents does not change frequently 
due to changes in the value o f the currency. However, once depreciation o f  a 
currency occurs, it is a highh' nonlinear event because it involves devaluation. “Hie 
result is that a devaluation leads to a substantial deterioration in balance sheets and a 
decline in net worth, both for nonfinancial firms and financial firms," which in turn 
leads to reduced credit ac tiv it\. investment and economic slowdown. (Mishkin, 
1999, pp. 584-5)
Such a problem is strengthened by a tendency for a currency to overshoot its 
depreciation after a foniierly fixed currency is floated. This mechanism is caused by 
an ‘intrinsic perversity’ in the interactions between tlieir exchange rate regimes and 
other problems in their economies, especially weaknesses in their financial sectors;
“When it becomes clear that the monetaiy and fiscal autliorities are trapped in a situation 
where they want to defend the exchange rate, but for any reason dare not raise domestic 
interest rates (credibly and substantially) and are running short of reserves, a crisis occurs as 
tlie speculative pressures against the exchange rate become overwhelming. Tlie market, 
which is not used to operating without official support tends to become illiquid and move 
erratically. Downward pressures build as recognition o f tlie adverse consequences o f  
financial disruption associated witli massive depreciation become mutually reinforcing.” 
(Mussa et ah, 2000, pp. 39-40 )
Theoreretically, a fixed exchange rate is not the only way to decrease risks 
associated with tlie exchange rate. Under a  floating regime, foreign exchange rate 
risk and uncertainty in transactions can tlieoretically be limited by hedging o f
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foreign currency transactions. Research shows, however, tliat exchange rate risk can 
be hedged only to tlie limited extent that nonresidents are willing to hold local 
currency exposure. According to Mussa et al. (2000), few developing or transition 
countries have organised markets for currency futures and options and those markets 
located in industrial countries deal mainly in industrial country currencies. Their 
conclusion is tliat tliere is "no indication o f significant net capacity to shift foreign 
exchange risks abroad at a reasonable price", (pp. 28-29) a conclusion shared by 
Mishkin (1999). Under floating exchange rate regimes, emphasis is placed on self­
protection by each economic agent, but the extent to which they can do actually do 
so remains questionable.
At tlie same time, Flood and Rose (1999), reviewing tlieir own as well as others 
research, state that “fiindainentais are irrelevant for exchange rate volatility except 
in high inflation countries and in the long run... there are multiple equilibria and 
endogenous changes in the market structure", (p. 671) In other words, there is not 
neccessarily a unique or stable short- to medium-temi equilibrium for a floating 
exchange regime.
Given these facts and the ahead}' reviewed importance o f the exchange rate for 
monetaiy and macroeconomic policy in general, it is not suprisiiig to find tliat small 
open economies rarely if  ever allow their currencies to truly float. As demonstrated 
by Calvo and Reinhart (2000). Reinhart (2000) and Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser 
(2001), many officially floating currencies exiiibit behaviour much closer to pegged
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exchange rates than to tine floaters such as tlie US, Japan or eurozone (and Germany 
before that).
In analysis and evaluation o f various foreign policy regimes, one should remember 
that “a reasoned judgment o f the desirable exchange rate regime needs to be based 
not only on how it performs in a crisis, but how it perforais overtim e on average... 
in general, it is not the exchange rate regime alone that is tlie flmdamental source o f 
pre-crisis vulnerability' and o f subsequent substantial damage... and changing the 
exchange rate regime will not automatically correct other critical problems”. 
(Mussa et al., 2000, p. 38)
Problems o f the European Monetary System in the early 1990s and the number o f 
currency crises in developing and transition economies with adjustable pegs (Asian 
crisis, Mexico, Brazil, Czech Republic, Slovalcia) during the 1990s stimulated the 
view that fixed exchange rate regimes are not sustainable unless they are very hard 
indeed, involving acuiTency board or a currency union, (e.g. Eicliengreen, 1994; 
Summers, 1999) Tliis view defined the vanishing middle -  fixed exchange rates that 
were subject to discretionaiy adjustments by policy-makers.
A consensus emerging recenth' is more nuanced and can be summarised in tliree 
points (Fischer, 2001; Frankel, 1999; Masson, 2000; Mussa et al., 2000; Reinhart, 
2000):
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• the vanishing middle has not vanished nor is it likely to, but it is unsuitable 
for small open economics closely integrated with international financial 
markets
• so-called soft pegs can be suitable and sustainable for countries that shaie 
a  combination o f some of the following: a low degree o f involvement with 
international financial markets and high foreign exchange rate reserves, a 
high share of trade and symmetric shocks with the coiuitry to which it is 
pegged as well as widespread reliance o f the financial system and economy 
on the anchor country, flexible and sustainable fiscal policy and labour 
markets
• A wide variety o f flexible exchange rate arrangements is possible and small 
open economies that officially float their currencies generally do not practice 
benign neglect o f  the exchange rate, which is unlikely to be a  desirable 
policy option
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1.6 Conclusion
Tlie first chapter reviewed existing literature dealing with objectives, frameworks 
and institutions o f monetaiy policy. It integrated three strands o f commitment in 
monetary policy -  central bank independence, domestic policy targets and exchange 
rate instruments -  into one framework for policy analysis o f small open economies. 
Wlienever possible, it included empirical evidence on situation on countries in 
transition, which are the focus o f the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Review of macroeconomic developments 
with emphasis on inflation and monetary policy developments
2.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to review briefly macroeconomic history o f Central 
Europe during tlie 1990s and early 2000s in order to introduce a reader not familiar 
with Central Europe to tlie transition period. In a  group o f cross-cutting sections, it 
explores specific factors that have had significant influence on the conduct or 
outcomes o f monetaiy policy in tlie Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
Tlie focus is on issue that tend to be overlooked in closed-economy models or ones 
concerned with developed economies approximately on die same level o f 
development. Tlie second half o f the chapter contains four country case studies witli 
an introduction to political and economic developments, monetaiy^ policy framework 
and its evolution during transition as well as macroeconomic context o f monetary 
policy-making.
W e focus on the following specific factors that have had significant effects on tlie 
conduct and/or effect o f monetaiy policy;
© fragility, shallowness and monopolistic structure o f financial markets 
o imbalances and peculiarities in the relationship between the real economy 
and the financial sector 
® difficulty o f controlling inflation, its reasons and consequences —
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® expectations and pressures o f future EMU membership 
® Gradual financial integration into the world economy
Additionally, uncertainty about the equilibrium real exchange rate was also a  very 
important factor, but is more closely analysed in the chapter on the relationship 
between foreign exchange rate and monetaiy/ policy.
There are authors -  (e.g. Golinelli and Rovelli, 2001a; Golinelli and Rovelli, 2001b) 
-  who believe that these problems have not substantially affected the robustness o f 
monetary policy; indeed some believe that this was so even before tlie end o f 
communism. The aim o f this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate why and how the 
problems mattered.
2.2 Fragility, shallowness and monopolistic structu re  of financial m arkets
During most o f the communist period, central banks and commercial banks in the 
region existed only in name. The State Bank of Czechoslovakia, Tlie Hungarian 
National Bank and the National Bank of Poland were the so-called monobanks- they 
combined central and commercial banking ftinctions. Tlie role o f the financial sector 
was to fulfil the investment plan as well as other financing requirements o f tlie state 
enterprises and tlie government budget. Central planners detemiined targets in the
real economy and adjusted financial flows to achieve them. In this passive role, 
financial institutions had no role in credit allocation. (De Melo et al., 1997)
It was only in the late 1980s that the two-tier banking system became established 
again in Central Europe. Hungar\ was the pioneer and created a two-tier banking 
system on January 1, 1987. In Poland, tlie establishment o f new baiilcs was slightly 
liberalised already in 1982, but it was only from February 1989 that the NBP 
divested itself o f most o f  its commercial banking functions. Czechoslovakia was the 
last, dividing the State Bank of Czechoslovakia into several institutions on January 
1, 1990.
Even though the policy instranients used by newly established central banks evolved 
fairly quickly - by 1992/93. all the central banks relied primarily on indirect 
instruments and countries had established formal T-bill markets (De Melo et al., 
1997) -  this posed challenges o f its own. As Matliieson and Haas (1995) point out: 
“premature reliance on auction-based indirect monetary policy instruments can give 
rise to adverse selection, moral hazard and collusion problems that can create large 
public sector funding obligations because o f credit risk assumed by the public 
sector.” (p. 200)
In the period studied in the thesis (1993-2001), one can therefore talk about a 
liberalised financial environment. In such an environment, the efficacy o f the 
monetary transmission process depends to great extent on the responsiveness_of the
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interest rates faced by borrowers and savers to tlie interest rate tliat the central bank 
influences tlie most -  usual 1\ a short-temi money market rate. (Kaniin, Turner and 
VaiTtDack, 1997)
The responsiveness o f interest rates faced by savers and borrowers to money market 
rates depends on many factors, primarily on die depth and maturity o f the financial 
system. Cottarelli and Kourelis ( 1994) evaluated transition countries in this respect 
in 1994, concluding that there was a lack o f maturity and depth, which impeded the 
smooth transmission o f monetaiy policy impulses. Six years later, Schaechter, Stone 
and Zelmer (2000) still shared tiiis view in their assessment.
The problem was not necessarih in the fonnal level o f intermediation, which 
differed substantially - Czechoslovakia had a  much higher level at the beginning o f 
transition (an M2/GDP ratio o f 0.68) than Hungary (0.38) and Poland (0.22), where 
moderate to high inflation and the smaller extent o f forced savings had eroded bank 
deposits. (De Melo et al,, 1997. p. 24) The real issue was the insolvency o f 
individual banks and the banking system as a whole. In all four countries, tliere was 
a systemic insolvency o f the banking sector as a whole in the early transition period 
and the problems continued to be particularly acute in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia until the end o f the 1990s. Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000) argue that 
one o f  the reasons why tlie impact o f interest rates on credit was limited was the 
highly interest inelastic lending policies o f banks burdened by nonperfomiing loans 
and tlie high probability o f fiiturc bailouts, a conclusion shared by De Melo_et al.
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(1997) and Kaniin, Turner and Van’t Dack (1997). Banking sector privatisation was 
substantially delayed (with the exception o f Hungary) and so the largest banks were 
state-owned for most o f tlie 1990s and often politically influenced in their lending 
policies.
Tlie financial fragility had an additional impact on monetary policy in pushing 
central banks to preserve the peg for too long due to the foreign exchange-dominated 
liabilities o f domestic investors while, at die same time, preventing them from 
raising interest rates high enough to defend tlie peg. (Mussa et al., 2000 and Kamin, 
Tum er and Van’t  Dack, 1997)
Table 2.1: Level of dollarisation (deposits in foreign currencies as a share of
M2), end o f  year, 1993-2001
Slovakia Czech
Republic
Hungarj' Poland
1993 9.94% 7.97% 16.76% 28.77%
1994 12.61% 6.99% 18.07% 28.54%
1995 11.07% 8.42% 23.07% 20.43%
1996 9.88% 7.62% 20.78% 17.27%
1997 10.44% 11.35% 19.02% 17.12%
1998 13.30% 11.09% 18.44% 14.69%
1999 14.43% 10.65% 16.59% 14.68%
2000 17.09% 10.65% 17.44% 14.02%
2001 17.05% 9.86% 16.75% 15.01%
Source: central banks
The solvency challenge was exacerbated by stiuctural liquidity problems. Banking 
sectors were dominated by a few large banks and tliere were usually substantial 
liquidity imbalances between the banks, with a former monopoly savings institution 
supplying much o f tlie market liquidity. (Kamin, Tumer and Van’t Dack, 1997 and 
De Melo et al., 1997)
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On the positive side, the short maturity o f  most loans in transition countries and the 
frequent use o f variable-rate loans led to a relatively quick effect o f policy interest 
rate changes on bank lending, which together with tlie strong influence o f tlie 
foreign exchange rate channel meant tliat policy decisions were transmitted rapidly 
into tlie real economy even if  the signal might have been scrambled. As Homok and 
Jakab (2002) show, central banks in the region forecast inflation witli a horizon o f 4- 
6 quarters (Slovakia, Poland) or 6-8 quarters (Hungary, Czech Republic), with tlie 
strongest impact o f  monetaiy policy in 3-6 quarters, depending on country.
2.3 Im balances and peculiarities in the relationship between the real economy 
and  the financial sector
Delayed privatisation o f banks in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovalda, as well 
as political unwillingness to impose a hard budget constraint on certain groups o f 
enteiprises (e.g. engineering national champions in the Czech Republic, sensitive 
sectors in Poland or important regional employers in depressed regions in tlie Czech 
Republic and Slovalcia) combined to create a situation where lending was often 
driven by political considerations and corporate borrowers were highly 
differentiated in tenus o f both liquidity and solvency. In such an environment, the 
effects o f monetaiy policy depend both on the overall balance-sheet position o f tlie 
corporate sector, but more importantly on its distribution among firms. I f  tlieir 
condition is as dispersed as it was in tlie Czech Republic, Poland and SlovaHa, the
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effects o f  monetaiy/ policy will be much more impredictable than where most finns 
have rather similar balance sheets. (Kamin, Tumer and Van’t Dack, 1997 and Coats 
2000)
At the same time, while finns were highly dependent on bank financing in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (see Buchtikova, 2001), households in all four countries were 
much less so as lending to households continued to develop quite gradually in all 
four countries. Tlierefore, the impact o f monetary policy on consumption as a 
sizeable part o f aggregate demand was influenced by monetary policy only 
indirectly through the foreign exchange rate channel and changes in the financial 
situation o f enterprises. This has begun to change only in the late 1990s with the 
rapid development o f consumer credit.
Another issue, prominent in the advanced transition economies, was a  divergent 
currency stmcture o f exports and imports and the introduction o f a new currency. 
All countries had a much more substantial share of dollar imports tlian dollarxports. 
The exports gradually became more and more dominated by eurozone countries or 
countries with close ties to the eurozone, but this was tme for imports only to a 
limited extent. This meant tliat movements in the EUR/USD rate had a  significantly 
different impact on export and import prices and monetary/ policy.
Before the euro was introduced, the natural ‘world’ currency to use in tlie region 
was tlie dollar despite the dominance o f EU trade. Hie reason was the lack o f a
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single EU currency. The dollar was a currency used in many lending operations, 
which mattered due to limited potential for hedging. Therefore, there was 
occasionally a mismatch between policy-makers, who understandably focused on 
tlie euro after its introduction, and households and enterprises with their widespread 
focus on tlie dollar exchange rate.
2.4 Price m isalignm ent and limited controllability of inflation
Koen and De Masi (1997) present the following ten stylised facts about prices in 
transition, which present probably the most concise available summaiy o f inflation 
developments and underlying d\ naniics:
® price liberalisation translated into an overall surge o f prices 
Ô the initial burst was followed by a prolonged period o f relatively high 
inflation
® seasonality and administrative price changes have caused misleading 
fluctuations around core disinflation 
® prices o f goods moved rapidly towards international levels, with tlie 
exception o f certain staples 
0 an identical, but dela\cd process took place with seivices as well 
® the relative price structure also moved closer to that in market economies 
o relative prices have been converging across transition countries 
0 wild price level disparities remain
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© flili convergence o f price levels towards the level o f  industrialised countries 
will be a very long-term process 
Focusing on tliose factors that were most significant for inflation developments in 
Central European countries, one should start witli price misalignment both in 
absolute and relative tenus. In other words, a combination o f structural deficiencies 
in the economy and price regulation led to imbalances in relative prices and, 
especially in former Czechoslovakia, to prices that did not clear the market and led 
to demand-supply mismatch. The result was a low price level -  see table 2.2 -  and a 
burst o f inflation upon price liberalisation even in Czechoslovakia, which was 
otherwise macroeconomically quite balanced.
Table 2.2: Comparative price levels (% ol German price level)
1991 1999
Czech Republic 21.7 35.7
Hungarv 34.6 39.3
Poland 34.9 43.0
Slovakia 23.3 31.5
Source: Backe (2001)
According to Coorey et al. (1998), Pujol and Griffiths (1998) and Wozniak (1998), 
shifts in relative prices accompan\ ing tlie adjustment process created an upward and 
persistent pressure on inflation in transition countries above and beyond the direct 
influence, reflecting a  general thcoiy o f the influence o f relative prices -  see Ball 
and Mankiw (1995).
In some countries, this played out rather quickly - in Hungaiy, relative price changes 
decreased significantly from 1993-4 onwards (see Vincze and Zsoldos, 1995-6), in
others, the movements lasted until the late 1990s or even the 2000s (Czech Republic 
and Slovakia), primarily because increases in administered prices to cost-recovery 
level were delayed for political reasons.
Other important inflationaiy impulses during the transition period were already 
mentioned elsewhere - fiscal deficits, soft bank credits, backward-looking wage 
indexation. (Coorey et al., 1996: Nuti, 1996; Richards and Tersmann, 1995 and 
Desai, 1998)
Equally significant is the fact that monetary policy has only had a limited control 
over inflation. Both regulated prices and supply-determined prices, such as food and 
commodities, exist also in developed economies, but their share is much higher in 
transition economies. Table 2.3 presents a rough breakdown o f  die CPI basket in the 
V-4 countries. We can see that core’ prices, which are not primarily determined by 
supply or political shocks, were in a minority as late as 1999.
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Table 2.3: CPI composition in Central European countries, 1999,%
Group o f  prices Czech Republic Hungaiy Poland Slovalda
Food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco 32.7 30.2 35.8 31.2
Energy and/or regulated prices 23.2 25.2 15.7 20.5
Core prices 44.1 44.6 48.5 48.3
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Czech and Slovak central banks. 1 limgarian Statistical Office, Polish Main Statistical Office
2.5 Expectations and pressures of fu tu re EM U m em bership
So far, many o f the issues discussed in the chapter would be familiar to economists 
and policy-makers in emerging markets o f  Latin America or Southeast Asia. Their 
combination with the prospect o f membership in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) is truly unique though. Therefore, the point o f this brief section is to explain 
that the existence o f tlie ‘finish-line’ o f EMU membership influenced monetary 
policy in the countries studied during the whole transition -  specifically since the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed in IS)91.
Tlie expectation o f EMU membership has presented a clear exit strategy though with 
an uncertain date. All advanced transition countries have a clear ‘light at the end o f 
the tunnel’ -  entry into the European Monetary Union, abolishing their own 
currencies together with independent monetaiy policy and adopting the euro. 
Therefore, monetary policy, in both its framework and execution, can rely on and 
has to reflect tliese expectations. Since EMU entry is linked to a 2-year waiting 
period in tlie ERM-2 system, the countries aware o f their fliture obligations took this 
into account in designing foreign exchange rate regimes.
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EMU membership is also linked to fulfiling the Maastricht criteria, especially the 
ones focusing on the maximum inflation (1.5%) and long-term interest rate (2%) 
differential vis-à-vis the EMU countries as well as the maximum fiscal deficit (3% 
o f  GDP) and debt (60% o f GDP). These requirements largely determine the 
medium-term monetary and fiscal policy targets in acceding countries.
On the other hand, there is also the issue o f internal contradiction in these criteria, 
particularly between nominal exchange rate stability and low inflation. These two 
criteria can be contradictoiy in the presence o f  a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
(Szapary, 2000)
Overall, medium-temi poIic\ frameworks adopted in Central European countries 
since 1998 strongly reflected these needs and largely defined medium-temi inflation 
targets in line with expected EU entiy/ in the 2003-2004 period and tlie EMU entry 
2-3 years later.
In addition to expected EU and EMU, membership in two other exclusive clubs -  
OECD and NATO -  had important policy influences both before and after the entry. 
All four countries became members o f OECD between 1995 and 2000 and members 
o f  NATO in 1999 or 2002.
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2.6 Graduai financial integration into the world economy
Tlie command economy practiced in Central Europe from late 1940s until tlie end o f 
1980s relied, in its economic interactions with a non-communist world, on a 
combination o f non-convcrtiblc currency and a foreign trade monopoly by tlie state. 
Replacement of this model by one witli largely liberalised foreign trade and a 
partially convertible currenc\ w as one o f the first steps taken in each country as it 
began the transition. However, the full liberalisation o f cuiTcnt and capital accounts 
took much longer as did actual integration into world financial markets, with 
important impact on monetaiy policy as practised during 1990s and early 2000s. Tlie 
section briefly describes these dc\ elopnients.
The first step along regulator) change was renewal o f membership in the 
International Monetary Fund. Politically more liberal and economically weaker 
Poland and Hungaiy/ rejoined the IMF already during 1980s (Hungary in 1982, 
Poland in 1986). In Czechoslov akia, this happened only 1990 in the aftermath o f the 
political change. A similar progression, though much more compressed, happened 
witli liberalisation o f currcnc) transactions for foreign trade purposes -  1988 in 
Hungary, 1990 in Poland and I vv I in Czechoslovakia.
Table 2.4 contains summaiy o f further changes in the regulator}' regime during the 
1993-2001 period. The table is based on the IMF Amiual Report on Exchange 
Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions, the most authoritative source o f data for
92
I I
such an analysis. (Edison et al.. 2002) It reveals two milestones. One took place in 
1995 and 1996, when all four countries officially accepted obligations o f  Sections 2, 
3 and 4 o f Article VIII o f the IMF Articles o f Association,^ making their current 
accounts flilly convertible. Another was spread over the 1999-2001 period when the 
four countries fiilfilled most obligations o f  OECD membership related to complete 
liberalisation o f tlie capital account. The table also reveals that elimination o f 
restrictions progressed steadily throughout tlie whole period studied.
Table 2.4; Changes in currency and capital account restrictions during  the
Year Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
1993 -
1994
exports and imports 
o f securities 
denominated in 
domestic cun ency 
fully liberalised
elimination o f  
restrictions on 
l>urchases o f foreign 
cutTency for 
business travel 
puiposes
1995
Acceptance of 
obligations o f Article 
VIII, Sections 2, 3 
and 4
Exporters no longer 
required to convert 
export proceeds into 
domestic currency
all remaining 
restrictions on 
durent international 
transactions 
removed, 
acceptance of  
obligations of 
Article VIII, 
Sections 2, 3 and 4
all remaining 
restrictions on 
current international 
transactions 
removed, 
acceptance o f  
obligations of 
Article VIII, 
Sections 2 ,3  and 4
1996
acceptance o f  
obligations of 
Article VIII, 
Sections 2, 3 and 4; 
liberalisation of  
purchases of 
securities by 
foreigners w ith 
maturity o f more 
than 1 year, equity 
investment abroad 
liberalised
Limited
hberalisation o f FDI 
by residents abroad
liberalisation o f  
currency imports 
and exports, 
liberalisation o f  
long-tenn credits by 
residents to 
residents o f OECD 
countries and vice 
versa, liberalisation 
of real estate 
investment and FDI 
by residents in 
OECD countries
' Section 2 deals with avoidance ol' restrictions on current payments; Section 3 witli avoidance o f  
discriminatoiy currency practices; and Section 4 with convertibility o f foreign-held balances.
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1997
liberalisation o f trade 
in foreign securities 
domestically
liberalisation o f  
issue and 
introduction o f  
bonds witli a 
maturity o f more 
than 1 year and of 
shares of OECD- 
based corporations 
w ith investment- 
grade rating
insurers pennitted 
to purchase high- 
grade securities 
from OECD 
countries, nearly 
complete 
liberalisation o f  
investment by 
residents abroad 
and by non­
residents in Poland
liberalisation of 
trade in foreign 
securities 
domestically
1998 liberalisation of 
issue and 
introduction o f  
shares o f all OECD- 
based corporations, 
liberalization o f real 
estate investment 
abroad by residents
lending to non­
residents liberalized
hill liberalisation of 
holding o f foreign 
currency
1999 elimination of most 
remaining controls 
on operations with 
foreign securities, 
derivatives and 
extending credits 
witli sureties
liberalisation of 
trade in derivatives
2000
liberalisation of 
investment abroad by 
insurance companies 
and pension funds
liberalisation o f  
medium-temi and 
long-tenn lending to 
non-residents from 
OliCD countries
partial liberalisation 
of investments by 
pension funds 
abroad
liberalisation of 
medium-temi and 
long-temi lending to 
non-residents from 
OECD countries
2001
liberalisation of 
deposits by residents 
abroad, liberalisation 
o f issuance o f debt 
and money market 
securities locally and 
abroad by both 
residents and non­
residents
complete 
liberalisation o f 
foreign currency 
possession 
domestically and 
abroad, elimination 
of all remaining 
restrictions on 
capital transactions
liberalisation o f  
lending and 
borrowing between 
residents and non­
residents, 
liberalisation of 
issue, sale and 
purchase of all 
securities abroad by 
residents or 
domestically by 
non-residents
Source: author based on IMF data
Liberalisation o f the regulator)’ framework is, at least to a certain extent, necessaiy/, 
but not a sufficient condition for actual financial integration. Wliether cross-border 
financial flows become significant also depends at many other factors. In mid-1990s.
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several factors induced substantial capital inflows in all four countries in addition to 
gradual liberalisation o f the capital account, namely resumption o f growth after the 
initial transition depression, credible fixed exchange rates and, high interest rates. 
Since tlien, even if  in fits and starts, the level o f financial integration has continued 
steadily. Tlie developments are illustrated by table 2.5, which measures openness by 
the actual level o f financial assets and liabilities compaied to country’s GDP, an 
approach developed by Kraay (1998). To enable a comparison, data for several otlier 
small, open economies on a similar or higher level o f economic development are 
included. The table shows that the level o f financial openness for Central European 
countries is comparable to their peers.
Table 2.5: Financial openness in selected small open economies, 1993-2001
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Chile n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 76.5 88.8 111.3 108.5 119.2
Czech
Republic 41.5 42.9 52.4 57.8 67.8 65.5 76.7 76.4 77.0
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 75.1 81.6 94.2 n.a.
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 90.6 97.6 104.3 107.5 105
Israel 62.1 63.7 64.5 64.7 72.3 75.2 103.5 103.0 95.4
Korea 15.5 17.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 58.5
Poland n.a. 51.6 49.1 49.8 54.5 43.2 41.9 44.1 38.3
Slovakia n.a. 34.3 30.5 28.0 29.4 36.1 43.7 49.2 51.3
Source: autlior based on International I'inancial Statistics
Note: Openness is measured as a pcieciUage o f GDP represented by a sum o f foreign assets and 
foreign liabilities
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2.7 Key economic and m onetary developments in the Czech Republic: 1993 
2001
2.7.1 Introduction
Tlie Czech Republic is one o f tw o successor states o f Czechoslovalcia, the other one 
being Slovakia. As in many other communist countries, the ruling regime was 
overthrown at the end o f 1989, paving the way for a rapid transition to market 
democracy. Following two parliamentary elections (1990, 1992), Czechoslovakia 
ceased to exist on December 31, 1992, based on a mutual agreement o f the two 
constituent nations. The Czech Republic was governed essentially by the same 
centre-right coalition from 1992 until 1998, when it was replaced by a minority left- 
wing government, which was confimied in power by the parliamentary elections in 
June 2002, but chose to include two smaller centrist parties in order to gain 
a majority status.
The Czech Republic entered 1993 as a  newly independent country, but one still 
sharing a monetaiy union with Slovakia. This arrangement rapidly proved to be 
unsustainable and the union w as dissolved in February 1993. Since tlien, the Czech 
Republic has conducted its own. independent monetary policy.
The heritage of Czechoslovakia was overall macroeconomic stability. Tlie country 
had been a bulwark o f fiscal and monetaiy prudence during communism (what 
Tosovsky, 1996, calls tlie “tradition o f valuing price stability, even under central
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planners” , p. 156) and the earl\ transition policies confirmed Üiis trend. (Drabek et 
al., 1994) Restrictive monetaiy and fiscal policies accompanied the start o f reforms 
on January 1, 1991, ensuring that inflation fell rapidly after the initial one-time jump 
caused by price liberalisation. After falling to approximately 10% in 1992, inflation 
rose again to 20% in 1993 due to introduction o f VAT in the Czech Republic on 
January 1, 1993. Astable, pegged exchange rate introduced in January 1991 was 
undoubtedly a key nominal anchor contributing to the containment o f  inflation.
The Czech economy had historically been veiy open. During tlie 1990-1992 period, 
it had to deal not only with internal shocks stemming from transition, but also with 
the collapse o f its key external markets, particularly East Germany, the Soviet Union 
and other CMEA countries. The economy managed to reorient much o f its 
production towards OECD markets within the first two years o f transition.
As a consequence, the Czech Republic was emerging from Üie transition recession 
already in late 1992, but the break-up o f Czechoslovakia had a  negative impact on 
trade between the Czech Republic and Slovalria, tipping tlie Czech economy back 
into recession, albeit a mild one. This proved to be a very short-term influence -  
despite a continuing decline in bilateral trade with Slovalda, growth resumed in 
1993.
Therefore, the years 1993 to 1997 can generally be labelled as a period o f prosperity. 
Tlie economy recovered and the growth rates were quite high. Growtjy was
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accompanied by low unemployment rates without parallel in otlier transition 
countries and rapid real wage growtli.
However, this was, to use a term applied to a  similar period in Slovakia (Marcincin 
and Morvay, 2001), a macroeconomic illusion. Voucher privatisation, conducted 
primarily in tlie years 1992-1995. formally dispersed ownership between millions o f 
individual shareholders, but due to a peculiar combination o f state-owned major 
banks and bank-owned voucher investment funds, tlie state indirectly continued to 
control much of the economy. Bank credit remained the means o f propping up large 
industrial enterprises. The growth o f real wages was significantly faster than 
increases in labour productivity , leading to accumulating growth o f  unit labour costs 
-  by 3.6, 1.2 and 3.9% between 1994 and 1996. (CNB, 2000a, p. 7) Visible 
corporate governance problems also arose in several small and medium-sized banks, 
leading to expensive liquidation and clean-up.
Inflation stabilised around 10% despite attempts by the central bank to lower it, with 
a  pegged exchange rate remaining at the level set in January 1991. The result was a 
persistent real exchange rate appreciation o f the Czech currency. Even though there 
is a general consensus on the scope for some real exchange rate appreciation, some 
authors (e.g. Frait and Komarck. 1999) argue that the real appreciation before 1997 
was too fast.
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In the second half o f 1995, the Czech Republic completely liberalised the current 
account o f tlie balance o f payments. This step essentially fonnalised and legalised 
already existing practice. As a result o f its relatively high nominal interest rates, 
stable nominal exchange rate and low perceived political risk, the Czech economy 
began to attract significant amounts o f both short-term and long-term capital inflows 
in 1994 and 1995, amounting to 8-16% o f GDP. This began to pose severe problems 
for the policy-makers, as the inflows meant large sterilisation costs and the 
sterilisation was perceived as only partially effective. The dilemma was partially 
solved in February 1996, when the central bank widened the currency band from 
0.5% to 7.5% around the parit\\ thus discouraging some o f tlie speculative inflows. 
Capital inflows interacted with structural weaknesses o f the economy, and excessive 
growth o f liquidity based on capital inflows allowed rapid growtli o f lending, 
contributing to rapid investment growth and excessive wage growtli during the 
1993-96 period. (Jonas, 2001)
Fiscal policy was relativeh- conservative compared to other transition countries and 
led to a  continuing decline in public debt until 1997. In the early transition period, 
Czechoslovakia, unlike Himgan and Poland, did not use seigniorage to finance the 
fiscal deficit. (Budina et al., 1994) However, this overall picture masks tlie fact that 
the fiscal deficit between 1994 and 1995 reached 1 to 2% o f GDP and was 
accompanied by an increase in the so-called hidden deficits. The structural deficit 
reached 2.5% o f GDP in 1996, (CNB, 2000a, p. 7) The low deficit also reflected 
“the lack o f those stmctural reforms, that have resulted in other transition economies
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in significant real and financial costs (rise in unemployment, banking sector 
consolidation, etc.) and worsening fiscal balances.” (ICEG, 2002, pp. 65-69) More 
importantly, it was not the size o f the fiscal deficit that mattered, but its quite 
expansionary dynamics during the period when other components o f domestic 
demand were growing. (Jonas, 2001, p. 14)
Another factor worth mentioning is tlie asset bubble experienced by the Czech 
economy during tlie 1994-1997 period. As Singer (1999) argues, the privatisation 
mix o f  cash sales and bankruptcies used by Hungaiy and, to some extent, Poland, 
tends to produce an early unden'aluation o f  assets and increase in unemployment. 
On the other hand, loan-based sales and voucher privatisation as utilised by the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia tend to lead to asset price bubbles as overvalued 
privatised assets bought "on the cheap’ are used as collateral and/or stimulate 
consumption via the wealth effect (see CNB, 2000a; Hampl and Matousek, 2000). 
The existence o f a bubble was confiniied, when 1997 and 1998 meant a significant 
(and unique) decrease in prices o f real estate in the Czech Republic during the 
transition period. (Hampl and Matousek, 2000, pp. 47-8)
Capital inflows, continuing real exchange rate appreciation, the lagging coiporate 
restmcturing, rapid wage growth and an overall asset bubble together caused swift 
growtli o f  domestic demand w hich far outstripped domestic supply and therefore 
increased the current account deficit, which reached nearly 8% in 1996. It is worth 
noting that domestic demand grew faster than domestic supply during thejwhole
100
1992-1997 period (Jonas, 200 L p. 10) Reflecting sluggish export growth and strong 
increase in imports, economic growth also began to slow down gradually in 1995 
and 1996.
Tlie central bank reacted to what it perceived as an unsustainable macroeconomic 
stance and lack o f government action by increasing interest rates in Hie second half 
o f  1996, which stimulated a nominal appreciation o f tlie currency and flirtlier 
contributed to an existing slowdown in real GDP growth. Spurred by a combination 
o f potential currency crisis and a recession, the government passed, in April 1997, 
an austerity package containing expenditure cuts, other measures to dampen 
domestic demand and medium-term institutional and structural measures to 
stimulate tlie supply-side o f the economy. This was not enough to counter the 
coming effects o f the Asian crisis and tlie Czech Republic (together with other 
transition economies) saw an attack on its currency in May 1997. While the crisis 
was set off by speculative attacks from non-residents, these were successfully seen 
off. It was the second-round pressures caused by the domestic corporate sector and 
households, which became too strong and forced the currency into a managed float. 
(Smidkova et a l ,  1998) With the benefit o f hindsight, there is widespread agreement 
that only a much more vigorous fiscal policy could have saved the peg and even tliat 
is questionable if  one takes into account the lack o f microeconomic restructuring 
(see e.g. Begg, 1997; Brada and Kutan, 1999). It is also clear, retrospectively, that 
tlie economy was already heading into a period o f very low growth even prior to the 
crisis (Brada and Kutan, 1999. p. 319) __
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The currency crisis set o ff more fundamental changes in the Czech economy by 
changing botli tlie political and the economic landscape. In the ensuing and quite 
deep recession (it lasted until 1999), many unviable enterprises finally went 
bankrupt or at least undenvent substantial restructuring. The delayed corporate 
restructuring pushed unemployment up from 3.5% in 1996 to 9.4% in 1999. I f  one 
looks at other countries o f the region, this second slow-down is not unusual as the 
other three countries also had, at some point, to deal with the combination o f 
insufficient enterprise restructuring and acute fiscal and external imbalance. W hat 
makes the Czech Republic different is the depth o f  this recession -  it was the only 
country out o f  the four to actual 1\- experience negative growth; at its climax -4.1% 
year-on-year GDP growth.
Botli fiscal and monetaiy policies contributed to the depth o f recession by their 
relative strictness. In the case o f monetaiy policy, the restrictive policy was a 
response to a very high level o f uncertainty regarding inflation following the 
depreciation and floating. For fiscal policy (and to some extent for monetary policy), 
the key factor was a fear o f  a rccuning attack if  the current account and overall 
fundamentals did not improve. Consequently, the fiscal tightening declared before 
the crisis was even strengtliened after the floating.
The third important factor was a credit cmnch in the banking sector. With 
problematic balance sheets even prior to the crisis, change in the political climate
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away fiom industrial policy via easy credit and feeling acutely the recession, Czech 
banks significantly decreased their lending to tlie real economy and particularly to 
enterprises.
As a result, inflation, instead o f rising, dropped dramatically. It also undershot 
significantly the targets set by the central bank for 1998 and 1999. Within two years, 
the Czech Republic essential 1\ achieved the disinflation which it had been unable to 
achieve during the 1993-1997 period and which qualified it for EMU entry.
By early 2000, tlie economy had emerged from the recession. A massive wave o f 
foreign direct investment starting in 1999, togetlier with both private-led and state- 
led restructuring o f the existing corporate sphere, reinvigorated industrial 
production. The new government, eleeted in 1998, undertook a massive clean-up 
and privatisation o f major banks and this, togetlier with changes in already existing 
private banks, led to a revival in lending activity. Fiscal policy was significantly 
relaxed to pay the costs o f  the banking restructuring, but also to stimulate demand by 
investment in infrastmcture and significant increases in pay for public employees. 
Unemployment stabilised and inflation remained low and stable.
Table 2.6: M acroeconomic data, Czech Republic, 1993-2001, in %
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP growtli 0.6 3.2 6.4 4.8 -0.8 -1.2 -0.4 2.9 3.8
average inflation 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 5.4
unemployment 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 9.4 8.8 8.5
CA deficit/GDP 0.4 -0.1 -2.7 -7.4 -6.1 -2.3 -1.9 -4.7 -5.7
Source: ING Barings
103
2.7.2 The monetary} policy framework
In the Czech Republic, as in other Central European countries, disinflation was the 
key challenge for monetaiy policy. The Czech Republic entered the transition with 
stable macroeconomic flindamentals, generally managed to implement prudent fiscal 
and monetary policies and, consequently, the issues faced by monetary policy during 
the initial years o f  transition were, in many respects, not as daunting as was the case 
in the other three countries. However, as tlie transition progressed, there has been 
a convergence o f  policy challenges, with tlie Czech Republic temporarily sharing an 
acute problem o f external constraint and fiscal imbalance.
In studying tlie monetaiy^ policy framework in the Czech Republic, several specific 
factors need to be mentioned - sec Buchtikova (2001); Cincibuch and Vavra (2000); 
Hampl and Matousek (2000) for a more detailed analysis on which the following 
paragraphs are based. In addition to strong nominal wage rigidity, it is tlie role of 
banking that malces the Czech economy different from Hungary and Poland and, to a 
lesser extent, Slovakia.
Banking is the dominant form o f financial intermediation in all transition countries, 
but in the Czech case, this dominance is absolute. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
balance sheets o f enterprises w ere transformed by emphasising a switch to bank 
loans. In this period, this was little more than an accounting operation that allowed 
more control o f planners over enterprises. However, as a result, the Czech economy
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was highly monetised even prior to transition and the corporate sector highly 
indebted. During the 1990s, again unlike in Hungary and Poland, tlie low inflation 
did not allow enterprises to inflate away their loans from the communist period. The 
voucher privatisation and loan-based privatisation continued in this tradition. This 
phenomenon o f overbanking has had several effects on the transmission mechanism, 
not all o f them obvious. It strengthened the hold o f  monetaiy policy over enteiprise 
activity, but in a highly non-linear manner. As long as the budget constraint was soft 
on many enterprises, as it remained in the Czech Republic, demand was quite 
inelastic to the interest rate, especially as for many enterprises a decrease in their 
loans would mean acute and possibly terminal problems in the production or 
distribution process.
At the beginning o f transition, the Czech policy-makers had to institute a monetary 
policy framework that would take advantage o f sound macroeconomic 
flindamentals, but would also be able to deal with Hie uncertainties o f transition. Tlie 
policy response was a fixed exchange rate as the intennediate target o f monetaiy 
policy complemented by a monetaiy target. Tlie central bank also announced 
inflation targets in tenus o f the headline consumer price index, but tlie exchange rate 
peg remained the true nominal anchor for agents as the central bank did not make 
extensive use of the inflation target as an instrument to stabilise expectations. 
Details o f  the policy framework and its fulfilment are shown in table 2.6
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At the same time, administrative controls were crucial in the early transition period: 
“Credit ceilings, interest rate ceilings and even moral suasion contributed to the 
outcome tliat, in an environment w ith discontinuities and institutional reforms, credit 
extension and growth o f the money supply did not get out o f  the hands o f  the 
monetary autliorities.” (Tosovsky. 1996, pp. 150-1)
Table 2.7; Monetary Policy Framework in the Czech Republic
Year Operational taiget Intermediate Target 
(actual developments in 
parenllieses)
Final Target 
(actual end-of-tlie-year 
inflation in parentlieses)
1993 Monetary base Exchange rate band of 
±0.5 % and 
complementary target o f  
M2 growtli o f 19% 
(20.5 %)
Target for CPI inflation; 
18% (20.8%)
1994 free reserves Exchange rate band of 
±0.5 % and 
complementaiy target o f  
M2 growtli of 12-15% 
(21,5%)
Target for CPI inflation: 
10-12% (10.2%)
1995 free reserves Exchange rate band of 
±0.5% and 
coinplementaiy target of 
M2 growtli o f 14-17% 
(19.6%)
Target for CPI inflation: 
9-11 %(9.1%)
1996 short tenu interest rates Exchange rate band of 
±7.5 % and M2 growtli 
11-17% (18%)
Target for CPI inflation: 
gradual decline in order 
to achieve EU level 
(8.8%)
1997 short terai interest rates Exchange rate band of 
±7.5 % (floating from 
27 May)
M2 arow th 7-ll% (l0 .1  
%)
Target for CPI inflation: 
gradual decline in order 
to achieve EU level 
(8.5%)
1998 short term interest rates Target for net inflation: 
5.5-6.5% (1.7%)
1999 short term interest rates Target for net inflation: 
4-5%  (1.5%)
2000 short term interest rates Target for net inflation: 
3.5-5.5% (3%)
2001 short term interest rates Target for net inflation: 
2-4% (2.4%)
Source: author, based on National Bank o f Slovakia data, Horska (2001) and CNB (1998)
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As we can see, the basic policy framework was quite stable between 1993 and 1997. 
The final inflation targets were generally achieved by the central bank though this 
reflected imeven adherence to intennediate targets, where the exchange rate peg 
remained the bulwark o f policy implementation, but monetary targets were 
consistently overshot in the 1993-1995 period and undershot in 1996.
The policy irrelevance o f monetary targeting in tlie environment o f high and 
unstable capital inflows was one o f the reasons why tlie Czech central bank switched 
to direct inflation targeting after the exchange rate crisis o f  1997. In 1998, the 
central bank explicitly argued that monetary targeting had a problem in a  lack o f 
predictable relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation in the unstable 
Czech environment: “Despite several econometric analyses, there was a high level 
o f uncertainty.” (CNB, 1998, pp. 1-2) On the other hand, Cihak and Holub (1998) 
countered tliat: “research confirms a strong relationship between M2 and inflation 
measures including net inflation and confinns it for various periods... [the problem 
is that tlie] coefficients are unstable.” (Cihak and Holub, 1998, pp. 225-226) 
Parameter uncertainty though has been enough to prevent the central bank from 
seriously reconsidering monetaiy targeting.
In the early years o f transition, the central bank changed the operational tai'get twice 
before settling on an interbank interest rate once the money market was sufficiently 
developed and deep in 1996. It also simplified the currency basket and gradually
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increased tlie weight o f DEM as the currency o f the key export markets (directly in 
Germany, but also indirectly in other ERM member countries).
Table 2.8: Currency basket composition in the Czech Republic, 1991-1997
Period Composition of the currency basket
January 1991-December 1991 USD 31.3 %, DEM 45.5 %, ATS 12.4 %, 
G BP4.2% ,CH F6.6%
Januaiy 1992-April 1993 USD 49.1 %, DEM 36.2 %, ATS 8.1 %. 
FRF 2.9 %, CHF 3.8 %
May 1993-May 1997 USD 35%, DEM 65%
Source: Czech National Bank
The most significant change in the policy framework that centred on the exchange 
rate occurred in 1996, when the Czech National Bank widened the exchange rate 
band to 7.5% around the parit> to discourage speculative inflows. This attempt was 
quite successfiil as evidenced inter alia by monetary expansion far below its target 
for the year. A potential for 15% fluctuation o f a variable that served as the 
intermediate target and the nominal anchor should have required an increasing role 
for the monetary or inflation target to accompany the move. This did not happen, 
reflecting the fact that the central bank did not really allow the currency to fluctuate 
within the fiill band and largeK continued to use it as tlie nominal anchor.
After tlie 1997 currency crisis, a brief seven month period o f monetary targeting 
followed until anew  regime was devised. (CNB, 2000a, p. 6) The Czech central 
banlc became the first transition central bank to introduce, in December 1997, an 
inflation targeting framework, to be followed by Poland, Hungaiy and, arguably, 
Slovakia.
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As table 2.7 illustrates, the direct inflation targeting was not a  clean break with tlie 
past (indeed Cihak and Holub ( 1998) called it “an old wine in new bottles”). Czech 
monetary policy was already predicated on announcing end-of-year inflation targets 
12 months in advance. With the anchor o f a fixed exchange rate gone, this was given 
more prominence and the target horizon was gradually lengthened -  e.g. the 2002 
target was aiuiounced already in April 2001, 20 months in advance. The expected 
EU and EMU entry provided a suitable medium-term target o f  1-3% based on the 
Maastricht criteria and the expected entry date o f 2005,
The central bank temporarily targeted core inflation instead of the previous headline 
inflation targets, but this was a purely practical matter based on political uncertainty 
surrounding the timing and size o f a generally acknowledged need for massive 
increases in administered prices. As soon as a  stable government emerged and put 
togetlier a credible calendar for further deregulation o f utility prices, the Czech 
central bank switched back to headline inflation targets tliough it announced them 
hand in hand witli a  core inflation target. (ICEG, 2002, pp. 65-69)
An imexpected problem of the new framework was the unfamiliarity o f tlie 
macroeconomic territoiy, with the Czech Republic experiencing an unexpectedly 
deep recession, which could not be explained and modelled purely in cyclical tenus. 
As a  result, tlie first two targets were massively undershot, threatening the hard-won 
credibility o f the central bank. For example, nominal wage contracts signed for 
1998 were frequently based on the central bank target and turned out to mean high
109
real wage increases, which worsened tlie recession and contributed to rising 
unemployment. (Jonas, 2001. p. 45) However, inflation targets were fulflled in 2000 
(with a  small undershooting) and in 2001, restoring tlie credibility o f  tlie central 
bank and o f the inflation targeting framework.
2.7.3 M onetœ y developments T)93-2001
Interest rates were negative in real terms during 1993 and early 1994, but were 
raised sharply and then more moderately during tlie 1994-1997 period to battle 
inflationary pressures. The central bank had to impose a restrictive policy to halt 
inflation, but high interest rates simultaneously encouraged capital inflows. Tlie real 
appreciation and tlie large current account deficit made tlie Czech Republic 
vulnerable to a  speculative attack on the currency (see Brada and Kutan, 1999). At 
tlie same time, a  pegged exchange rate meant nominal stability, but sharp real 
appreciation due to an inflation rate 6-7% higher than in the anchor countries - 
Germany and tlie US. Between 1993 and 1997, the real exchange rate appreciated by 
neai'ly 30%.
After the Czech currency was floated in late May 1997, inflation rapidly increased, 
seemingly on the basis o f currency depreciation and inflation expectations. 
However, i f  we look at core inflation (headline inflation adjusted for the impact o f 
regulated prices), we see a much less dramatic increase, which took inflation back to 
the level o f late 1996. Indeed, most o f  tlie increase in headline inflation was caused
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by one-time increases in regulated prices in m id-1997 and in January 1998, which 
temporarily but dramatically opened the gap between headline and core inflation. At 
the same time, the nominal exchange rate depreciated by 10% below die former 
parity and fluctuated close to this level until spring 1998. Until March 1998, 
inflation expectations were also not in line with the targeted disinflation path. 
(Hmcir and Smidkova, 2000)
Looking at these numbers, it is possible to understand why monetaiy policy reacted 
to the currency crisis and its aftermath by bringing nominal interest rates down quite 
slowly and kept them around 15% until it became clear, in the spring o f 1998, that 
the inflation was falling. The central bank explicitly argued that “after the loss o f 
the nominal anchor, there was a threat tliat inflation would remain at the two-digit 
level”. (CNB, 1998, p. 1) Ex post, it is clear tliat this was too strong a  medicine for 
an economy heading into recession and facing a  restrictive fiscal policy. However, at 
tlie time botli domestic and international observers (see e.g. Cihak and Holub, 1998 
and OECD, 1998) were worried that a permissive policy could lead to a significant 
increase in inflation, which would later be very costly to reverse.
Despite two more substantial increases in regulated prices in mid-1998 and in 
January 1999, both core and headline inflation began to fall rapidly beginning in 
February-Marcli 1998 and this sustained fall lasted until Jiuie-July 1999. During this 
period, headline inflation decreased from 12.6% to 1.1% and core inflation from 
7.5% to -0.6%. Tliis constitutes an astonishing drop o f 8% (if measured by_core
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inflation) witliin 16 months for inflation, which was already in single digits. As 
already mentioned, the disinflation was accompanied by a  rarity in central Europe 
after 1993 -  an actual and deep recession. Between 1997 and 1999, tliere was also a 
16% decrease in the nominal volume o f loans to industry (Hampl and Matousek, 
2000, p. 42)
The extraordinary inflation peifonnance can only be understood if  certain 
exogenous factors are taken into account (see CNB (2000a); CNB (2000b); ICEG 
(2002) for a more in-depth analysis).Volatility in financial markets following the 
Asian and tlie Russian crisis, downward pressure on food prices and collapse in the 
price o f oil were the principal culprits. Changes in oil and food prices accounted for 
a  2-3% decrease in prices in 1999. (CNB, 2000a; CNB, 2000b)
Tliere were also structural factors at work. As ICEG (2002) notes, deregulation, 
increased corporate and banking sector financial discipline and tlie simultaneous 
increase in unemployment contributed to an unexpectedly speedy decrease in 
inflation. (ICEG, 2002, pp. 65-69)
Tlie nominal foreign exchange rate recovered from post-crisis depreciation in spring 
1998 and fluctuated around the former parity until late 2000. Initially, tliis meant 
that the real exchange rate appreciated even beyond its pre-crisis level. However, 
due to rapidly falling inflation, nominal exchange rate stability in 1999 also began to 
mean real exchange rate stability.
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Monetary policy reacted by repeated cuts in interest rates (tlie repo rate) from 15% 
in March 1998 to 5.25% in November 1999. However, by cutting only in reaction to 
actual inflation decreases, the policy preserved positive real interest rates, which 
were quite high for an economy in recession, especially if  one takes into account 
core inflation rather tliaii headline inflation.
In 2000 and 2001, both inflation and interest rates stabilised, headline and core 
inflation moving in tlie 3-5% range, keeping real interest rates essentially at zero. On 
tlie other hand, tlie nominal exchange rate began to appreciate rapidly, leading to 
nominal and real appreciation b> 10% in 2000 and 2001.
2.8 Key economic and m onetary developments in H ungary: 1993-2001
2.8.1 Introduction
Hungary^ differed from both Czechoslovakia and Poland in its political development 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In Czechoslovakia, the resistance to the ruling regime 
was successfully isolated and scattered and Poland was witness to an open and mass 
political struggle between the govenuiient and a non-communist opposition. 
Hungary, scarred by the experience o f the 1956 Soviet invasion, implemented 
conciliatory political and economic policies -  the so-called “goulash communism”.
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As a  result, by the late 1980s. much o f the ground had already been prepared for 
political and economic transition and political change was negotiated without major 
setbacks or conflicts. After the first free elections in 1990, Hungary had 
a  conservative right-wing government, which was then replaced, in 1994, by tlie 
government o f  the postcommunist party. The government changed again towards the 
right wing in 1998 and again back to the postcommunists in 2002. Hungarian 
governments, however, more tlian governments o f any other country in tlie sample, 
defy ideological labels -  e.g. the toughest reform measures were taken by the 
postconimunist government between 1994 and 1998.
Economic reforms introduced before the end o f communism included price 
liberalisation, which had taken place in a very gradual manner since the 1960s. The 
communist central bank was split in 1987 to create a  two-tier banking system, two to 
three years before Czechoslovakia or Poland. In 1989 and 1990, Hungary introduced 
a modem tax system including VAT and income tax, again three years before the 
other countries studied in the thesis.
On the other hand, the overriding policy objective o f the 1970s and 1980s was to 
placate tlie population by increases in the standard o f living, which were not 
necessarily based on productivity or output growth, and that led to a rapid 
accumulation o f debt. As Kornai (1998) argues, it was atypical feature o f “goulash 
communism” to place “much greater weight on raising present-day material 
welfare”, (Kornai, 1998, p. 172) particularly in comparison with two neighbours -
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Czechoslovalcia and Romania, in 1989, Hungary had a 65% gross external debt/GDP 
ratio, nearly all o f which was, for understandable reasons, sovereign debt. (Barabas 
et al., 1998, p. 59) While official domestic debt was nearly non-existent, many 
hidden liabilities surfaced during transition, as in otlier transition countries. (Tanzi, 
1992)
Tliis mixture o f structural refonns and soft policy towards households continued 
unchanged during the first v ears o f transition -  dubbed by Kornai as “goulash 
postcommunism”, (ibid.) On one hand, modem accounting and commercial laws as 
well as a tough bankruptcy law came into effect in 1991 and 1992, leading to a much 
more rapid enterprise and bank restructuring than in either Czechoslovakia or 
Poland and contributing to a surge o f FDI tliat made Hungary tlie transition country 
with the highest FDI per capita.
On the other hand, Hungaiy continued to have an unusually large public sector 
compaied even to other transition countries and the decline in tax revenue was not 
matched by expenditure cuts. Real wages declined significantly less tiian output, 
based paitially on lax fiscal and monetaiy policies in 1992 and 1993. After its peak 
in 1991, the inflation proved to be sticky at levels around and above 20%, to some 
extent reflecting a heritage of tw o decades o f relatively high inflation compaied to 
other commiuiist countries. This led, despite frequent devaluations, to significant 
real exchange rate appreciation. At tlie same time, there was a widespread backward 
wage indexation. (Krzak, 1996) __
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Tiie economy recovered by tlic end o f 1993 and continued to grow in 1994. As 
during tlie communist period, iiowever, growth quickly ran into an external 
constraint. By the end o f  1994. the current account deficit exceeded 9% o f  GDP, tlie 
fiscal deficit exceeded 8% o f GDP and public debt exceeded 85% o f GDP. The new 
government that came to power in the summer o f 1994 was confronted by the threat 
o f  a Mexican-style crisis and decided, in early 1995, to act. (Cottarelli, 1998)
The 1995-1996 period is usual!) seen as a fundamental turning point in Hungarian 
economic histoiy. It included both short-term and medium-term steps aimed at 
malting fiscal policy and the current account sustainable and creating the 
environment for long-temi growth. The adjustment was based on a significant 
increase in all administered prices, a switch to a crawling peg and fiscal 
retrenchment focusing on public sector wages, stmctural refomis in health care and 
pension systems and cuts in transfers and subsidies. The results were a steep 16.5% 
decrease in real wages between 1995 and 1997, but also a decrease in tlie current 
account deficit from 9.5% to 2.25% o f GDP between 1994 and 1997, a decrease in 
consolidated government expenditure o f 13.2% of GDP and in revenue o f 8.3% o f 
GDP between 1994 and 1997. External debt reached 37.6% o f GDP in 1997, 
compared to 65% in 1989. (Barabas et al., 1998, p. 59) On the other hand, 
unemployment did not rise significantly from its previous level o f 10-11% and one­
time inflation shocks did not translate into a sustained increase in inflation. It soon 
returned to 20% from tlie peak o f approximately 30% in early 1995. At tlie_same
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time, the structural measures undertaken earlier together with continuing 
privatisation, FDI inflows and hoaltliy macroeconomic policies meant tliat, despite 
dramatic fiscal retrenchment, growth remained positive, albeit low in 1995 and 
1996. In January 1996, full convertibility o f the current account was introduced. 
(NBH, 2001, p. 3)
Between 1997 and 1999, Hungaiy entered a period o f increasing growth and sharply 
falling inflation. Exports grew dramatically, assisted by a recovery in the country’s 
main trading partners. The rate o f exchange rate crawl was gradually decreased 
slightly ahead o f the falling inflation and tlius contributed to disinflation, which 
proceeded quite successfiilly between 1997 and early 1999, helped by a fall in oil 
prices as well as a region-wide fall in food and agricultural prices. As a result, real 
GDP grew by 4.9% and 4.4% in 1998 and 1999 respectively, while average CPI 
inflation reached 14.3% and 10%. Tlie government ran a conseiwative fiscal policy 
and real wage growtli was quite moderate (with the exception o f the election year 
1998).
After the 1998 elections, the new government continued to operate prudent fiscal 
policies for two years, but then began to reverse tliem again in 2001, in the run-up to 
elections. A substantial hike of minimum w^ages and tlie wages o f state employees 
not only meant fiscal expansion, but contributed to rapid growth in real wages in tlie 
economy as a whole. Although w ages grew  ^dynamically in 2001, there was still no 
sign o f excess household consumption growth (see ICEG, 2002, for details).
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Inflation and export performance were quite uneven, mostly due to exogenous 
factors (e.g. tlie business cycle in the eurozone and commodity prices), but this did 
not have a  significant impact on overall growth, which continued to be between 4 
and 5% annually.
Table 2.9: Macroeconomic data, Hungary, 1993-2001, in%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP growtli -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 5.1
average
inflation
22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.3
unemployment 12.1 10.4 10.4 9.2 7.7 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5
CA deficit/GDP -9.0 -9,4 -5.6 -3.7 -2.1 -4.9 -4.3 -3.3 -3.4
Source: ING Barings
2.8.2 The monetary policy framework
Monetary policy in Hmigaiy during tlie relevant period (1993-2001) has been driven 
by a key objective o f reducing inflation from the prevailing high level, but also by 
the objective o f continuity in disinflation. In other words, a stop in disinflation or 
even a  temporary reversal has been considered in a different light than in a country 
witli a stable level o f inflation. (Bozo, 2000, p. 49)
Monetary policy in Hungary, as much as in other Central European countries, was 
influenced by distortions in the monetaiy transmission mechanism. During much o f 
tlie 1990s, two thirds o f household deposits were concentrated in one bank, which 
caused nominal upward stickiness o f deposit rates. Other banks, which inherited a
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large loan portfolio, tliereforc had to rely heavily on interbank and central bank 
financing. This imbalance changed only gradually. (Szapary, 1997, p. 25)
At the same time, bank deposits and credits have been largely short-temi and the 
average duration weighted b\ the present value o f disbursements even in the most 
developed market (that o f fixed govt, papers) was 1.4-1.5 years even in 2000. Tlie 
share o f facilities maturing within a year bearing variable interest is also high on 
both the credit and the deposit side. (Bozo, 2000, p. 48, 72) Both of these factors 
reduce tlie lag in die monetaiy transmission mechanism in Hiuigary.
Monetary policy has faced a paradox - the overall objective has been related to 
disinflation, but the actual polic\ has been driven primarily by considerations o f 
external (im)balance. As Bozo (2000) writes: “In Hungaiy, external equilibrium is 
inseparable from the objective o f reducing inflation and achieving price stability... 
Tensions arising from imbalances in domestic production and absorption typically 
first lead to the deterioration o f the cuiTent account. Inflationary pressures only 
appear later when measures (such as devaluation, indirect tax increases) are taken to 
address the problem o f external disequilibrium.” (ibid, p. 50)
Tlierefore, it is not surprising that it was the exchange rate that was used by die 
National Bank o f  Hungaiy/ as its intermediate target from 1987 until 2001 and also 
used as a nominal anchor between 1995, when the crawling peg was introduced, and 
2001. (ibid., pp. 53-4) During this period, monetary targets in the fomi of M3 were
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calso used as a complementaiy indicator, but tliey were repeatedly overshot and 
generally were overridden in the interest o f the exchange rate target. (Gollinelli and 
Rovelli, 2001)
Developments in die way the intermediate exchange rate target was implemented are 
shown in tables 2.10 and 2.11. Most trade-related foreign exchange rate transactions 
were liberalised as o f Januaiy L 1990. From 1990 until early 1995, Hungary 
followed a  policy o f discrete small devaluations, of which the majority ranged 
between 1 and 2%. In March 1995, as a  part o f  the overall change in macroeconomic 
policy, the regime o f discrete changes was replaced by a continuous devaluation, i.e. 
by a crawling peg. The rate o f crawl was frequently decreased, until die peg became 
stable in May 2001.
At the same time, changes in the exchange rate regime were accompanied by 
changes in the width o f the foreign exchange rate band and in the currency basket. 
Wliile the period o f frequent and discrete devaluations involved an extremely narrow 
band, it was widened slightly to 2.25% during die period o f the crawl, allowing 
monetaiy policy not only some flexibility, but also limited market feed-back.
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Table 2.10: Developments in fixed exchange ra te  regime in H ungary, 1990- 
2001
Type o f the exchange rate 
regime
Period and size o f change
Fixed-but-adjustable peg January L 1990 -  March 11,1995
Parity adjustments 1.0%; Januaiy 31,1990
2.0%; February 6,1990
2.0%: February 20,1990
15.0%; January 7,1991
5,8%: November 8, 1991
1.9%; March 16,1992
1.6%; June 24, 1992
1.9%; November 9,1992
1.9%; February' 12, 1993
2.9%; March 26,1993
1.9%; June 7, 1993
3.0%; July 9,1993
4.5%; September 29, 1993
1.0%; January 3,1994
2.6%; Fcbraary 16,1994
1.0%; May 13,1994
1.2%; June 10,1994
8.0%; August 5,1994
1.1%; October 11,1994
1.0%; November 29,1994
1.4%; Jauuarj' 3,1995
2.0%; February 14,1995
Introduction o f the crawling 
peg
March 12, 1995
Changes in tlie rate o f crawl 1.9%; March 12,1995
1.3%; July 1, 1995
1.2%; January 1,1996
1.1%; April 1, 1997
1.0%; August 15, 1997
0.9%: January 1,1998
0.8%; June 15, 1998
0.7%; Januar)' 1,1998
0.6%; January 1,1999
0.5%; July 1,1999
0.4%; October 1,1999
0.3%; April 1,2000
End o f tlie crawling peg October 1, 2001
Source: National Bank of Hunaan'
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Nominal stabilisation o f tlie exchange rate around a fixed parity in 2001 was 
accompanied by a substantial w idening o f tlie band to 15%, preparing Hungary for 
the ERM 2 system. At the same time, 1990s saw a  gradual shift from pegging with 
an equal role for the US and European currencies to a regime strictly pegged to the
euro.
Table 2.11: Band width of the Hungarian peg, 1990-2001, in%
Period Band width around parity in%
Until 31/5/1994 0.3
1/6/1994-4/8/1994 0.5
5/8/1994-21/12/1994 1.25
22/12/1994-3/5/2001 2.25
4/5/2001 -  abandonned 10/2001 15.0
Source: National Bank o f Hungaiy
Table 2.12: Development of currency baskets in Hungary, 1991-2000
Period Basket composition
January 1991 -  November 
1991
basket of 9 cunencies
December 1991 -  April 
1994
USD 50%, DEM 50%
May 1994 -  December 
1996
USD 30%, ]-:CU 70%
January 1997 -  December 
1998
USD 30%. DEM 70%
Januaty 1999 - EUR 100%
Source; National Bank o f Hungary
Tlie widening o f the band in 2001 also meant that while Hungary still preserved 
some limits on nominal exchange rate flexibility, the nominal exchange rate ceased 
to ftilfll its role as the nominal anchor and the intennediate target o f monetary 
policy. In an economy, where inflation is in single digits, a variable with potential 
fluctuation o f 30% clearly cannot serve either o f the two purposes.
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Therefore, exchange rate targeting was, at the end o f the period under study, 
replaced by inflation targeting, Hungaiian inflation targeting involves public 
announcement o f an inflation target in terms o f headline inflation (set to 4.5% for 
December 2002 and 3.5% for December 2003). Tiie inflation target is surrounded 
by a 1% tolerance band. The central bank prepares and publishes an inflation 
forecast, with a conscious aim of making it the new nominal anchor for anchoring 
expectations o f  economic agents. Therefore, tlie inflation forecast can be seen as tlie 
new intennediate target o f  monetary policy.
It is also important to note tliat the concept o f core inflation is quite developed in 
Hungary and both tlie central bank and the statistical office have, for several years, 
calculated and published a core inflation index. Tlie central bank core index 
excludes effects o f seasonal foodstuffs (egg, potatoes, fruit, vegetables), solid and 
liquid fuel and gasoline, and covers 91% o f the CPI. (Valkovszky and Yincze, 2000, 
p. 6) Nonetlieless, the inflation target is specified in tenus o f headline inflation.
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Table 2.13: Monetary Policy Framework in Hungary
Year Operational target Intermediate Target Final Target
1993 Net domestic credit stock 
and a fixed nominal 
exchange rate witli ± 0.5% 
lluctuation band
To reduce current account 
deficit (actual deficit USD -3.5 
bn.) and curbing inflation 
(22.5%)
1994 Money market operations 
to influence lending 
capacity o f tlie banking 
system and money market 
interest rates (actual 
weighted monthly average 
yields of discounted 
treasury bills maturing in 
1 and 3 montlis were 
29.3% and 30.4% 
respectively)
Net domestic lending of the 
CIJ (net domestic assets) and 
maintaining tire real 
exchange rate (not allowing 
appreciation), using a fixed 
nominal exchange rate, witli 
a band tirat was widened 
iroin ± 0.5 % to ±1.25% in 
August and to ± 2,25% in 
1 )ecember
Main target: to reduce the 
current account deficit (target: 
USD -2.6 bn, actual: USD -3.9 
bn).
Complementary target: furtlrer 
cut in inflation (18.8%)
1995 Short-term money market 
interest rates; actual 90- 
day treasury bill yield 
(end of period): 30.5%
Nominal exchange rate - pre- 
announced crawling peg 
with ± 2.25% fluctuation 
band
Continued reduction in tire rate 
o f inflation (28.2%)
1996 Short-term money market 
interest rates; actual 90- 
day treasury bill yield 
(end of period): 22.2%
Nominal exchange rate - pre­
announced crawling peg 
with ± 2.25% fluctuation 
band
Continued reduction in the rate 
of inflation (23.6%)
1997 Level of money market 
interest rates; actual 90- 
day treasury bill yield 
(end o f period): 19.4%
Nominal exchange rate - pre­
announced crawling peg 
with ± 2.25% fluctuation 
band
Continued reduction in the rate 
of inflation (18.3%)
1998 Level o f money market 
interest rates; actual 90- 
day treasury bill yield 
(end o f period): 16.1%
Nominal exchange rate - pre- 
annouirced crawling peg 
with ± 2.25% fluctuation 
band
Continued reduction in tlie rate 
of inflation (14.3%)
1999 Level of money market 
interest rates; actual 90- 
day treasury bill yield 
(end of period): 12.4%
Nominal exchange rate - pre­
announced crawling peg 
witlr ± 2.25% fluctuation 
band
Continued reduction in die rate 
of inflation (10.0%)
2000 Level o f short term 
money market interest 
rates; actual 90-day 
treasury bill yield (end of 
period): 11.6%
Nominal exchange rate - pre­
announced crawling peg 
with ± 2.25% fluctuation 
band
Continued reduction in die rate 
of inflation (9,8%)
2001 Short term 3 montli 
money market (prhnarily 
govermnent securit) 
market) interest rate: 
actual 90-day treasury bill 
yield (end o f period): 
9.7%
Inllation projection (from 13 
Max 2001 the fluctuation 
band was widened to ± 15% 
and subsequently on 1 
October 2001 tire crawling 
peg was abandoned)
Direct inflation targeting 
(target: 7% ± 1% for December 
2001 -  actual 6.8% in 
December, average is 9.2%)
. ..
Source: author based on data provided by National Bank of Hungary and National Bank of Slovakia
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Hungaiy has been quite stable in terms o f operational instruments used by monetary 
policy to achieve operational targets. Until the early 1990s, the central bank was 
strongly restricted in developing its monetary policy instruments, partly because o f 
tlie absence o f a money market, partly because o f a limited competition between 
banks. During that period, it used direct refinancing credits to banks as the main 
policy instrument, but because o f the soft budget constraint o f  both banks and 
enterprises, demand was virtually unlimited and credit rationing had to be 
implemented, (see Bozo, 2000, p. 82)
Due to an early start in tlie de\ elopment o f the banking sector, the central bank was 
able to switch to the use o f repo iiistiiiments by 1993. For several years now, it has 
been the two-week deposit rate that has acted as the key policy rate. Since autumn 
1995, tlie Hungarian banking sector has had surplus liquidity which is withdrawn by 
the central bank from the banking sector tlirough its reverse repo. (Bozo, 2000, p. 
66)
The operating target has also been quite stable, involving a group o f 3-6 montli 
interbank and government paper interest rates, which were considered to be most 
relevant for overall policy transmission. More recently, this was limited to the 3- 
month interbank rate only.
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2.8.3 A detailed look at moneiaiy developments in Hungary during the 1993-2001 
period
After the deep transition recession that started in 1991, monetary and fiscal policy 
were rapidly loosened in 1992. Fiscal and monetary expansion resulted in further 
current account deterioration and external borrowing. Increasing current account 
deficits and external indebtedness forced repeated devaluations and indirectly 
increased inflation. According to Suranyi and Vincze (1998), real interest rates were 
negative between mid-92 and mid-93, tlie fiscal deficit increased steadily from mid- 
92 and monetary accommodation was an impoitant source o f inflation.
Monetary policy changed its course in m id-1993 and began to tighten, but was 
powerless to change the underly ing fiindamentals without the co-operation o f fiscal 
policy. It proved ineffective in promoting domestic savings by “increasing interest 
rates when deteriorating fundamentals destroyed public confidence and made forint 
investments too risky” . (Barabas et al., 1998, p. 65) Tlie reason is that under the 
planned economy, policymakers “prefened to solve the problems arising from 
supply-demand imbalance by inflation rather than rationing -  this means that any 
sign o f external imbalance brings inflation expectations.” (Suranyi and Vincze 1998, 
p. 164)
To understand the fiscal policy in Hungaiy during that period, it is useless to look at 
official fiscal figures as the following examples illustrate very well. Before 1997, 
much o f tlie pre-1989 debt was channelled through interest rate-free loans from the
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central bank, the tme interest cost showed in the NBH accounts and not directly in 
the fiscal deficit. (NBH, 2001a) Between 1992 and 1993, the difference between the 
change in the public debt/GDP ratio and tlie cash flow deficit was 10%, which 
indicates the size o f off-budget deficits. (Bambas et al., 1998, p. 68)
At the same time, the exchange rate was subject to two conflicting central bank 
objectives: to promote external competitiveness and to provide a nominal anchor, a 
conflict worsened by uncoordinated fiscal and income policies. (Golinelli and 
Rovelli, 2001)
In 1993, the central bank resoh cd this conflict in favour o f decreasing inflation and 
began to delay devaluations and increase interest rates. However, the exchange rate 
policy was not credible, as the deteriorating external imbalance reinforced 
expectations o f future devaluations and inflation, causing an actual heightening o f 
inflation expectations. (Szapaiy and Jakab, 1998, pp. 694-5) The inertial element in 
Hungarian inflation was strong until 1996 and was to a large extent caused by 
inflation expectations. (Barabas ot al., 1998, p. 60)
At the same time, the main practical concern o f tlie monetary authorities regarding 
the monetary aggregates became how to sterilise excessive money creation caused 
by capital inflows as intermediate inonetary^ targets were systematically overshot 
because o f insufficient sterilisation, (Golinelli and Rovelli, 2001, p. 10)
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By 1994, the central bank came to believe that “any additional tightening would 
have been ineffective: fiirther devaluation would only serve to validate inflation and 
interest rate increases would simply raise fiscal debt service or accelerate capital 
inflows.” (OECD, 1995)
During the 1995-1996 period, monetary policy and monetary developments should 
be seen as an integral part o f the overall policy package, with monetary policy 
closely co-operating with fiscal policy on reducing internal and external imbalance 
and setting the stage for sustainable growth.
Wliile fiscal policy focused on cutting the fiscal deficit and revenues at the same 
time (including a substantial increase in regulated prices), monetary policy 
concentrated primarily on restoring external balance. To tliis end, both a devaluation 
in March 1995 and a switch to a crawling peg with a relatively high depreciation 
rate o f 1.9%/month were chosen. Interest rates were sharply raised to ensure both 
positive real interest rates and currency stability.
After the dramatic first half o f 1995, “monetary policy has intentionally not 
attempted to engineer a faster pace o f disinflation because external equilibrium 
improvements and real GDP grow th were considered vulnerable.” (OECD, 1997, p. 
4) Inflation also played a decisix e role in the quick and huge reduction o f the real 
value o f expenditures in Hungarian public finance (Laszlo, 1998, p. 149) even 
though there is no proof that this was an explicit policy consideration.
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The rate o f crawl was cut to 1.3% per montli by July 1995, but subsequent 
reductions in the pace o f exchange rate depreciation were gradual. Tlie change in the 
rate o f crawl interacted with the foreign exchange movements within the allowed 
band, contributing to a much lower depreciation in 1996 and 1997, but a much 
higher one in 1998 after the Russian crisis caused a temporary movement from the 
appreciation limit o f the band towards the depreciation limit. On the other hand, 
since inflation continued at a higher rate, tliere was still substantial real exchange 
rate appreciation. Real interest rates were consciously preserved at 3-4% as inflation 
declined. Since 1995, the nominal exchange rate has become, econometrically, tlie 
key determinant o f prices. (Suraiix i and Vincze, 1998)
Table 2.14; Development of key monetary indicators between 1995 and 1998
3-month 
interbank 
interest rate
Core CPI 
inflation
CPI inflation 12-month
currency
depreciation
December 1995 29.5 24.4 24 9 26.8
December 1996 22.3 18.2 18.0 10.5
December 1997 19.6 16.8 16.9 7.8
December 1998 17.6 10.2 9.8 11.4
Source; National Bank of Hungaiy
Tlie smooth fall in inflation was iiitermpted in m id-1999, when it began to rise for 
the first time in four years and disinflation stalled for two years until mid-2001. 
Higher EU inflation, a closing output gap in Hungaiy and an increase in 
administered, commodity and food prices have been identified as die principal 
culprits o f the phenoiiieiion, which could also have been obseiTed in Poland at the 
same time and, to some extent, in Czech Republic and Slovakia. __
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Tlie increase in world prices for energy caused an upsurge in inflation boüi directly 
through market-detennhied household energy inflation (NBH, 2000, p. 7), but also 
through producer prices. Food prices were an important source o f inflation, due to 
poor crops, policy choices and a certain catching up with the overall price level. 
(ICBG, 2002, pp. 49-57) Regulated prices were also important: 2.8% o f  the 11.2% 
rise in the consumer price index in December 1999 is accounted for by the rise in 
this category. (NBH, 2000, p. 7)
As a consequence, the central bank core inflation index, which excludes the effects 
o f  seasonal variations in food prices and changes in prices o f petrol and certain 
energy sources as well as regulated prices from headline inflation, remained below 
10% and even declined at the same time as the headline inflation was increasing.
It needs to be noted that these supply-side explanations are insufficient - even the 
core inflation index stopped its downward path during 2000 and rose to Üie same 
rates as headline inflation. The additional factor is that EU producer prices also 
started to increase at the end o f 1999 and “due to tlie high openness o f tlie Hungarian 
economy, the unfavorable evolution o f EU PPI had a strong impact on domestic 
production costs.” (ICEG. 2002. pp. 49-57) In general, continuing robust recovery o f 
the Hungarian economy and the recovering domestic demand began to limit the 
scope for painless and quick disinflation without external risks. The inflation 
differential vis-à-vis tlie euro area remained in the 7.5-8% mnge during much o f
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2000, At the same time, the current account deficit remained low compared to 
previous years.
The policy response was quite vigorous in exchange rate policy, as the rate o f  crawl 
was cut from 0.7% at the end of 1998 to 0.3% in April 2000. This is seemingly 
contradicted by substantial cuts in interest rates during 1999, but these were anti- 
inflationary in the sense that they were primaiily aimed at decreasing tlie 
profitability o f  speculative capital inflows.
From April 2000 until May 2001, monetaiy policy remained neutral, with the central 
bank arguing that “economic shocks tliat fueled the inflation [in 2000] primarily 
affected the supply side o f the economy”. (NBH, 2001b, p. 9) However, the effects 
o f  all the factors mentioned abo\ c continued to keep inflation between 8 and 10%.
In 2001, monetary policy took some decisive steps to achieve furtlier disinflation. 
The crawl was stopped and the fluctuation band widened to 15% in both directions. 
The central bank did not intervene when the currency strengtliened considerably and 
the result was 8% year-on-year nominal appreciation and 12.5% year-on-year real 
appreciation at the end o f 2001. Nominal interest rates were kept essentially stable 
around 10% regardless o f the decline in inflation from May 2001, and the central 
banlc adopted an inflation-targeting regime. (NBH, 2002) One o f tlie reasons for this 
strong response was the experience o f previous years, when the real appreciation
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based on price indicators was much lower than the improvement in unit labour costs. 
(ICEG, 2002, pp. 49-57)
At the same time, the factors that contributed to stable and/or rising inflation in 1999 
and 2000, were reversed: the euro appreciated against the dollar, oil prices fell and 
EU PPI dropped sharply and food inflation decreased. As a result, price pressures 
began to decrease after May 2001 and there was a 4% and 3% decrease in headline 
and core inflation by the end o f 2001 compared to just six months earlier.
2.9 Key economic and monetary developments in Poland: 1993-2001
2.9.1 Introduction
Poland started tlie communist period on a lower level o f  economic development than 
Czechoslovalda or Hungaiy and faced growing political and economic problems 
from the 1960s on, which it tried to resolve during the 1970s and 1980s by 
a  combination o f standard-of-li\ ing increases based on foreign borrowing and 
a  partial economic refomi. At the same time, tlie government faced a  much better 
organised political opposition than in the other two countries, primarily due to 
a  strong backbone provided by the Catholic Church and, after his 1978 election, by 
tlie Pope John Paul II. The economic and political problems came to a  head in 1980- 
81 when a deep recession contributed to mass protests and a resulting martial^ law.
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After the martial law was abolished, the country experienced a decade o f mild 
political repression, which ended in late 1989 in a  negotiated hand-over o f power to 
the first non-communist government in four decades. The shock therapy instituted in 
January 1990 led to massive government unpopularity and tlie political fragility 
manifested itself in goveniment reshuffles.
The 1993 elections were won by the postconiniuiiist party, which governed in 
a  coalition with an agrarian party. The 1993-1997 period meant a slow-down, but 
not a stop o f  structural reforms and macroeconomic policies were moderate. After 
the 1997 elections, the new right-wing coalition tried to speed up structural reforms 
o f  the economy, to refoiiii the health, public administration and education sectors 
and to institute conseiwative fiscal policies. Results were mixed and the 2001 
election saw a  return o f tlie 1993-97 left-wing government, which has had to deal 
with a significant fiscal deficit and a stagnant economy.
As Wellisz (1998) writes, the new government foiiiied in tlie autumn o f 1989 
inherited a partially liberalised and half-dismantled command system and an 
economy on the verge o f hyperinflation. Imbalances in the economy, particularly on 
the fiscal and quasi-fiscal side, were enomious. Poland had a veiy high debt, which 
it was not able to seivice fulK . Due to high inflation, tlie economy suffered from 
extensive dollarisation and demonetisation. In general, Poland was considered to 
have significantly worse initial conditions than other Central European countries. 
(Kolodko, 1989; Sachs, 1993) On the other hand, it should be noted that them was
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already a sizeable private sector at the outset o f  transition and much more 
experience with the features o f a market economy than in Czechoslovakia. (De 
Broeck and Koen, 2000)
In January 1990, a  comprehensive stabilisation and liberalisation programme called 
the Balcerowicz Plan was introduced, including a fixed exchange rate. Fiscal and 
monetary tightening, stmctural reforms and the breakdown o f CMEA markets 
caused a  sharp recession, but a shorter and milder one than in other Central 
European countries. At the same time, inflation was reduced from more tlian 1000% 
to 100% within a year and 50% witliin two years. Tlie initial peg lasted longer than 
expected, but was replaced, after one devaluation, by a crawling peg in October 
1991.
Tlie economic recovery started in late 1991 and Poland enjoyed moderate growtli 
and gradually decreasing inflation until 1994, when the groxvtli rate increased even 
further and the economy grew by more than 5% annually from 1995 until the end o f 
1998. In 1999, tlie real GDP w as 20% higher than in 1989, the highest level o f  all 
transition countries. (Balcerow icz. 2000)
De Broeck and Koen list the following principal reasons for such stellar 
perfoimance, which led to Poland being called ‘a soaring eagle’: low entry barriers 
for new firms, entrepreneurial dynamism o f the private sector, hard budget 
constraints on public enterprises and generous debt relief. At the same time, the
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commercialisation and mass privatisation o f existing state-owned small and medium 
enterprises was rapid and relatively successful. (IMF, 2000) T ie  interesting feature 
o f  the recovery is that manufacturing grew more rapidly tlian services, a doubly 
surprising feat given a generally perceived overindustrialisation o f all communist 
economies.
After hovering around 30% between 1993 and mid-1995, inflation fell rapidly from 
28% to 6% between 1995 and the beginning o f 1999. Lack o f progress in 
disinflation during 1994-1995 can be explained largely by a relatively high rate o f 
crawl and unsuccessflil sterilisation o f die rapid accumulation o f foreign exchange 
reserves, which caused monex supply to grow much faster than projected. T ie  
reserve build-up resulted from a large trade surplus and capital inflows. (OECD, 
1997)
The period o f high growth came to an end in die 1999-2001 period. While the 
impact o f  the Russian crisis xvas an important factor, the key to an abrupt slowdown 
lies in stmctural impediments in the economy. The restucturing o f large enterprises 
was more drawn out than in the other three countries. Sales o f state-owned banks 
began in 1993, but by 1998, half o f bank assets were still in state hands. (IMF, 
2000, p. 4)
Equally importantly, the privatisation and restmcturing o f sensitive sectors -  mining, 
agriculture and steel -  essentially stalled during the 1993-1997 period. Uibour
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market flexibility in Poland continued to be low and deteriorated fiirtlier following 
new labour legislation. The new government that came to power in the autumn of 
1997 tried to speed up structural refoims, but was overwhelmed by its many 
priorities and by the political sensitivity o f  key sectors.
As a  result, the rapid growth increasingly resembled overheating, with the current 
account deficit reaching record highs and an actual increase in inflation in 1999. 
Monetaiy policy became more restrictive in 1997 and early 1998, but was relaxed 
later in 1998 and 1999 in response to tlie Russian crisis. However, the resumption o f 
swift growth and external imbalances in early 1999 led to a  very tight policy in late 
1999, 2000 and 2001. The restrictive monetary policy was aided by a  switch to an 
inflation targeting framework in September 1998. At tlie same time, exchange rate 
flexibility was gradually increased with a band o f 10, 12.5 and then 15% around the 
central parity in 1998 and 1999. Finally the currency was floated in April 2000. 
Continuing capital inflows, resulting from FDI and high interest rates, significantly 
strengthened the currency, and that strenghtening was a deliberate part o f the 
disinflation effort.
With real interest rates reaching 10%, the economy quickly slowed down, the real 
GDP growtli collapsed from more than 6% in late 1999 to 1% in late 2001 and 
unemployment reached the highest level among OECD countries. Inflation and the 
cunent account deficit also decreased shaiply, leading to repeated cuts in interest 
rates. However, economic problems contributed to amounting fiscal deficit and
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a smaller drop in the current account deficit than desired by the central bank. 
Consequently, monetaiy policy remained highly restrictive, witli the policy rate at 
11.5% in the 4tli quarter o f 2001 compared to annualised inflation o f  3.6% during 
tlie same period.
Table 2.15: M acroeconomic data, Poland, 1993-2001, in%
1993 1994 199.5 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP growtli 3.8 5,2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 2.6
Average
inflation
35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 15.0 11.8 7.3 10.1 5.9
unemployiiieiit 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 10.5 10.1 13.0 15.0 17.0
CA
deficit/GDP
- - - -1.0 -3.0 -4.3 -7.5 -6.3 -5.5
Source: ING Barings
2.9.2 The monetary policy framework
As in the other three countries, the main task o f monetary policy in Poland during 
the 1993-2001 period was to disinflate from a high initial level. Wliat was 
idiosyncratic about Poland was the extremely high initial level o f price increases -  
Poland suffered from hyperinflation o f more than 1000% in later 1989/early 1990, 
whereas tlie highest inflation rates experienced by other Central European countries 
never reached more than 50% and that only for miniscule periods.
Hyperinflation made disinflation more challenging not only because o f a higher 
initial level, but also because it induced, together with the subsequent difficulty o f 
bringing inflation down, widespread indexation, especially in wages. (OECD, 1997, 
pp. 28-29)
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High inflation in the early 1990s is linked to another Polish idiosyncrasy - an 
extremely weak fiscal position. As shown in more detail below, the primary cause 
high inflation was the need to finance extensive fiscal deficits without a  developed 
debt market. Tlie fiscal problem abated in the mid-1990s, but came back with the 
2000-2001 recession though b\ that time financial markets were sufficiently 
developed and the central bank independent enough to counter monetisation o f the 
deficit.
Finally, as a result o f experiences from the 1980s, Poland suffered from the highest 
level o f dollarisation and demonetisation in the sample. Despite impressive reversals 
in the first half o f  the 1990s, the level o f  financial inteimediation and the use o f the 
domestic currency have been low er than in Hungary, Czech Republic or Slovakia. 
Therefore, the transition witnessed higher money growth than in tlie otlier three 
countries not only in nominal, but also in real temis.
In response to these factors, Polish policy-makers chose to start the transition witli 
a strong nominal anchor -  a fixed exchange rate linked to the US dollar -  aimed at 
braking the hyperinflation. On Januaiy 1, 1990, most trade-related foreign exchange 
rate transactions were liberalised. The peg lasted until October 1991, with just one 
devaluation o f  16.8% and a gradual shift in the basket towards emphasis on 
European currencies. In October 1991, Poland introduced a  monetary policy
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framework that existed, albeit in a modified fomi, until September 1998 and canied 
tlie economy through much o f the transition.
The central bank’s strategy was to combine two elements: ‘The intermediate target 
was to increase the money supply under conditions o f crawling devaluation o f the 
Zloty vis-à-vis the basket o f currencies, witli limited fluctuations o f the real 
exchange rate within the permitted band”. (National Bank o f Poland, 1998, p, 8) As 
tlie central baiil( itself admitted, the strategy did not allow it to meet the two 
intermediate targets in fiilL “although initially, given the limited links between tlie 
Polish economy and the global financial market implying greater monetary policy 
sovereignty, it allowed for reducing inflation” , (ibid.) It was the exchange rate tliat 
continued to serve as the nominal anchor.
In the 1993-1995 period, the rate o f crawl was substantially below the rate o f 
inflation and tlie exchange rate band was extremely narrow -  0.5%. This policy o f 
fighting inflation with a relatively strong foreign exchange rate attracted large 
capital inflows due to a large uncovered interest rate paiity. In 1995, tlie exchange 
rate band was widened to 2% and later to 7% and the rate o f crawl was kept 
essentially steady despite falling inflation until 1998.
During the whole period, the exchange rate target always prevailed over tlie 
monetary target as evidenced by the fact tliat the monetary targets were overshot 
each year between 1994 and 1997. Tliis was largely a consequence o f the
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authorities’ inability to fine-tune monetary growth, which was swayed by capital 
inflows, especially in the 1994-95 period.
Table 2.16: Monetary Policy Framework in Poland
Year Operational target Intermediate Target
(actual developments in 
parcnllieses)
Final Target 
(actual end-of-the-year 
inflation in parentheses)
1993 Short-term interbank 
interest rates
Crawling peg exchange rate 
mechanism (2%, later 1.6% 
monthly devaluation) 
and complementary target of 
M2 growtli of PLN 15 bln 
(PLN 14.8 bhi)
Target for CPI inflation: 
32.2% (37.6%)
1994 Short-tenn interbank 
interest rates
Crawling peg exchange rate 
mechanism (1.5%, later 1.4% 
monthly devaluation) and 
complementary target o f M2 
growth o f PLN 15.5-16.9 bln 
(PLN 21.4 bhi)
Target for CPI inflation: 
23% (22.5%)
1995 Short-term mterbank 
interest rates
Crawling peg exchange rate 
mechanism, since May 
Crawling ER band ±7 % (1.4%, 
later 1.2% montlily 
devaluation) and 
comiilementary target o f M2 
grow th of PLN 17.1 bln (PLN 
26.9 bhi)
Target for CPI inflation: 
16.9% (21.6%)
1996 Reserve money Crawling ER band ±7 % (1% 
monthly devaluation) 
and complementary target o f  
M2 growtli PLN 23 bln (PLN 
30.5 bhi)
Target for CPI inflation: 
17% (18.5%)
1997 Reserve money Crawling ER band ±7 % (1% 
monthly devaluation) 
and complementary target of  
M2 growtli PLN 27.4-28.6 bln 
(PLN 39.8 bhi)
Target for CPI inflation: 
15% (13.5%)
1998 Interest rates Crawling ER band ±7 % 
extended 10 and finally to 
12.5% (1%, later 0.8% and 0.6, 
finally 0.5% monthly 
devaluation)
Target for CPI inflation: 
9.5 % (8.6 %)
1999 Interest rates Crawling ER band ±12.5% 
extended 15% (0.5%, later 
0..1% montlily devaluation)
Target for CPI mflation: 
8 -8.5%  (9.8%)
2000 Interest rates Crawling ER band ±15% (0.3% 
monthly devaluation)
Since April 2000 fully floating 
ER mechanism
Target for CPI mflation: 
5.4-6.8%  (8.5%)
2001 Interest rates Target for CPI mflation:
6 -8% (3.6%) __
Source: author based on data provided by National Bank of Poland and National Bank of Slovakia
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From late 1995, the exchange rate was increasingly unable to provide a precise 
nominal anchor as the central bank allowed it an increasing flexibility within the 7% 
band around tlie central parity. In an environment where inflation was still above 
20%, the importance o f the issue was limited. However, during 1998, as inflation 
steadily approached 10% and the band was expanded to 10 and 12.5% and later even 
to 15%, the central bank decided it was time for anew  monetary framework.
Table 2.17: Changes in the rate of crawl of the Polish zloty
Date Rate o f crawl
October 14,1991 1.8%
September 12,1994 1.5%
August 27,1993 1.6%, also devaluation by 7.4%
November 30, 1994 1.4%
Febmary 16,1995 1.2%
January 8,1996 1%
Febmary 25,1998 0.8%
July 16,1998 0.65%
September 9,1999 0.5%
March 24,1999 0.3%
April 12,2000 End o f  the crawling peg
Source: National Bank of Poland
Table 2.18: Development of currency basket in Poland, 1990-2000
Period Composition o f the currency basket
Januaiy 1990-A pril 1991 USD 100%
May 1991 -  December 
1998
USD 45%. 1 )EM 35%, GBP 10%, FFR 5%, 5% CNF
Januaiy 1999 -  April 2000 EUR 55%. USD 45%
Source: National Bank o f Poland
In 1997 and 1998, monetaiy policy in Poland underwent substantial institutional 
transfomiation related to approval o f anew  constitution that included all EU
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accession requirements including those for EMU entrj'. The newly established 
Monetary Policy Council decided to switch to inflation targeting.
In Poland, inflation targeting meant a more significant change in monetaiy policy 
than in tlie Czech Republic, but even so its impact on actual policy should not be 
overstated. Exchange rate flexibility was quite high already and the new framework 
should be seen, to some extent, as a reaction to the loss o f a  nominal anchor in 
a tightly regimented exchange rate. The timing o f inflation targeting was closer to 
the mainstream experience than in the Czech case - it was introduced after the bulk 
o f  disinflation was achieved, when the inflation was actually decreasing, but the 
difficult part o f disinflating from the 10% level remained to be done. Inflation 
targeting was accompanied by a gradual change in exchange rate policy -  as already 
noted, exchange rate targeting was increasingly weak to non-existent and was 
officially terminated by April 2000.
2.9.3 Monetary developments 1993-2001
Monetary developments in the early 1990s were driven by an inherited 
hyperinflation and continuing fiscal weakness. Since institutions that allowed 
domestic creditors to absorb government debt were only gradually developing and 
Poland was not in good standing with foreign creditors, a decreasing, but large 
portion o f  the deficit had to be directly monetised via the central bank. Tliere is 
a consensus in much o f the literature that during tlie 1991-1994 period, this factor
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contributed most significantly to continuing high inflation in Poland (see, for 
example, Chopra, 1994; Van Wijnbergen and Budina, 2001 and Wellisz, 1998). 
Even in 1994, tlie financing o f the fiscal deficit accounted for 50% o f the increase in 
monetary aggregates (OECD, 1997, p. 30-32) though this rapidly declined to 5% by 
1995.
Despite the fiscal weakness, inflation dropped significantly between 1990 and 1993, 
but then fluctuated wildly on a slightly downward trend between 1993 and early 
1995, overshooting inflation targets. (OECD, 1997, pp. 26-27) In addition to fiscal 
problems, an increasingly important inflationaiy factor in 1994-1995 was the rapid 
accumulation o f foreign exchange reserves resulting from a large trade surplus and 
capital inflows. Consequently, the money supply grew much faster tlian projected. 
(OECD, 1997, pp. 30-32)
After initial policy confusion in 1993 and much o f 1994, a strong policy response 
gradually emerged in the second half o f 1994 and early 1995. It built on the previous 
decision to sterilise much of the capital inflow, but went further. In 1994, the central 
bank began a policy o f cutting interest rates despite inflation that was not yet falling 
significantly in order to decrease the interest rate differential. In 1995, tlie exchange 
rate band was widened to 2% and later 7% to increase uncertainty for speculative 
inflows. T ie  rate o f crawl was cut from from 1.6% to 1.2% in six months between 
August 1994 and Febniaiy 1995, opening an approximately 10% gap between 
inflation and the rate o f depreciation o f the central parity.
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T ie  policy proved a success in teniis o f disinflation as Poland experienced four 
uninterrupted four years o f rapid disinflation -  from a high o f 29% in February 1995 
to a  low o f 6% in June 1999. During the whole period, tlie M2 growth not only 
outstripped the nominal GDP growth, but was also highly erratic. The apparently 
smooth disinflation contains four quite different periods. During the first one, 
interest rates fell in harmony with falling inflation until the end o f 1996. At the 
same, a dynamic period in bank lending to households and enterprises began 
(OECD, 1998), together with rapid growth o f  domestic demand “induced by rapidly 
growing real wages, extensive lending and a relatively high fiscal deficit”. ft4BP, 
1998, p. 5)
In 1996, the current account deficit grew dramatically and inflation, while declining, 
overshot the official target. In response, the central bank steadily tightened monetary 
policy from tlie last quarter. Most o f tlie restriction took place in 1997 and early 
1998, when NBP raised interest rates several times up to 24%. (OECD, 2000, pp. 45 
-  46) At tlie same time, the rate o f crawl was kept steady until the decreasing 
inflation matched it to prevent further real exchange rate appreciation (OECD, 1998)
In response to a continuing brisk decline in inflation and stabilisation in tlie current 
account deficit, the policy was relaxed mildly in m id-1998 and tlien rapidly during 
late 1998 and early 1999, as the Russian crisis hit the Polish economy through 
financial maiket turbulence and a collapse in exports to Russia. The GDP growth
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fell dramatically from more than 6% in the spring o f 1998 to 1% a year later, but the 
slowdown was short-lived and the growth rate approached 6% again in tire last 
quarter o f 1999.
At the same time, a combination o f demand-side and supply-side factors caused a 
reversal in tlie path o f disinflation. The supply-side factors were similar to those in 
the other three countries during the period -  jumps in oil and food prices. On tlie 
demand side, it is wortli noting that monetary expansion continued during the whole 
period, with M2 growth running above 20% durmg 1999. Lending both to 
enterprises and households continued to grow swiftly and was a key source o f tlie 
expansion. (OECD, 2000) The external imbalance deepened as well and, following 
the Czech and Slovak cuiTcncx crises, was perceived as the most binding constraint. 
The central bank originally had an inflation target o f 8-8.5% for 1999, which was 
revised to 6.6-7.8% in early 1999 when the inflation pressures were at their lowest. 
Instead, tlie end-of-year increase in the CPI was 9.8%.
All o f these factors elicited a robust response from monetary policy. During much o f 
1999, the tightening was mild as there was a high level o f uncertainty concerning 
future developments -  the 3-month interbank interest rate rose from 12.9% in 
Febmary 1999 to 14.1% in September 1999. In response to dramatic increases in 
real GDP, inflation and the current account deficit and an unresponsive fiscal policy, 
interest rates were then raised by more than 5%, with the 3-nionth interbank rate 
reaching 19.6% in November 2000.
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The policy o f high interest rates was successflii in ameliorating key macroeconomic 
imbalances, but at a high cost. After peaking at 11% in July 2000, inflation dropped 
to 3.6% in December 2001 and has continued to fall. The current account deficit 
dropped mildly from its peak in 1999. On the otlier hand, the real GDP grew by just 
0.5% at the end o f 2001 and unemployment reached a  record high o f 17%.
At the same time, the gap between nominal GDP and M2 growth closed during 1999 
and 2000, but the paths soon diverged again, confirming instability o f  the monetary 
aggregate especially vis-à-vis turning points in the economic cycle. The foreign 
exchange rate contributed to disinflation by appreciating in nominal terms by about 
10% during 1999 and 2000, but this was more than reversed in 2001.
Slowing growth and massive unemploymient contributed to a fiscal crisis worsened 
by the political cycle as the 2001 parliamentary elections delayed a  governmental 
response to the problem. As a result, the current account deficit remained relatively 
high at more than 5% o f GDP.
Between December 2000 and 2001. interest rates were cut again (since mid-2000) in 
step with tlie slowing economy and the dramatic decrease in inflation, however, 
these steps failed to raise growth or decrease unemployment even during early 2002. 
T ie  real interest rates remained high, with the central bank arguing that furtlier
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relaxation is contingent on government resolving the fiscal and structural problems 
in the Polish economy.
2.10 Key economic and m onetary developments in Slovakia: 1993-2001
2.10.1 Introduction
Slovakia is one o f the two successor states o f Czechoslovakia, the other one being 
tlie Czech Republic. After becoming independent in 1993, Slovakia entered 
a turbulent political path o f  heightened conflict between nationalists with a  strong 
flavour o f crony capitalism and questionable regard for a rule o f law and a loose 
group o f  more pro-Western parties. After tlie former won eaiiy elections in 1994, 
Slovakia diverged from its former path o f EU and NATO integration and rapid 
economic refonn, which resulted in tlie exclusion o f Slovakia from the first group o f 
NATO entrants and countries negotiating EU accession in 1997 and in a  currency 
crisis in 1998. Following the 1998 parliamentary elections, apro-W estem 
government witli a strong majority was elected, proceeding, despite internal 
conflicts, witli important political and economic reforms. Tlie right-wing part o f that 
government was essentially re-elected in the 2002 elections with a mandate to speed 
up stmctural refomis.
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The Slovak economy was hit much harder than its Czech counterpart by the 
transition recession as its industrialisation during tlie commimist period made it 
more dependent on CMEA markets and assigned it tlie position o f a processor o f  
raw materials and producer o f simpler manufactures. Consequently, the transition 
recession was more painful in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, manifesting 
itself in divergent development o f unemployment, which exceeded 10% in Slovakia 
in 1991 while the Czech unemployment rate hovered between 3 and 5% during the 
same period.
On January 1, 1993, the independent Slovak Republic was formed. Five weeks later, 
on February 8, 1993, the Czecho-Slovak monetary union split and Slovakia began 
implementing a fully independent monetary policy. Due to a loss o f fiscal transfers 
from the Czech Republic and the continuation o f  the economic downturn caused by 
the decrease in trade witli the Czech Republic, Slovakia underwent a second round 
o f painful adjustment during 1993 and early 1994. (Toth, 2000)
The adjustment paid off in 1994, when die Slovak economy was able to take 
advantage o f recover}' in its main export markets o f die EU and the Czech Republic 
and export-led growth climbed to nearly 5% in 1994 and nearly 7% in 1995. At die 
same time, a lower structural deficit and the recovery led to a small fiscal surplus in 
1995. At the same time, the existence o f a fixed exchange rate, a long-standing 
culture o f  low inflation and a near-freeze in regulated prices contributed to 
impressive disinflation.
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Tlie recovery was based on the ability o f niciny Slovak enterprises to supply 
intermediate manufacturing inputs and simple goods for OECD markets, which are 
both highly cyclical. Wlien the growth in Western Europe slowed down in 1996, the 
impact on die Slovak economy was as strong as tlie influence o f the previous upturn. 
(OECD, 1999)
Tlie Slovak government then embarked on a policy o f growing out o f  problems via 
extensive infirastmctural investment and real wage increases. The official fiscal 
balance worsened somewhat, but most o f the stimulus was hidden via private and 
quasi-private borrowing with government guarantees. (OECD, 1999) The current 
account imbalance, which reached more than 10% in 1996 and remained at that level 
until 1998, is, in many ways, a better measure o f the effect o f the stimulus to 
domestic demand provided by fiscal policy.
A t the same time, privatisation continued through die 1994-1997 period with large 
industrial enterprises, especially those in the chemical, oil and paper industry as well 
as metallurgy that fomied a backbone o f die Slovak economy through their export 
earnings. Tlie process was tinged by massive levels o f cronyism and a defective 
incentive structure that motivated overinvestment or asset-stripping, based on a 
specific situation in each enterprise. (Beblavy, 2000b)
149
Monetary policy responded sw iftly to fiscal expansion and worsening external 
imbalance by sharply raising interest rates. Real ex post interest rates remained 
between 13 and 25% until early 1999, as fiscal policy refiised to tighten and 
contagion from the Asian and the Russian crisis had to be dealt with. At the same 
time, state-owned banks, burdened witli a high level o f non-performing loans and 
political interference, did not provide a reliable channel for monetary policy.
Tlie combination o f a  very high twin deficit and extremely high real interest rates 
was not sustainable in tlie mediiim-temi and ended in a currency crisis similar to the 
Czech crisis: started by contagion from the Russian crisis, domestic enterprises and 
households took over in speculating against tlie fixed exchange rate. After trying to 
stave off depreciation for several weeks, the central bank capitulated on October 1, 
1998, and floated the currency.
After the parliamentar}' elections o f 1998, a new policy o f stabilisation and rapid 
structural reforms began, reliei ing imbalances at tlie expense o f increased inflation 
and unemployment as well as slower GDP growtli. Many o f the enterprises 
privatised during the 1994-1997 period collapsed in 1998 and 1999 or had to 
downsize drastically. Regulated prices, particularly o f utilities, were repeatedly 
raised to catch up with cost-rccovery levels. Large state-owned banks, technically 
insolvent by 1998, were consolidated and privatised, togetlier wdth many utilities. 
Tlie new owners o f tlie country's industrial base essentially resold it to investors 
from tlie OECD countries.
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A decrease in the fiscal deficit and in household consumption produced a temporary 
and substantial reduction in the external imbalance during 1999 and 2000, while 
core inflation remained stable. Growth, which dropped below 2% in 1999, began to 
recover by tlie end o f that year. However, in 2001 and 2002, as the political cycle 
turned into its second half, stiiictural reforms stalled, the fiscal deficit grew due to 
cuts in direct taxes and the current account deficit began to grow substantially 
though it did not reach the 1996-1998 levels. At the same time, it was financed by 
FDI rather than by borrowing.
Table 2.19: Macroeconomic data, Slovakia, 1993-2001, in%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP growtli -6.9 5.2 6.5 5.8 5.6 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.3
average
inflation
23.2 13.5 10.0 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.0 7.3
Unemployment 12.2 13.7 13.1 11.3 11.8 12.5 16.2 18.6 19.2
CA deficit/GDP -4.0 5.0 2.7 -9.6 -9.2 -9.0 -4.9 -3.6 -8.6
Source: INO Barings
2.10.2 The monetary policy frame work
The situation in Slovakia has been, in many ways, similar to the Czech environment 
described earlier. Wliile disinflation was the key challenge for monetary policy, 
Czechoslovakia entered the transition with stable macroeconomic fimdamentals, it 
generally managed to implement pmdent fiscal and monetary policies and, 
consequently, the issues faced by monetaiy policy during initial years o f transition 
were, in many respects, not as daunting as was the case in Hungary and Poland.
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Independence in 1993 changed the situation dramatically - the low credibility o f 
botli fiscal and monetary policy o f the new state, the low foreign exchange reserves 
and a stmggle for fiscal adjustment created pressure on macroeconomic policy, 
which monetary policy managed to withstand while continuing disinflation. In the 
medium teim, though, Slovakia proved susceptible to tlie disease o f twin deficits and 
external constraints on growth.
Tlie effect o f  banking on monetary policy was also similar to the Czech Republic -  
the phenomena o f overbanking and uneven budget constraints strengthened the hold 
o f  monetary policy over enterprise activity, but in a highly non-linear manner - as 
long as the budget constraint ivas soft on many enterprises, the demand was quite 
inelastic to tlie interest rate.
At the beginning o f the transition period, the Czechoslovak policy-makers had to 
introduce a monetary policy framework taking advantage o f sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals, but also able to deal witli the uncertainties o f transition. Tlie policy 
response was a fixed exchange rate as tlie intermediate target o f  monetary policy 
complemented by a monetary target. Details o f  tlie policy framework and its 
fiilfilment are shown in table 2.20.
Independent Slovakia continued in the Czechoslovak monetary policy framework o f 
a  fixed exchange rate (including a single 10% devaluation in July 1993). Due to
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lower capital inflows as ivell as less rapid financial innovation, the velocity o f 
money was more stable and Slovak policy-makers were able to adhere to their 
monetary targets more than the Czech central bank. Tlie basic policy framework was 
quite stable between 1993 and 1998 and the final inflation targets were generally 
achieved by the central bank.
Table 2.20; Monetary Policy Framework in Slovakia
Year Operational target Intermediate Target
(actual developments in 
parentlieses)
Final Target 
(actual inflation in 
parentheses)
1993 Not clearly defined Hxclnuige rate band o f  0.5 
% and complementary M2 
growüi 19% (18.5%)
CPI inflation; 30.4% 
(25.1%)
1994 Not clearly defined Exchange rate band o f  1.5 
% and complementary M2 
growth 13.2% (18.6%)
CPI inflation: 10-13.2% 
(11.7%)
1995 Not clearly defined Exchange rate band o f  1.5 
% and complementary M2 
growUi 12.3% (21.2%)
CPI hiflation: 8-10% 
(7.2%)
1996 Short temi interest rates Exclnuige rate band o f 5% 
togetlier witli M2 growtli 
11.6% (16.6%)
CPI inflation: 6.0-7.2% 
(5.4%)
1997 Not clearly defined Exchange rate band o f 7% 
together witli M2 growtli 
10.7(8.8%)
CPI inflation: 4.9-5.8% 
(6.4%)
1998 Not clearly defined Exchange rate band o f 7% 
together witli M2 growtli 
9.4% (2.5%)
CPI inflation: 5.6-5.9% 
(5.6%)
1999 Not clearly defined M2 growtli 6.0-8.8% 
tlO.7%)
Net inflation (witliout 
regulated and food prices): 
6.0-7.5 (6.1)
CPI 13.5-15.5% (14.2)
2000 Short term interest rates core inflation (witliout 
regulated prices); 4.7-5.8% 
G 6 )
CPI 8.8-9.9 (8.4)
2001 Short tenn mteresl rates core inflation (without 
regulated prices): 3.6-5.3% 
(3.2)
CPI 6.7-8.2% (6.5)
Source: author based on data provided by Xalional Bank of Slovakia
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It also simplified the currency basket and gradually increased the weight o f  DEM as 
the currency o f  the key export markets (directly in Gennany, but also indirectly in 
other ERM member countries). ^
Table 2.21; Composition of the currency basket in Slovakia, 1991-1998
Period Composition of the currency basket
January 1991 -  December 1991 USD 31.3%, DEM 45.5%, ATS 12.4%, 
GBP 4.2%, CHF 6.6%
January 1992-June 1994 USD 49.1%, DEM 36.2%, ATS 8.1%, 
FRF 2.9%, CHF 3.8%
July 1994 -  October 1998 USD 40%, DEM 60%
Source: National Bank of Slovakia
Following the currency crisis, the central bank gradually switched from an 
exchange-rate-targeting regime to a new one. Its shape has not been altogether clear 
though. The 1999 Monetary^ Program stated: “NBS will target net inflation^ at the 
level o f  5 - 7%, while anticipating a primary effect on the overall consumer price 
index o f  about 2 percentage points for every average 10% increase in regulated 
prices. NBS will only influence secondary effects o f price deregulation, in the sense 
o f acting against ‘price contagion"’. (NBS, 1998, p. 2)
 ^The Czechoslovak crown was devalued several times in the second half o f  1990 in order to reduce 
the differential between tire official and the parallel black market exchange rate, and to create tlie 
requisite conditions for tlie intioduclion of internal convertibility of tlie crown on January 1, 1991 
(Svejiiar, 1993, p. 33). The introduction of internal convertibility meant unrestricted access to foreign 
currency for all domestic legal entities for conmiercial purposes and, to a limited degree, also for 
individuals. Tlie exchange rate regime was gradually liberalised tlirough tlie abandonment o f  
admmistrative restrictions. This action preceded tlie introduction o f full current account convertibility 
on October 1, 1995. The capital account also underwent gradual liberalization.
 ^ Net hiflation covers non-tradables without regulated prices and tradables witliout food -  55% of 
CPI, while core inflation consists non-tradables witliout regulated prices and all tradables -  82% of 
CPI.
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The monetary program thus contained tlie expression ‘target net inflation’. In tlie 
2000 Monetary program, NBS stated that “development o f headline inflation will be 
a subject o f predictions, while the core inflation will gradually become a target o f 
NBS” . (NBS, 1999, p. 3) These statements led several authors (Beblavy, 2000a; 
Dufek and Odor, 2000; Toth, 2000) to assume that the current monetary policy 
framework in Slovakia is inflation targeting, similar to regimes implemented in the 
Czech Republic and Poland.
Tlie monetary policy o f NBS exliibits several features that point to inflation 
targeting. NBS does not have aii\ other targets and began to communicate more with 
the public. On the other hand, there is no increased accountability and NBS has not 
stated what is tlie horizon for reaching price stability or at least low inflation. NBS 
has not begun to publish an inflation report. NBS officials point to the 2000 
Monetary program, which states that core inflation will become an explicit target 
only in a few years. According to these positions, NBS cannot at the moment take 
responsibility for the development o f inflation due to the turbulent and unpredictable 
environment.
In conclusion, NBS probably has not implemented any o f the four major monetary 
policy frameworks (exchange rate targeting, inflation targeting, monetary targeting 
and nominal GDP targeting). Its policy can be characterised as implicit inflation 
targeting with a  significant amount o f  discretion as opposed to the constrained 
discretion o f inflation targeting.
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At the same time, the central bank continued to pay attention to movements in the 
exchange rate. In its monetaiy program for 1999, NBS stated: “NBS expects to 
intervene on the cun ency market to decrease the volatility o f  the foreign exchange 
rate. The overall trend in foreign exchange rate development though will depend on 
economic fundamentals and will, tlierefore, not be directly a concern o f NBS 
intervention”. (NBS, 1998) In its monetary program for 2000, NBS stated: “NBS 
expects appreciation pressures. It is ready to intervene against excessive volatility 
[of the exchange rate] as in 1999. There is however, no precise level and band for 
intervention. It is expected that under favourable macroeconomic developments, tlie 
intent o f  NBS will be to stabilise the foreign exchange rate approximately at the 
current level”. (NBS, 1999) In its monetary program for 2001, NBS stated: 
“ [Exchange rate policy] will continue to be focused on eliminating excessive 
volatility o f the exchange rate, while tlie trend o f  appreciation should be influenced 
by expected economic fimdamentals.” (NBS, 2000)
This approach was motivated not only by a position that the market should be left to 
find an equilibrium exchange rate, but also by tlie low foreign exchange reserves 
after the ultimately unsuccessful defence o f the peg in 1998. However, it is very 
difficult to determine when the central bank is intervening against excessive 
volatility and when it is inten ening against the level o f  the exchange rate and the 
statements on exchange rate policy have been progressively more and more vague as 
the central bank learned that it did not want to commit itself beforehand.
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Tlie National Bank o f Slovakia intervened on the market in May 1999, when it 
supported the currency, from December 1999 until May 2000 when it sought to 
weaken the currency, and in May 2000 when it supported the currency again. The 
intei*ventions in May 1999 and May 2000 can be considered interventions against 
volatility as there were substantial intra-day movements. However, in this case as 
well as during tlie December 1999-May 2000 period, the movements in the 
exchange rate that prompted the intervention were a consequence o f a  market 
sentiment, which was o f a more pemianent nature. Tliere have also been strong 
indications o f  bands, which the central bank sought to defend in both directions, but 
which shifted over time.
2.10.3 Monetary developments 1993-2001
Wlien looking at monetary policy after the break-up o f Czechoslovakia, we have to 
keep in mind the dilemma faced by NBS in tlie first years o f  the existence o f the 
independent Slovak Republic. High inflation, low credibility o f both fiscal and 
monetary policy o f the new state, low foreign exchange reserves, relaxed fiscal 
policy, and the consequent deficit o f tlie current account o f tlie balance o f payments 
triggered pressures for further internal (inflation) and external (devaluation) 
depreciation o f tlie currency.
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It became obvious soon after the dissolution o f Czechoslovalda on Januaiy 1, 1993 
that due to high expectations o f devaluation early in 1993 and low foreign exchange 
reserves, the exchange rate o f the crown was unsustainable given the prevalent 
degree o f liberalisation o f the foreign exchange market and transactions. NBS 
responded witli a series o f  administrative measures, mainly involving limits to 
bailies' access to foreign currenc) fluids (NBS, 1994, p. 47) and delaying payments 
for imports. Tliis approach alone could not achieve success, because it could not 
increase confidence in the Slovak crown. The low levels o f credibility and foreign 
exchange reserves were not the only problems: the fiscal deficit and external deficits 
were also an issue. Tlie aforementioned administrative measures amounted to de 
facto restrictions on internal convertibility, which could only temporarily moderate 
the effects o f these problems, but not resolve them. A purely administrative solution 
would have led to a furtlier deepening o f tlie imbalance and a  gradual backsliding on 
foreign exchange regime liberalisation.
On the other hand, a pure ‘market’ solution - a drastic devaluation to the tune o f 20 
to 40% - presented some major risks. Due to the one-time character o f  the price level 
increase in Januaiy 1993, inflation was expected to stabilise at the level reached in 
1992 - around 10% - relatii ch  rapidly as long as the exchange rate remained 
unchanged. A major devaluation would have probably resulted in a sharp increase in 
inflation due to the openness o f the Slovak economy. Tliis would have added a  more 
significant inflationary impulse to the one-time impulse from the beginning o f tlie 
year. The result would probably have been a sharp rise in medium-term inflationary
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expectations with subsequent problems for economic policy along with the erosion 
o f  the gains from the sharp devaluation.
Therefore, the combination o f instruments chosen in 1993 by the National Bank o f 
Slovakia - administrative tools combined with a  10% devaluation - can be 
considered a  suitable choice, as evidenced by the fact tliat the crown's exchange rate 
was sustained and most administrative measures were eliminated as early as in 
December 1993. This rate was then sustained until October 1998.
The end o f 1993 marked a turning point in Slovakia's economic situation. In 1994 
and 1995, the economy saw high levels o f growth relative to tlie rest o f  the region. 
During this period, NBS did not focus on aggressive disinflation, but instead 
accommodatingly allowed the economy to grow', concentrated on eliminating some 
administrative barriers, and accumulated foreign exchange reserves. I f  we compare 
tlie inflation in 1992 with the inflation in the years 1994 and 1995, we can see that 
after the effect o f tlie aforementioned changes in 1993 subsided, inflation gradually 
returned to 1992 levels (especial!} if the inflation is cleansed o f volatile food prices, 
which are to a large extent determined by supply-side factors).
After several years o f a transitional recession, NBS saw as one o f its targets “a 
growth-promoting monetar} policy set within the framework o f anti-inflationary 
intentions”. (NBS, 1996, p. 14) The target was successfrilly met in 1994 and 1995 
when simultaneously with rapid GDP growth, the inflation declined. But monetary
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policy affects inflation with a one-year and in some countries even a  two-year lag. 
This raises the question of whether NBS, through its pro-growth policy in 1995, did 
not sow the seeds o f fiitiire internal and external imbalances, which had to be dealt 
with tlirough heavily restrictive policies in the years 1996-1998. The question is also 
raised by an analysis o f  real interest rates in Slovakia in 1995 and overall monetary 
policy in Slovakia during this period. In 1995, inflation in Slovalda was already at 
fairly low levels, but throughout the year, real interest rates remained negative (tlie 
only such period between 1993 and 1999). Tliis implies an even larger decline o f 
nominal rates. This event was o f great importance in tliis period due to the open 
character o f  the Slovak econom\’ and a fixed exchange rate. We can tlius speak o f a 
significantly expansioiiaiy monetar)' policy.
Ill 1996, particularly in the second half, fiscal policy became sharply expansionary 
(see for example Miklos and Zitnansky, 1997 and NBS, 1997). The years 1996 to 
1998 in Slovakia then saw a textbook example o f a conflict between monetaiy and 
fiscal policy. Fiscal policy was heavily expansionary and accompanied by twin 
deficits (high fiscal deficit and high deficit in the current account o f tlie balance o f 
payments).
During the 1996-1998 period, fiscal policy was significantly expansionary, to which 
monetary policy responded b>- strong tightening. However, the imbalance was so 
significant that the restriction was ultimately not enough. NBS could have 
theoretically used an even more restrictive monetaiy policy to resolve the imbalance.
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prevent an overheating o f the economy and the deepening o f internal and external 
imbalances. However, real interest rates were already extremely high - for instance, 
at the beginning o f  April 1997, ox post real interest rates in Slovakia reached 13.1%, 
while in Czech Republic in the same period they were 5.3% and in Hungary 1.5%.^ 
A further rate increase would have particularly affected the credit position o f the 
state, which during die 1996 to 1998 period had drained away most domestic 
savings. But the state displayed low levels o f interest elasticity o f demand even in 
the following period and it was unlikely that an interest rate increase would have 
altered its behavior.
High interest rates were alread) causing distortions in the economy through the 
general phenomenon o f adverse selection, when rising interest rates attract 
applicants witli higher-risk or rent-seeking projects. In addition, unevenly distributed 
access o f  economic entities to foreign currency credit posed an even more 
significant distortion. These loans were available primarily to larger entities and to 
ones with a government guarantee. A stricter monetaiy policy would have 
exacerbated this imbalance.
After three years o f CPI inflation between 5 and 7%, inflation increased steeply 
during 1999 and 2000, particularK' between July 1999 and July 2000 when it was 
above 14%. Tliis w'as caused primarily by high increases in regulated prices, 
increases in indirect taxes, the réintroduction o f an import surcharge and the
 ^Ex post real interest rates were calculated by deflating nominal interbank interest rates in the period. 
By year-on-year CPI inflation in lire same period.
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depreciation o f the Sloval< crow n. However, once the one-time shocks related to 
these factors disappeared, inflation fell substantially and returned to previous levels. 
The increase in inflation is related to temporary phenomena and in particular to four 
increases in regulated prices and indirect taxes -  January 1999, July 1999, February 
2000 and January and Febniaiy 2001.
These factors allowed the central bank to significantly loosen monetary policy. A 
dramatic decrease in government demand for domestic savings and decrease in bank 
interest in other than risk-free lending activities accompanied economic slowdown. 
This was caused by a decrease in the general government deficit as well as by the 
shifting o f some o f its financing to foreign markets and by bank restructuring. All o f 
tliis resulted in a steep fall in interest rates without a corresponding steep increase in 
lending (which was the case in 1995).
U iese factors began to weal<en during the second half o f 2000 and the first half o f 
2001. The real GDP growth began to accelerate during 2000 and 2001 and 
household consumption and investment began to grow again by the final quarter o f 
2000 and the first quarter o f 2001. At the same time, employment and real wages 
also began to grow. On the other hand, the fiscal deficit stabilised and then 
increased, together with renew ed sharp growth o f the current account deficit. The 
overall economic rebound limited the potential for furtlier loosening o f monetary 
policy.
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2.11 Conclusion
This chapter dealt, both in country studies and in cross-cutting sections, with factors 
o f significant past or present influence on the performance o f monetary policy in 
advanced transition countries. It focused on the factors usually not covered by 
closed-economy models concerned with developed economies approximately on the 
same level o f  development. Four country studies contained introduction to political 
and economic developments, monetary policy framework and its evolution during 
transition as well as macroeconomic context o f monetary policy-making. Despite 
different initial conditions, man}' difficulties and false starts o f  the transition 
process, all four countries have been successflil and rapid reformers.
We found that the monetaiy policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia was most influenced b} the small and open nature o f  these countries as 
well as their lower level o f economic development compared to other OECD 
countries. W ith the exception o f Poland, tliey have always been highly open to trade 
and transition brought a dramatic deepening o f the trend. 1990s and early 2000s also 
witnessed rapid financial integration into the global economy, both in terms o f 
deregulation and actual financial flows.
There were several additional influences, related to but distinct from the direct 
effects o f  smallness, openness and underdevelopment -  e.g. fragility, shallowness 
and monopolistic structure o f financial markets, imbalances and peculiarities in the
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relationship between the real economy and the financial sector, high level o f  
uncertainty about the equilibrium real exchange rate, difficulty in controlling 
inflation due to idiosyncratic pressures as well as expectations and pressures o f 
fliture EMU membership.
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Chapter 3: Monetary policy transmission mechanism in Central Europe
3.1 Introduction
In order to understand how and why monetary policy was actually conducted in 
Central Europe between 1993 and 2001, it is necessary to look at the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in tire coiuitries concerned. This 
chapter contains an econometric analysis of the transmission mechanism 
individually for all four countries concerned based on a teclmique called vector 
autoregression (VAR). Its results demonstrate tlrat while policy-makers could 
count on some robust channels of transmission, many of tlie channels identified 
for economically and financially more developed economies have been erratic or 
difficult to spot at all.
Monetary policy-makers have at their disposal policy instruments -  usually a 
short-term interest rate sometimes complemented by use of (sterilised) foreign 
exchange-rate inter\'entions. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
refers to tlie process by which changes in tliese instruments lead to changes in 
fundamental macroeconomic variables, particularly in inflation.
Even tliough tliere is no universally accepted description of transmission 
chaimels, a fairly consensual view recognises four essential channels of 
transmission of monetary policy in modern financial systems, (e.g. Ramin et ah, 
1997; Mislikin, 1995 or Bean cl ah, 2002)
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The first channel works through direct interest rate effects -  which affect not 
only tlie cost of credit, but also the cash flows of debtors and creditors. As 
Mishkin (1995) points out. il is the key monetary transmission mechanism in tlie 
basic Keynesian textbook. Restrictive monetary policy means a rise in real 
interest rates, raising the cost of capital and causing a decrease in investment 
spending including spending on consumer durables by households. While it is 
one of tlie oldest and most frccjuently discussed channels, tliere is no consensus 
on its effects even in large, closed economies,* not to mention die small open 
ones.
The second chamiel covers the impact of monetary policy on tlie economy 
thiougli domestic asset prices, primarily bond, stock and real estate prices. 
(Kamin et al., 1997) As Melt/er (1995) explains, monetarists are particularly 
fond of tliis channel, believing that “it is vital to look at how monetaiy policy 
affects the imiverse of relalli c asset prices and real wealtli” .
The tliird channel, particular!} salient for small open economies, is tlie effect of 
monetaiy policy on the exchange rate. Monetaiy policy can cause nominal and/or 
real appreciation/depreciation of the domestic currency, influencing aggregate 
demand and tlie price level. (Tay lor, 1995; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) Svensson 
(1998) shows how the exchange rate can be a very important and rapid chamiel 
of monetary policy transmission in a small open economy. For transition and 
developing coiuiti'ies, the pass-through of changes in the exchange rate is 
generally higher compared to dci’cloped coiuitries. (Calvo and Reidiart, 2000)
' See. e.g., Taylor (1995) and Bcrnankc and Gerlter (1995) for a debate concerning the US.
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Credit availability is the Ibiirih major channel. Asymmetric infonnation and 
costliness of contract enforcement make for agency problems in financial 
markets. The most important consequence is tlie so-called balance-sheet effect, 
by which a restrictive monetary policy decreases the prices of financial assets 
and thus leads to a lower net w orth of firms and individuals. Lower net wortli 
increases moral hazard and ad\ erse selection, decreasing availability of lending 
and lowering investment and aggregate demand (Mishkin, 1995; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995).
Overall, tlie impact of interest rales tlirough various chamiels is often impeded in 
transition and developing countries due to tlie highly interest inelastic lendmg 
policies of banks. (Schaechlcr. Stone and Zelmer, 2000; Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994)
The body of literature attempting to study tlie transmission of monetary policy on 
an empirical basis is too vast to survey even briefly. The focus in this chapter is 
tlierefore solely on analysis of time series data, specifically on die vector 
autoregression (VAR) technique,
A VAR is an “n-equation. n-\ ariable linear model in which each variable is in 
tiun explained by its own lagged values plus cinrent and past values of the 
remaining n-1 variables”. (Slock and Watson, 2001, p. 101) VARs come in tliree 
varieties, generally termed reduced form, recinsive and structural. While VARs 
in reduced and recursive forms do not make assumptions about the underlying
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structure at tlie cost of missing nonlinearities, conditional lieteroskedasticity and 
drifts or breaks in parameters, structural VARs use economic theory to determine 
contemporaneous links among the variables at the cost of imposing an a priori 
structure on the data, (ibid.)
VARs have become veiy popular in econometric analysis of tlie transmission 
mechanism. They allow a researcher to impose as much structure on tlie data as 
she wishes and dares to. While the structural approach is botli widespread and 
has its merits, we choose to follow a large body of literature tliat relies on VARs 
in analysis of monetary policy transmission.^ Bernanke and Blinder (1992), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Blanchard and Quali (1989) among otliers used 
VARs to estimate policy transmission for the US. More recently, witli the advent 
of EMU, VARs were utilised in analysis of tlie einozone transmission 
mechanism -  e.g. Kakes and Pattanaik (2000), Monticelli and Tristani (1999) 
and Peersnian and Siiiels (2001) - as well as in application to small open 
economies such as Sweden, (see Jacobson et al., 2001)
It is not surprising tlial VARs have proven to be a popular instrmnent in 
analysing tlie transmission mechanism for transitional and developing economies 
precisely because they do not require a priori assumptions about tlie economic
 ^An alternative view prol'ers .structural models of monetary transmission, emphasizing the need 
to have estimates for the unobservables -  e.g. the natural rate and expected inflation. (Andres, 
1998; Boyd and Smith, 200; Taylor. 1998) Qin and Vanags (1996) estimate a standard cost-plus 
model for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, 
finding that the model can account Tor long tun inflation and concluding that the basis of inflation 
during both pre-transition and transition period are the same. Golinelli and Rovelli (2001) claim 
that “a simple open macroeconomic model, with forward-looking inflation and exchange rate 
expectations, can adequately characterize the relationships between the output gap, inflation, the 
real interest rate and the exchange rate during the course of transition” in the same three 
countries, (p. 27) However, their work is based precisely on deriving ex post the unobservatttes.
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structure and, if used with care, can provide valuable insights into what has 
actually been happening in these economies. Erol (1997), Kim (1999), 
Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2002), Payne (2002) and Ross (2000) have 
constincted VAR models for Turkey, Korea, Greece, Croatia and Slovenia 
respectively. Blangiewicz and Charemza (2001), Gavura (2001), Hanousek and 
Kocenda (1998), IMF (1999). Izak (1998), Kuijs (2002) and Welfe (2000) have 
each focused specifically on one of the Central European countries studied in tlie 
tliesis.
Blangiewicz and Charemza (2001) coiistnict a SVAR model for Poland during 
tlie period 1971-1991. Welfe (2000) constructs a structural VAR for Poland for 
the years 1991-1996, finding a strong relationship between prices and wages and 
showing tliat the influences on inflation are not Imear. IMF (1999a) constructs a 
VAR model of Polish inflation, where tlie exchange rate is shown to have a 
robust relationship with inflation.
Hanousek and Kocenda (1998) examine Graiiger-causality relationships between 
various interest rates in the Czech interbanlc market during tlie 1993-1997 period, 
finding tliat tlie relationships differ in time and reflect the idiosyncratic problems 
faced by banks during tlie transition. They also find that interest rates had 
significant influence over the foreign exchange rate. Izak (1998) looks at the 
credit transmission chamiel of monetary policy in tlie Czech Republic using an 
error-correction model. He concludes that tliere is a co-integrated relationship 
between the policy rate, interbank rates and interest rates on actual credit
Alternately, one can use both sliiielLiral and VAR models -  see Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and
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extended by banks, but he is unable to identify any influence on credit volume or 
investment.
IMF (1999b) constructs a VAR model of Hungarian core inflation tliat includes 
industrial production, PPL broad money and tlie Deutschemark exchange rate. It 
confirmed tliat it is the exchange rate and PPI tliat contain infonnation about 
futiue inflation.
Gavura (2001), using Graiiger-causality tests and bi-variate VARs, finds a strong 
impact from tlie nominal exchange rate, a limited effect from money and wages, 
and no impact from the interest rate on Slovak inflation. Kuijs (2002) utilises a 
structural VAR, relying on estimated long-riui relationships based on economic 
theory. His paper shows that foreign prices, tlie exchange rate and wage costs 
wield influence over inflation, but he cannot find a direct impact of monetary 
aggregates or interest rates. On tlie other hand, he observes a statistically 
significant indirect impact of interest rates on prices via the nominal exchange 
rate.
3.2 Building the VAR models
A VAR model is particularly well suited for analysing monetary policy m 
transition countries because it requires less a priori knowledge of tlie workings 
of tlie economy. It allow's us to look at the basic question facing policy-makers:
Terlizzese (2002) for a coinprehcnsi\ c analysis of the eurozone transmission mechanism.
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does tlie transmission mechanism work and what are its reliable elements? On 
tlie otlier hand, the lack of structure renders VAR modelling vulnerable to 
misinterpretation and findings idiosyncratic to model specification. Two basic 
model specifications, applied in other countries, were used and tested for a 
variety of specifications in order to minimise tlie problem.
The chapter uses two specific VAR models, building, in tlie selection of variables 
as well as in tlieir ordering, on work done by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Kakes and Pattanaik (2000), Peersnian and Smets 
(2001) as well as Erol (1997). Payne (2002) and Ross (2000).
Table 3.1: Suiwey of VAR models of the monetary transmission mechanism
Model Economy Variables and ordering
Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995)
US Real GDP, GDP deflator, 
commodity prices, 
interest rate
Erol (1997) Turkey broad money (M2), 
nominal exchange rate, 
short-term interest rate, 
real GDP and CPI
Ross (2000) Slovenia broad money (M2), CPI, 
wages and nominal 
exchange rate
Kakes and Pattanaik 
(2000)
Eurozone CPI, real GDP, real 
exchange rate, bread
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money (M3), long-term 
interest rate and short­
term interest rate
Peersnian and Smets 
(2001)-A lt. I
Eurozone Real GDP, CPI, domestic 
nominal short-term 
interest rate and real 
exchange rate
Peersman and Smets 
(2001)-A lt. 2
Eurozone Real GDP, CPI, M3, 
domestic nominal short­
term interest rate and real 
exchange rate
Payne (2002) Croatia CPI, wages, broad money 
(M2) and nominal 
exchange rate
Source: authors
Our first model follows Ross (2000) and Payne (2002) by focusing solely on 
nominal variables. Il contains inflation, the short-term interest rate, broad money 
(M2) as well as tlie nominal exchange rate and nominal wage development. Its 
value lies primarily in modelling how various nominal pressmes influence 
inflation.
The second model contains inflation, broad money and tlie short-term interest 
rate, but also two additional real l ariables: the real exchange rate and real gross 
domestic product. Building on Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kakes and Pattanaik 
(2000), Peersnian and Smets (2001) and Erol (1997), it allows a closer look at the
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interaction between monclary policy and tlie real economy, including tlie 
potential stabilisation role of monetaiy policy.Tlie long-term interest rate, 
mifortimately, cannot be included as tlie series are ratlier short in all countries 
involved.
The ordering of variables in the VAR can have important consequences for tlie 
results if tlie residuals from the VAR are correlated. Enders (1995) recommends 
tlie following nile of thumb -  one should consider two series of residuals 
correlated, if the absolute value of correlation is higher tlian 0.2, Appendix 3.1 
contains detailed correlation tables for all four countries and two possible 
models. It shows tliat, with the exception of Slovakia, the residuals tend to be 
highly correlated. Therefore, the issue of ordering is quite important.
The chapter follows Sims (1980) in imposing a causal ordering. However, even 
die causal ordering is not always straightforward and, dierefore, two ordermgs 
are used for each model -  based, to some extent, on specifications by Erol 
(1997), Kakes and Pattanaik (2000) and Ross (2000). We follow tiiis approach 
even in Slovakia in order to pursue a unified mediodology.
For die first model, die orderings are:
® broad money (M2). CPI, wages, nominal exchange rate, short-term 
nominal interest rate 
® CPI, wages, nominal exchange rate, broad money (M2), short-term 
nominal interest rate
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For tlie second model, the orderings are:
o CPI, real GDP. real exchange rate, broad money (M2), short-term 
nominal interest rate 
o real GDP, CPI, broad money (M2), short-term nominal interest rate, real 
exchange rate
In botli cases, tlie model is supplemented by exogenous variables. The variables 
chosen are tlie world price level (proxied by tlie German CPI index), world 
economic activity (proxied by the German GDP index) and the oil price. The 
reason for tlieir inclusion is that their absence could lead to misspecification (see 
Sims, 1992).
The period for which the models are estimated, runs from Januaiy 1993 to 
December 2001. Due to its short duration and availability of nearly all data on 
a montlily basis, the monthly iVcquency was chosen, which meant converting the 
GDP data from quarterly into monthly on a linear basis.
Stationarity tests were perlbrmed based on tlie Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
methodology. The results for individual coimtries are presented in table 3.2. In 
the column T(0)\ we test the hypothesis that tlie series have order of integration 
0, i.e. they are stationary in levels. In the column T (l)’, we test the hypothesis 
that tlie series have order of integration 1, i.e. tliey are stationary in first 
differences. Bold values indicate that tlie hypotliesis camiot be rejected at the 
10% level (bold values in italics indicate tlie same at tlie 5% level).
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Table 3.2: Stationarity tests t'or two models of monetary policy transmission« m-k TEÏ'■ ■ ex
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1) 1(0) 1(1)
Nominal 
effective 
exchange rate
-2.439 -5.2.V.S* 0.762 -4.242 -0.485 -5.716 -1.832 -3.979
Real effective 
exchange rate -2.212 -x39‘/ -1.365 -5,094 -2.813 -5.640 -2.512 -4.209
Real GDP -3.663 - -3.913 - -1.966 -4.498 -3.555 -
Broad money 
(M2/M3) -1.787 -4.071 -2.521 -4.736 0.861 -6.271 -1.684 -5.887
Short-term 
interest rate -1.503 -5.630 -2.787 -4.908 -3.368 - -1.931 -4.523
Wages -1.866 -4. 794 -3.286 -4.539 -1.042 -7.724 -3.353 -9.331
Core inflation 
rate'* -0.660 -6.565 -0.253 -4.775 -1.561 -5.003 -3.683 -
Source: author
The stationarily tests show that the order of integration is generally 1, with a few 
series -  primarily tlie real GDP - stationary in levels. In such a case -  when some 
of tlie series are not stationary in levels - two routes can be taken:
o a vector error-correction model, i.e. model in first differences extended 
by cointegrating residuals 
® a VAR in levels, if cointegration is established
We take the second approach since cointegration can be established between the 
relevant groups of variables (see Appendix 3.2 for test results). As Peersnian and 
Smets (2001) note, analysis in levels allows for an implicit cointegrating 
relationship in the data in the case when a more explicit analysis is limited by the
 ^Ail tlie variables tested should, iVoin the economic point of view, follow an underlying trend; 
nominal effective exchange rate, broad money and wages because of relatively high inflation; 
interest rate and inflation rate because of continuing disinflation and real GDP because of growth 
trends. Therefore, the table presents test results based on the assumption of a trend. Nonetheless, 
stationarity tests were conducted also without the presence of a trend, with nearly identical 
results.
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relatively short sample, as il is here. Kakes and Pattanaik (2000) point out tliat a 
vector error-correction model would require imposing a long-term structme, such 
as tlie one used by Kuijs (2002) in his analysis of Slovakia.
Our approach is shared by Ross (2000) and Payne (2002) in their analysis in
otlier transition countries. In general, Sims (1980) and Enders (1995) recommend 
against differencing even for non-stationary variables in order not to tlirow away 
information as long as this is kepi in mind when interpreting tlie results.
For tlie same reason, the data arc not seasonally adjusted because many changes, 
particularly in prices, during ilie transition decade, were not a result of seasonal 
factors, but of repealed changes in taxes or administered prices in individual 
months. The short time period and the difficulty of locating structural breaks also
led to a decision not to include any dummies in the VARs.
The last issue in setting up the model is determining tlie lag lengtli of VARs. 
Ideally, iiifonnation criteria, such as AIC and BIG, should be used to determine 
lag lengtli (Enders, 1995). Appendix 3.3 shows results of the two tests for various 
series. The result diverge significantly even for the same series and range from 2 
to 12 - a lag lengtli beyond the scope of our tests and degrees of freedom. 
Consequently, equal and ad hoc lag lengths of tliree and six moiitlis were chosen 
for all models, based on a short sample and evidence of a rapid transmission of 
monetary policy in tlie countries analysed.
Ill case of the Czech Republic and Poland, the inflation rate is based on headline inflation.
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Inflation data in the model arc generally based on core consumer price indices 
that exclude regulated prices as well as tlie influence of indirect tax changes 
(witli tlie exception of Poland, where the data was not available). The short-term 
interest rate is the interbank rale of 1-3 niontli maturity based on availability. 
Nominal and real exchange rales are the effective rates provided by tlie IMF 
statistics, based on the slruciure of transactions witli otlier countries. Broad 
money, ratlier than a narrower monetaiy indicator, was chosen because it was tlie 
intermediate target in all four countries at some point, is used and defined in a 
similar way in all foin countries of the sample, has been used by other autliors in 
similar instances and is also more stable tlian other indices.
3.3 Analysis of VAR results
Once tlie models were fully specified, impulse response analysis was used to 
look at monetaiy transmission mechanisms in tlie four countries, supplemented 
by Granger causality tests. Due to a short data period and use of unstructured 
VARs, a conservative methodology was chosen. We looked at VAR results witli 
botli lag lengtlis and both orderings and only if they were broadly in accord witli 
each otlier, is the result used. Therefore, tlie results presented below represent 
those outcomes that seem to be robust to minor changes in model specification, 
such as tlie change of ordering and lag length. All tlie impulse response charts are 
shown in Appendix 3.4
The analysis focuses on four areas: —
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o wliat is the influence of variables directly influenced by policy (interest 
rate, nominal exchange rate) on macroeconomic outcomes (prices, 
output)?
@ what is the influence of otlier variables tliat can be influenced by policy 
albeit in a less straighilbrward way (wages, real exchange rate, money) 
on macroeconomic outcomes?
® how do variables directly related to policy react to developments in otlier 
variables, i.e. is there any measurable policy reaction?
® is there a mutually reinforcing relationship between inflation and otlier 
variables?
In tlie Czech Republic, nominal exchange rate appreciation lowers prices and an 
increase in tlie interest rate causes real exchange rate appreciation, which 
decreases prices and real GDP. At the same time, an interest rate increase has a 
direct positive effect on real GDP, making tlie overall effect of interest changes 
on tlie output ambiguous. Wage gi'owth causes nominal exchange rate 
depreciation and increase in prices, while an increase in prices causes real 
exchange rate appreciation and increase in real GDP. Overall, tlie Czech 
Republic provides indications of the effects of both tlie interest rate and tlie 
nominal exchange rate on inflation, though tlie impact on output is ambiguous. 
Wages also seem to play a role in determining inflation.
In Hungaiy, the only robust effects concern the exchange rate -  botli nominal and 
real exchange rate appreciations are shown to have a negative effect on prices.
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In Poland, a positive interest rate shock causes nominal exchange rate 
appreciation, which in turn decreases prices. Wage and broad money growtli 
increase prices while, in the case of broad money, tlie shock is also followed by a 
positive influence on real GDP. Policy reacts to nominal and real exchange rate 
appreciation by decreasing the interest rate, while growtli in real GDP is 
followed by an increase in the interest rate. Poland tlius provides a more intricate 
though conventional array of transmission mechanisms, in which tlie interest rate 
has the ability to influence inllalion, but primarily tliroiigh tlie exchange rate, and 
policy reacts to botli exchange rate (inflation) and output considerations in a 
countercyclical manner.
Slovalcia shares with Huiigar\ the feature tliat botli nominal and real exchange 
rate appreciation have a negative influence on domestic prices. An increase in 
wages leads to growth of broad money and prices, and growth in broad money is 
followed by an increase in real GDP. Interest rates increase in reaction to tlie 
growth of wages.
For all four comitries, even though the results differ, some similarities emerge as 
well. The most important one is the robust role of tlie exchange rate in 
detemiining inflation ivhilc the interest rate chamiel remains difficult to detect. 
Anotlier conclusion is that, with the exception of Poland, there seems to be no 
explicitly countercyclical policy -  monetaiy policy seems to react to inflation 
and exchange rate developments, but not to output. At tlie same time, monetaiy 
policy does not show much innueiice on tlie development of output. Wages seem 
to play a fairly important role in determining inflation in Central European
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countries, which explains why incomes policies (even tliough largely 
unsuccessful) were assigned such an important role by tlie autliorities, especially 
in tlie first half of the transition period.
Additionally, two common and quite important factors were not discussed above. 
First of all, models for Poland and Slovakia involve, despite inclusion of several 
exogenous variables, a price pu/zle. The puzzle emerged when VARs were used 
to explain monetary policy transmission -  an increase in the interest rate led to an 
increase in prices rather than a decrease. The explanation provided by Sims 
(1992) was tliat forward-looking policy-makers reacted to expected exogenous 
shocks by raising interest rates and, tlierefore, without tlieir inclusion into a 
VAR, tlie effect of these shocks on prices and tlie effect of tlie interest rate 
cannot be disentangled. The models presented here included tlie most important 
exogenous supply and demand shocks as exogenous variables - the German CPI 
and GDP as well as the oil price. The continuing existence of tlie price puzzle in 
Poland and Slovakia indicates that not all tlie sources of relevant exogenous 
shocks have been found yet.
Anotlier result, shared to some extent by all countries, is a teniporar}^ positive 
effect of inflation on real exchange rate appreciation. Since much of tlie period 
studied was dominated by exchange rate pegs, tlie prima facie explanation of the 
nominal rigidity lies in a combination of a fixed nominal exchange rate and 
inflation. However, it is interesting to note tliat the effect was particularly strong 
in Poland, a coimtry which practiced increasing nominal exchange rate flexibility 
since 1995 (7, 10, 12.5 and 15% bands, concluding hi floating in April 2000) and
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in the Czech Republic, a counUy which floated tlie currency in May 1997, in tlie 
middle of the period studied. Therefore, this points to a conclusion, furtlier 
elaborated in tlie chapter on the role of tlie foreign exchange rate, tliat even
though an increase in official exchange rate flexibility translates into an actual !
policy shift, such moves should not be overrated. i
3.4 Conclusion
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy refers to tlie process by which 
changes in the policy instruments lead to changes in fundamental 
macroeconomic variables, particularly in inflation. In order to understand how 
and why monetary' policy was actually conducted in Central Europe between 
1993 and 2001, this chapter examined tlie transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy ill the coimtries concerned. It did so by an individual econometric analysis 
of tlie transmission mechanism for all four comitries concerned based on a 
technique called vector autoregression (VAR).
The findmgs confirm both a priori assumptions and empirical findings elsewhere 
that a predictable monetary policy transmission mechanism in advanced 
transition countries has existed for some time, but that because of speciflc 
transition factors and general icatures of small open economies, tlie exchange 
rate chamiel seems to be dominant, while tlie more traditional interest rate 
chamiel is much less widespread.
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Appendix 3,3: Summary of AIC and BIC tests for suggested lag length in 
VARs modelling monetary policy transmission in Central European 
countries
Suggested lag length
AIC BIC
With constant With other 
exogenous 
variables (oil, cpi, 
gdp)
With constant Witli other 
exogenous 
variables (oil, cpi, 
gdp)
Czech Republic
Nominal model 8 6 8 6
Real 1 model 7 5 7 5
Real 2 model 7 5 7 5
Hungary
Nominal model Infinity Infinity 2 Infinity
Real 1 model 9 6 9 6
Real 2 model 9 6 9 6
Poland
Nominal model Infinity Infinity 2 2
Real 1 model 10 7 10 7
Real 2 model 10 7 10 7
Slovalda
Nominal model Infinity Infinity 2 2
Real 1 model 12 11 2 11
Real 2 model Infinity 11 2 11 _
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Appendix 3.4: Impulse response charts for models of monetary policy 
transmission in Central Europe
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CZK Reall Deseasonalized Lags 6
division by zero
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CZK Real2 Deseasonalized Lags 6
Division by zero
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HUN Real2 Level Lags 3
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Chapter 4: Institutional constraints on policy discretion 
central btuik independence
4.1 Introduction
Within the overall framc\\’oik of the thesis, this chapter aims to conduct an in- 
depth analysis of central bank independence in four advanced transition 
countries, but also, following Berger and de Haan (1999), it also aims to use the 
results of the analysis to evaluate some of the underpinning theories and indices 
of central bank independence. The decision to utilise a sample o f just four 
countries resulted from scepticism about the value of econometric exercises in 
this case, not to mention that several such exercises already conducted for 
transition countries. Even if one believes in the value of such an approach, the 
transition environment is not suitable for such calculations, as the relevant laws 
changed frequently and there have been significant changes related to individual 
fiscal years. Also, the decision to focus on a sample of four countries effectively 
precludes econometric analysis of the relationship between central bank 
independence and various macroeconomic indicators.
The most important objection against quantitative analysis tliough is wider. It is 
tlie ambition of tlie chapter to demonstrate that actual central bank independence 
in transition is substantially inlluenced by other factors than those captured by 
existing legal indices, quite apart from the methodological and practical 
problems of the indices. It is indicative of a need for a more nuanced 
understanding of central bank independence that all quantitative measurements 
of it for transition countries -  ranging from Siklos (1999) and Lybek (1999) to
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Louiigani and Sheets (1997) and Maliszewski (2000) -  felt a need either to 
construct a new index or at least to add significant new dimensions to the 
existing ones.
Ultimately, an in-depth analysis of central bank independence in a small sample 
of coiuitries should be able to expand oiu miderstanding not only of what 
happened in the countries concerned, but also what implications this has for the 
theory in general. In order to achieve this, the chapter explores not only the 
well-known indices of legal independence of central banks and their 
deficiencies, but tries to look beyond to other determinants of actual central 
bank independence. It focuses, in particular, on the following topics reflected in 
the structure of the chapter;
® legal and constitutional factors affecting independence of central banks 
® the rule of law, personal independence and political role of central banks 
® central banlc autonomy in exchange rate policy 
® exogenous factors contributing to effective central bank independence
On tlie other hand, the chapter leaves aside two issues often discussed together 
witli independence of central banks. One is the effect of centralised wage 
bargaining and tlie other transparency and accountability of central bankers. In 
both cases, the rationale for their absence is based on the overall difficulty of 
their measurement and lack oi' reliable data in transition countries.
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It also does not deal with wider iinderpinnings of cential bank independence -  
with theories, such as those of Posen (1995), Maxfield (1995), Hayo (1998) or 
McNamara (2002) that postulate a need for wider social support and/or support 
by domestic and foreign investors for prudent monetary policies and low 
inflation as a precondition for maintenance of central bank independence and 
low inflation. To test them in the Central European countries would be worthy 
of a thesis of its own and would require access to political and polling data tliat 
the autlror of the thesis does not have.
4.2 CBI -  what do legal indices tell us?
To imderstand the developments in cential bank independence during 1990s and 
2000s, it is important to remember that during most of the commimist period, 
central banks in the region existed only in name. State Bank of Czechoslovakia, 
Hungarian National Bank and National Bank of Poland were the so-called 
monobanks (de Melo et al.. 1997) -  they combined central and commercial 
banking functions.
It was only in the late 1980s that Ime central banks became established again in 
Central Europe - Hungaiy in 1987, Poland in 1989 and Czechoslovakia in 1990. 
These changes required substantive amendments of tlie existing laws, so new 
laws on central banks w^ erc written prior to this action. The law^ s were all passed 
during the period of one-party rule without democracy or true mle of law. 
Noiietlieless, they established some measiue of autonomy for central bankers. 
Since they were in force only for a brief time and/or during the period of one-
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party inie, it is superfluous lo analyse them. After the change of the political 
regime, change to the central bank law was considered vital in all foiur countries.
In Poland, several substantial amendments of the NBP law occurred in the eaiiy 
1990s. In Hungaiy. a new law became effective in December 1991. In 
Czechoslovakia, the new Ian came into effect in Febniaiy 1992. These laws 
were generally based on the Bundesbank law and the law on the Austrian 
National Bank. (Siklos, 1994) They were crucial in establishing a relatively high 
level of independence. Principal features of tliese laws conducive to 
independence were the follow ing:
® relatively long terms of office 
» well-defined appointment procedures
® definitions of monelaiy policy objectives, usually in terms of internal and 
external monetary stability 
e general autonomy in the conduct of monetaiy policy 
® limitations on central bank lending to the government.
On the other hand, particularh in Himgary and Poland, there were still some 
important features limiting autonomy:
e lack of autonomy in exchange rate policy in Himgaiy and Poland 
® short or not well-defined lengths of term of office in Hrmgaiy and Poland 
(later also in Slovakia)
9 need for parliamentary approval of monetaiy policy in Poland.
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Under these laws, central banks of the region became powerful political and 
economic players that played cmcial roles in economic reforms and the 
preservation of macroeconomic stability during tlie following decade.
During the following period of the early and mid 1990s, the legal position of 
central banks in all four countries remained largely unchanged. New laws were 
passed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia following the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, but tliey largely reflected the Czechoslovak law. In Hungaiy, 
minor changes were passed that marginally increased central banlc 
independence.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, major changes in central banlc law were 
passed in all four countries in order to achieve compliance witli tlie Maastricht 
Treaty. The Maastricht Treat) requires all stales that wish to join EMU to grant 
considerable central bank independence. Even though central banks in Central 
Europe had already been quite independent, tlie following changes were usually 
required to make them fully compatible with the Maastricht Treaty:
9 complete ban on central bank credit to government 
9 making price stability the only objective of central banks
Therefore, existing central bank statutes had to be modified. Requisite changes 
took place in 1997 in Poland, in 2000 and 2002 in the Czech Republic, in 2001 
in Slovakia and in 2001 in Hungaiy. However, the need to satisfy the Maastricht
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criteria and to amend the central bank acts opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ - an 
opportimity to change the slalulcs in other ways. Political players in tlie Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia used it to weaken the actual autonomy of the 
central bank and the autonomy of its career officials from the current governing 
majority or even attempted to use it to weaken overall central bank 
independence. (However, proposals included in the latter category were usually 
defeated eventually as they would contradict the EU accession criteria.) This can 
be seen as a backlash against central banks, which were perceived as too 
powerful and too independent. The weakening of central bank autonomy usually 
meant changes in the make-up of the bank board;
9 in Poland, key decision-making powers were switched from a bank board 
made up of bank officials to a Monetary Policy Coiuicil, where tlie bank 
president is only one of ten members and the remaining nine are outsiders 
appointed by three centres of political power in tlie country.
9 ill the Czech Republic, the power to appoint the bank board was switched
from president to sei’cral centres of power (both houses of parliament and 
the president) though this w as later reversed 
9 ill Slovakia, tluee out of eight members were explicitly designated as
external members and the ultimate veto power of tlie Cabinet over all 
appointments for the board was preserved 
9 ill Hungary^ a similar veto power of the prime minister remained as well
The ultimately unsuccessful attempts to circumscribe central bank independence 
involved the following amendments of the central bank act, which reached
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various levels of approval (by the government, by one house of the parliament 
etc.):
« in Czech Republic, a proposal tliat the operating budget of the bank should 
be approved by the parliament 
® in Poland, a proposal that those nominating bank board members should 
have tlie power to recall them at their own discretion 
« in Slovakia, a proposal that the government should have tlie power to 
appoint half of the bank board directly
Indices developed for measurement of legal independence provide a useful 
shortliand for much of these changes. Tables 4.1-4.3 present the breakdown of 
values assigned within the framework of Grilli et al. (1991) and Ciikiemiaii
(1992).' During transition, the legal framework for central banking in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia underwent repeated and significant 
changes. To provide an accessible pictiue, the evaluation is limited to major 
developments where the provision influencing the index changed. Additionally, 
the laws passed dining the conmimiist period splitting the nionobanks and 
creating true central banl<s w ere not evaluated, because the rule of law was 
essentially non-existent during the communist period and witli tlie exception of 
Poland, they were replaced by new central banlcing laws in 1991 and 1992. In 
case of Poland, a completel}- new law came into effect only in 1998 and the 
1989 law, amended substantially, was valid luitil tlien. In tliis case, concurring
 ^See Chapter 1 tor details of both indices and their relevance.
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with the decision made b)' a Polish economist (see Maliszewski, 2001), tlie 1992 
version was chosen as the representative one.
Table 4.1: Ciikicrman index -  Central European countries 1991-2001
Czecho 
slovaki 
a 1992
Czech 
Republ 
ic 1993
Czech 
Rcpiihl ic 2(111,1
Czech 
Republ 
ie 2002
Slovak 
ia 1993
Slovak 
ia 2001
Hungar 
y 1991
Hungar 
y 2001
Poland
1989/9
2
version
Poland
1998
term of 
office
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
appointme
nt
procedure
0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5
conditions
of
dismissal
0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
incompati
bility
clause
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 I
policy
autonomy
1 1 0.66 I 1 1 0.66 1 0.66 1
conflict
resolution
1 I 1 1 I I 0.8 1 0.4 1
involveme 
nt in 
budget
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 I I
statutory
objective
I 1 ! I 1 1 1 1 1 1
limits on 
advances
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1
limits on 
securities
0.66 0.66 1 1 0.66 1 0.66 I 0.66 1
limits on 
decision
1 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1
limits on 
borrowers
1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 1
type o f 
limits on 
cred it
0.33 0.33 1 1 0.33 I 0.33 I 0 I
limits on 
m aturity
1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 0 I
limits on
interest
rate
0.25 0.25 1 i 0.25 1 1 I 0.25 1
limits on 
primary 
m kt
I 1 1 1 I I 1 1 I I
LVAU 0.75 0.77 0.84 0.88 0.77 0.86 0.79 0.93 0.69 0.94
LVAW 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.84 0.89 0.81 0.94 0.80 0.95
Source: author
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Table 4.2: GMT index (Political criteria) 
1991-2001 Central European countries
Czech
oslova
Ida
1992
Czech
Repu
blic
1993
Czech
Repu
blic
2000
Czech
Repu
blic
2002
Slova
Ida
1993
Slova
Ida
2001
Hung
ary
1991
Hung
ary
2001
Polan
d
1989/
92
vcrsio
n
Polan
d
1998
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 I 0 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 I I 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
5 I 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 1
6 1 1 0 1 1 1 I 1 0 I
7 1 I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 I i 1 I 1 0 I
Sum 6 6 5 6 5 4 5 6 3 6
Source: author
Noie: 1; governor not appointed by the government, 2: governor appointed for more then five 
years, 3: no board member appointed by the government, 4: board appointed for more then five 
years, 5: no mandatoty government representative on the board, 6: government/parliamentary 
approval of monetary policy is not required, 7: statutory responsibility to pursue monetary 
stability, 8: presence of legal provision supporting the Bank in conflicts with the government
Table 4.3: GMT index (Economic criteria) -  Central European countries 
1991-2001
Czech
oslova
Ida
1992
Czech
Repu
blic
1993
Czech
Repu
blic
2000
Czech
Repu
blic
2002
Slova
Ida
1993
Slova
Ida
2001
Hung
ary
1991
Hung
ary
2001
Polan
d
1989/
92
vcrsio
n
Polan
d
1998
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 I
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
4 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1
Sum 5 5 6 6 5 6 8 8 4 7
Source: author
Note: 1; direct credit facility is not automatic, 2: direct credit facility is at the market interest rate, 
3; direct credit facility is temporary. 4: direct credit facility is of limited amount, 5: the bank 
does not participate in the primary market for public dept, 6; the discount rate is set by the 
central bank, 7: supervision of commercial banks is not entrusted lo the central bank (2) or not 
entrusted to the central bank alone ( I )
Values in the indices reflect primarily tlie following factors:
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® relatively long terms of olTicc though with several exceptions reflected in the 
data
® well-defined appointment and recall procedures, but appointments made 
everywhere primarily bj- legislative or executive branch 
® definition of monetary policy objective, usually in terms of internal and 
external monetary stability, later replaced by explicit price stability objective 
required by the Maastricht Treaty 
® instrument independence and arguably goal independence of all central 
banks in tlie sample
® limitations on central bank lending to the government, to be completely 
forbidden later as required b\- the Maastricht Treaty 
o need for parliamentary approval of monetary policy in Poland mitil 1998
Tables 4.4-4.6 present international comparison of legal central bank 
independence. The comparison is between values in Central European countries 
in 1990s and early 2000s and values in developed countries during 1980s. The 
reason for temporal mismatch is that the data for industrial coiuitries in 1990s 
are not always available and also reflect changes implemented in tlie run-up to 
EMU.
It is clear that tlie level of legal independence enjoyed by central banks in 
Central European countries w as very high from the very start. In tlie Cukieniian 
index, all tlie value for Central European countries are above any value of 
developed countries during 1980s, including West Germany and Switzerland.
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Even tliough that is not true in the GMT index, the values are still among the 
highest.
Table 4.4: International coniiiarison of the unweighted Cukiernian index
Poland 1997 0.94
Hungary 2001 0.93
Czech Republic 2002 0.88
Slovakia 2001 0.86
Czech Republic 2000 0.84
Czech Republic 1993 0.77
Hungary 1991 0.77
Slovakia 1993 0.77
Czechoslovakia 1992 0.75
Poland 1989/92 version 0.69
Switzerland 0.68
West Germany 0.66
Austria 0.58
United States 0.51
Denmark 0.47
Canada 0.46
Netherlands 0.42
Ireland 0.39
Luxembourg 0.37
Iceland 0.36
Britain 0.31
Australia 0.31
France 0.28
Sweden 0.27
Finland 0.27
New Zealand 0.27
Italy 0.22
Spain 0.21
Belgium 0.19
Japan 0.16
Norway 0.14
Source: Cukiernian (1992) and preceding tables
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Table 4.5: International comparison of political independence (GMT index)
6 Germany Czecho.'jiovakia, 1992
Nctherland
s
Czech Republic 1993
Czech Republic 2002
Hungary, 2001
Poland. 938/1997
5 Switzerland Czech Republic 2000
USA Slovakia. 1993
Hungary, 1991
4 Canada Slovakia 2001
Italy
3 Australia Poland. 1989/92 version
Austria
Denmark
Ireland
2 France
Greece
Spain
1 Belgium
Japan
Portugal
UK
Source; Grilli et al. (1991) and preceding tables
Charts 4.1 and 4.2 document development of botli indices during the 1993-2001 
period. They show that, with the exception of Poland, the stylised fact about 
independence is tlie high initial level, which was slightly increased at the end of 
1990s and begimiing of 2000s to comply with tlie Maastiicht criteria. Poland 
experienced a more dramatic increase in 1997, reflecting both lower base and 
the decision to change the institutional set-up radically.
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Table 4,6: International comparison of economic independence (GMT
8 Hungaty. 1991
Hungary. 2001
7 Canada Poland, 1997
Germany
Switzerland
US
6 Australia Czech Republic 2000
Austria Czech Republic 2002
Belgium Slovakia 2001
5 Denmark Czechoslovakia, 1992
France Czech Republic, 1993
Japan Slovakia. 1993
UK
4 Ireland Poland, 1989/92 version
Netherlands
13 New Zealand
Spain
2 Greece
Portugal
Source: Grilli et al. (1991) and preceding tables
The indices also reveal, if analysed in more detail, that the prospect of EU and 
EMU was more of a double-edged sword for central bank independence tlian 
appears at the first glance. While the EU accession was undoubtedly tlie driver 
behind the total ban on central bank credit to government, it also opened the 
‘Pandora’s Box’, which, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in particular, 
allowed a decrease in CBI measured by legal indices in other areas.
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Chart 4.1: CBI in Central Europe as measured by the GMT index -  1993-
2001^
15
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• Hungary 
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Source: author
Many pages could be devoted to comparing results with other authors who have 
compiled the indices for the same countries (e.g. Dvorsky, 2000 and 
Maliszewski, 2000, but also Siklos, 1994 and Radzyner and Riesinger, 1997); 
however a detailed analysis would add little value to our understanding of the 
central bank independence in general or specifically in these countries. On the 
other hand, a brief summary can be useful in pointing to some systematic 
problems with the indices.
 ^ In order to present a concise summary, the political and economic independence are added 
together for the purposes of the chart. However, previous tables present disaggregated data.
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Chart 4.2: CBI in Central Europe as measured by the Cukierman index -
1993-2001
0.95
0.9 -
0.85
0.8 -
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
• Czech Republic 
Hungary 
■ Poland 
- Slovakia
Source: author
Divergence in assessment can reflect either factual mistakes (e.g. when 
Dvorsky, 2000 or Maliszewski, 2000, claim that Czech or Slovak central banks 
are not at all or not solely responsible for banking supervision). In many cases 
though the problem is in the need for interpretation of criteria, betraying the fact 
that the existing indices were not constructed deductively from a unified and 
general theoretical framework, but rather sought to generalise structure and 
differences between central bank laws in the sample at the time when the index 
was being constructed.
For example, there is no single way to assign values for appointment of the 
governor in the Cukierman index. The index considers appointment by:
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« central bank board
e council composed of members from executive and legislative branches 
as well as from central bank board 
® legislative branch (Congress, king)
® executive branch (council of ministers)
® one or two members of the executive branch (PM, finance minister)
In Hungar)', the governor is proposed by the prime minister and appointed by 
the president, who is elected by a parliament and is a largely non-partisan and 
ceremonial position. In Slovakia, the governor is proposed by the council of 
ministers, elected by the parliament and appointed by the president, who is a 
directly elected, but general 1\ non-partisan and ceremonial figiu'e. In the Czech 
Republic, the governor is appointed by the president, who is elected by a 
parliament and is a largely non-partisan and ceremonial position.
In Poland, the governor is elected by a parliament on the proposal of tlie 
president, who is a directly elected, powerful figure, who however has to co­
operate witli a prime minister and a coimcil of ministers. Dvorsky (2000) takes 
the position tliat in the Czech and the Polish case, the score based on the 
legislative branch coding should be assigned, whereas in Hungary and Slovakia, 
tlie coding based on the executive branch should be assigned, with tlie following 
reasoning:
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"... presidents ol'stale typically are not involved in economic policy and are generally 
elected for a longer term than governments. Furthermore, appointment by parliament 
seems to be preferable lo government appointment because the opposition parties have 
to be included in the discussion. Once governments come into play, even if only having 
the right to propose or recommend a candidate, there are... numerous possibilities to 
delay or complicate the appointment of central bank officials”, (p. 11)
The argument is slightly muddled, reflecting an uncertainly about the tlieoretical 
underpinnings of the index that goes back to Cukierman (1992) -  for problems 
in the original index, sec. for example, why should a king be coded as a 
legislative branch?
To come back to Dvorsky - win the inclusion of opposition parties in discussion 
of appointments or a longer electoral cycle for those who appoint tliem should 
improve the independence of a central bank is not obvious. Actually, if one 
believes in tlie importance of checks and balances (see below) and if one 
understands that the same procedures have to be followed (with the exception of 
Poland) for appointment and removal, then one could hypothesise that a more 
complicated procedure invoh ing a higher number of mutually independent veto 
points should increase actual cential bank independence, and this would put 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungaty on a par (with two mutually independent veto 
points) and Czech Republic behind them with one veto point. Alternately, one 
could argue that even if recall procedures are ignored, a higher number of veto 
points should mean higher central bank competence and independence by 
weaning out overly partisan and incompetent candidates, with tlie same result. 
Or one could argue the other w ay around or in a completely different w'ay since 
there is little indication in Cukierman (1992) of a unified theoretical framework 
for interpreting the indices.
243
Additionally, tlie wording (hat parliamentary appointment is ‘preferable’ 
indicates another muddle -  a fusion of positive observations of legal 
independence with norniatiic views about what makes for better monetary 
policy, coiifiriiiing criticism of central bank independence indices by Walsh
(1993).
The point of tliis detailed analysis of one, albeit one of tlie most problematic, 
criteria was to show why comparative analysis of evaluations of central bank 
independence in Central Europe would be lengthy but not very useful, and to 
demonstrate that because of s\ stemic problems in tlieir conslinction, the indices 
constitute a flawed instrument (though a useful one in summarising much of the 
development in a very concise form).
The results of another element of research presented here can serve to identify 
more of the problems. The research is inspired by Masciandaro and Spinelli
(1994) who asked central bankers from ten industrial countries to assign values 
to criteria developed by Grilli el. al (1991) according to tlieir real importance for 
central bank independence. They were asked to assign ten to a criterion of 
paramount importance for central bank independence and zero for a criterion of 
no importance.
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Table 4.7: Importance of selected criteria of central bankers according to 
central bankers^
Values î ! t [
ÊL
IIÎ II I!0 A, a g: Kllo S
Political independence
I. central bank governor 
not appointed directly by 
govern ment
10.10.63 7.25 2 5 2.25
2. central bank governor 
appointed for more than 5 
years
iO.S.5.5 7 1.4 6 1
3. rest of the board not 
appointed directly by the 
government
10.10.53 7 2.1 4 3
4. no govt, representative 
on the board
83.0.0 4 2.7 6 -2
5. no government 
approval of monetaiy 
policy
10.10.10,10 10 0 9 1
6. requirement in the 
central bank law that 
central bank pursue 
monetary stability
10.9.5.0 6 2.6 9 -3
7. provisions in the central 
bank law on conflict 
resolution
10.0.0.0 2.5 2.9 7 -4.5
Economic independence
central bank credit to the 
govt.
1. not automatic 10.10.10,10 10 0 7 3
2. market interest rate 10.10.10.5 8.75 1.4 5 3.75
3. limited duration 10.10.10,8 9.5 0.6 6 3.5
4. limited amount 10.10.10.8 9.5 0.6 7 2.5
5. central bank not in the 
primary govt, debt market
10.10.10.10 1 0 6 4
6. interest rates set by 
central bank
10.10.10,10 10 0 9 1
7. bank supervision 
outside central bank
8.5.0.0 3.25 2.3 4 -0.75
Source: author based on questionnaire responses, Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994)
One of the indicators (length of term of office of board members) introduced by Grilli et al. 
(1991) was not used by Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994) and we follow their approach to ensure 
uniformity of methodology.
Values in individual rows are arranged in the descending order, not by respondents.
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Here, tlie research is extended lo cential banks from Central Europe^ and botli 
surveys are compared in tabic 4.7 The first column contains individual values 
from central bankers in Central Europe. The second column contains the mean 
of these values and the third the standard deviation. The fourlli column contains 
the mean of the responses of central banlcs from industrialised countries, and the 
difference between the mean values for central banks in transition and 
industrialised coiuitries is in the last column.
Central bankers in Central Europe feel very strongly about foiu* particular 
elements of central bank independence.^ Generally, surveyed central bankers 
from transition coimlrics gai c ten to these criteria, suggesting tlie strength of 
consensus. Their view is also shared by the central bankers from industrialised 
countries based on Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994). First of all, no 
governmental approval of monetary policy should be required. This criterion can 
be roughly identified with goal independence, the ability of the cential bank to 
set the final goals of monetaiy policy (see Debelle and Fischer, 1995). Secondly, 
the central bank should set discoiuit and other major interest rates. This 
criterion, on the other hand, can be approximately identified with instrimient 
independence (freedom to choose means to achieve a given monetaiy policy end 
(ibid.)). Thirdly, there should be restrictions on central bank credit to 
government. This comprises four criteria of economic independence coiiceniing 
duration, amount, interest rate and automatic iiatiue of central bank credit to the 
govenimenl. And finally, the central bank should not be active in the primaiy
5 Vicegovemors responsible for monelaiy policy filled in a questionnaire in each of the four 
countries in 1999 and 2000.
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market for government debt. Participation of the central banlc in tlie primary 
market could serve to circunn cnt limits on direct credit and also would distort 
tlie market.
Based on these results, two pillars of true independence as perceived by central 
banlcers of smveyed transitional and industrial countries can be identified: goal 
independence witli freedom to implement tlie chosen goal and a well-defined 
relationship of the central bank and the government concerning credit to the 
govemment, which gives the central bank the power to determine tlie terms of 
the relationship and limits the e.xtent of central bank assistance to the budget
On the other hand, tree criteria were identified during the survey as badly or 
imprecisely phrased: that no representative of government be present on the 
central bank board, a requirement that the central bank pursues monetary 
stability and a requirement that the term of the central bank governor is longer 
than five years. All of these criteria show a wide spread in values. A large part 
of this is because of the imprecise nature of botli criteria. In case of tlie 
govemment representative, it is important whether the representative has an 
advisory position or a vote. For example, a central banker from a transition 
comitiy stipulated tliat in the Ibrnier case, tlie value should be ten and in the 
latter zero. Another offered an explanation of why a criterion of extreme 
importance in industrial countries (it was ranked as first in the political criteria 
in Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994) was considered not that important in 
transition countries. It is the criterion of whether the central bank law contains
® The definition of consensus used here is that all or all but one values fall within a range of 2
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provision requiring the centrât bank to pursue monetary stability. A central 
banker from a transition country rated this criterion 0, but noted tliat the 
requirement should be for price stability, Anotlier one noted that while giving 
this criterion five points, it would receive ten if it were for price stability. 
Consequently, it can be noted that if the criterion were price stability, it would 
be among the veiy important criteria -  creating a tliird pillar of a clearly-defined 
mandate for a central bank. The insistence on the price stability criterion can be 
explained by the fact that all (bur economies are very small and very open and 
so the external monetaiy stability (stable exchange rate) and internal monetary 
stability (low inflation) can easily be conflicting, weakening the central bank’s 
mandate to pmsue low inflation.
The same is tine to a certain extent for tlie length of the governor’s term. The 
criterion of term of more than five years was originally introduced in tliis fomi 
to measure whether the term of the central bank governor is longer than the 
electoral cycle, which lasts fi\e years in many countries. (Grilli, Masciandaro 
and Tabellini, 1991) However, in all four countries in our survey, the length of 
cycle is four years. Therefore, five years is enough to fulfil the raison d'etre of 
this criterion and this is rcllccted in tlie relatively low values given to tliis 
criterion in its present form.
Wliile the central banks in Masciandaro and Spinelli (1994) considered the 14 
criteria to be sufficient, central bankers from transition countries proposed some
and their mean is at least 9.
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additions to the criteria. reOccting their experience of transition. There were five 
proposed additions, which can be divided into three groups.
The first group reinforces the first pillar of central bank independence that 
measures goal and instrument independence. There is only one proposal in this 
categoiy -  a criterion measuring specifically whether the central bank can 
determine exchange rate policy. The second group reinforces tlie second pillar of 
central bank independence that restricts central bank financing o f tlie budget. 
One proposal introduces a criterion of whether there are any (quasi) fiscal 
measmes (subsidies) by the central bank. Another proposes banning direct credit 
altogether. The tliird group introduces a new pillar -  budget independence. This 
contains criteria such as who approves the budget (in all four countries, it is the 
bank board) or whetlier the law is specific on how central bank profit should be 
distiibuted.
If the results of the research are used to evaluate indices by both Grilli et al. 
(1991) and Cukiernian (1992). one finds tliat they are both robust and deeply 
flawed in measuring central bank independence.
The most important indicators of robustness of Grilli et al. (1991) and 
Cukierman (1992) are the locus on goal and instrument independence and the 
focus on central bank financing of the government. The analysis of their most 
important shortcomings follow s.
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The first major shortcoming is a lack of precision in defining certain criteria, 
particularly concerning the objective of monetary policy, the presence of a 
government representative on the board and the length of term of the governor 
and other bank officials (see above). These invalidate the usefulness o f tliese 
criteria for measurement of central bank independence. Formulation of these 
criteria should also be based on the rationale for tlieir inclusion in the index.
As far as length of term is concerned, those constructing the index should clarifj' 
whether they believe (as Cukierman, 1992 and Grilli et al., 1991 do) that tlie 
independence of the central bank increases not in a linear relationship with the 
length of term of policy-makers in the central bank, but that it is only important 
for the length of term to be greater than the electoral cycle. In that case, criteria 
should be constructed accordingly. If they believe tliere is linear relationship, 
tliey should also act accordingly.
In case of a government representative on the board, the criterion should 
distinguish whether the issue is the physical presence of a govermnent 
representative in the board meetings or the vote the representative can use to 
influence actual outcomes. Values should be assigned accordingly.
A similar approach applies to the issue of whether monetary/price stability 
should be in the central bank law as the final goal. Two factors have to be taken 
into account when considering this issue. First of all, a goal of monetary/price 
stability protects the central bank from political or other pressures aimed at 
using the short-term Phillips curve to increase output and employment above
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tlieir natural rate. This is true for both monetary and price stability. However, in 
the case of an open economy, only price stability provides a clear goal 
Monetary stability does not provide clear guidance as to whether external or 
internal stability should have priority. Any index should be clear about what is 
evaluating and why.
The second major problem w iih the most prestigious indices is omission of some 
extremely important elements of central bank (in)dependence, namely exchange 
rate management and budget independence. For a small open economy, tlie 
framework for exchange rate management is of great importance for actual 
central bank independence, but this is not reflected in the indices -  a point to 
which we return in a separate section.
Budget independence for a central bank has two dimensions tliat can be 
important for central bank independence. First of all, a large part of the budget 
of many central banks is spent on the execution of monetary policy, particularly 
if the bank is sterilising signincant financial flows or intervening in the foreign 
exchange markets. If the budget is determined by tlie govermnent or parliament, 
there is a significant scope lor influencing the actual execution of monetary 
policy. The relevance of this issue depends on tlie particular nature of a given 
economy and the way its monetary system is set, but it is likely to be relevant 
across the board. A similar argument can be applied to the persomiel budget or 
budget for rmining costs -  if the govermnent or parliament determine tliese, 
there is a significant scope for influencing the bank’s officials. On tlie otlier 
hand, there is the issue of democratic delegation, control and accountability. The
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central bank uses public resources, in form of budget subsidies or seigniorage 
revenues. Therefore, a trade-oIT between independence and accoimtability is 
necessary.
Botli criteria mentioned abo\ c also illustrate, however, anotlier important issue -  
the different importance of sonic criteria for various countries. The importance 
of exchange rate independence for a central bank rises with the openness of the 
economy and it is, therefore. \ ery difficult to pinpoint accurately. Wlretlier the 
ECB can determine its exchange rate policy is much less important for its 
independence than is the case with the National Bank of Slovalda. Budget 
independence is much more important in coimtries where a tiubulent economic 
and political climate makes it easier for politicians to politically manipulate tlie 
central bank budget without public outciy. Therefore, indices should take into 
account this factor and consider assigning different weights to these factors in 
different groups of countries.
Additionally, the traditional indices are difficult to use if tlie legal framework 
changes frequently and in a way which is not obvious. The most important 
example relates to fiscal policy, where all laws applicable since 1992 contain 
strict limitations or even outright abolition of central bank credit to govermnent. 
However, in the early years, the Czech and Himgarian laws contained temporary 
provisions raising the limits. Ei eii that was not enough as the annual budget law 
in Hungary raised the limit even further in 1994 against protests by the central 
bank, and a similar situation occurred repeatedly in Poland in early 1990s.
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4.3 Legal and constitutional factors affecting independence of central 
banks
The indices of legal independence ignore several very important elements that 
influence how legal independence Uanslates into actual independence. As 
McCallmn (1995), Goodman ( 1991), Posen (1995), Border (1996) among otliers 
noted, what is granted can be taken away. This applies both to statutes and 
individuals. Therefore, this section focuses on areas not analysed in indices such 
as Grilli et al. (1991). Alesina and Summers (1993), Parkin and Bade (1978) or 
Cukierman (1992) that determine the strength and limits of commitment to 
legally and actually independent central bank.
4.3J  Checks and balances and constitutional protection o f  central bank 
independence
As pointed out by Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage (1999) among otliers, 
existence of multiple veto points for passage of legislation is a way of 
strengthening actual CBl by making it more difficult and less likely tliat the 
independence, once granted, will be taken away. They show tliat existence of 
checks and balances has a significant influence on both actual and legal 
independence.
It is difficult to add to the literature based on Central European experience. 
Checks and balances are quite weak there -  lower chambers of parliaments 
dominate the legislative process. Even tliough upper chambers (not existent in 
Slovakia) and presidents can usually return legislation to the lower chamber, the 
veto can be and frequenlly is overridden with simple majorities. The only
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exception is Poland, where 60% of present deputies of the lower chamber are 
needed to override a presidential veto.
In place of checks and balances. Central European countiies have adopted a 
similar mechanism -  the constitutional protection of central bank independence. 
Central bank indices are generally based on tlie statute-reading methodology, 
but they ignore a statute that is even more important -  tlie coiuitry’s constitution. 
In all but a few countries, constitutions are much harder to change than laws 
both politically (there is a resistance towards amending them veiy often) and 
legally (higher quorum or even more complicated special amendment 
mechanisms). Therefore, inclusion of some form of central bank independence 
into a constitution confers a significantly higher degree of protection and, 
consequently, a significantly higher degree of effective central bank 
independence. It would, therefore, be luiderstaiidable, if constitutional protection 
of central bank independence w ere a serious factor in empirical analysis. Tliis 
has not been so.
This section provides an answer to this puzzle by finding that in traditional 
developed coimtries (of Europe), on wdiich CBI research has concentrated, tliere 
is no constitutional protection of central bank independence whatsoever, so it 
made no sense for economists to deal witli the issue. The section will also 
document that in the countries of Central and Eastern Eiuope, particularly in the 
coimtries that are the focus of the thesis, the level of constitutional protection is 
rather high.
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Based on available data, valid constitutions for 27 European countries have been 
analysed^. The constitutions analysed are based on docmnents provided by the 
International Constitutional Law project, which collects constitutions of tlie 
world. These may not be fully up-to-date in some transition countries, so actual 
constitutional texts for the four Central European countries were obtained 
separately for cross-checking purposes. To quantify the results, an index of 
constitutional protection of CBl was constructed, but its purpose was to get 
results into a digestible format rather than to get numbers tliat could be used for 
furtlier statistical analysis.
The index has four parts, which consist of answers to tlie following questions;
1. Is monetary policy or central bank mentioned in the constitution? (YES=1, 
NO-0)
2. Is the central bank management appointed pinely by parliament (tliough 
possibly indirectly) (YES or not mentioned=0, N0=1)
3. Is central bank independence mentioned in the constitution? (YES=1, 
NO=0)
4. Is price or currency stability mentioned as a principal central bank goal in 
tlie constitution? (YES=l. NO=0)
The first question measures the presence of the central bank in the constitution, 
not independence. It was included to show that in many coimtries, tliere is 
absolutely nothing on tlie central bank or nionetaiy policy in tlie constitution.
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia. (V.eoh Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lat\ ia, l.ithuania, Luxembourg, Netlierlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
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The other tlu*ee measure the constitutional protection of CBI. Their logic is the 
following:
® the second criterion looks at the credibility^ of the commitment to 
personal independence and the number of veto players. If a constitution 
gives an actor independent of the parliament the power to appoint central 
bank management, then even if the parliament decides to amend the 
central bank law. it has lied its hands as far as the personal independence 
of the central bank is concerned imless it can change the constitution. 
Since councils of ministers, in many cases, depend on parliamentaiy 
confidence, they can be seen, in such cases, as extensions of the 
parliament. On the other hand, presidents elected for a predefined period 
are independent of the parliament 
® if tlie central bank's independence is mentioned in the constitution, it is a 
higher order of protection of functional independence 
® if the price or currency stability is mentioned as principal goals in the 
constitution, it is a higher order of protection of goal independence (by 
prescribing a goal whicli is consistent witli low inflation)
The results of the analysis arc robust and imequivocal:
® out of 27 European countries studied, 15 can be classified as developed 
ones, 12 as transition countries
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® oui of 15 developed coiuilries, all have index value of 0 or 1, In otlier
words, the highest actual level of constitutional protection of CBI is 
constitutional presence, which, as already mentioned, is actually no 
measure of protection 
® on the other hand, out of 12 transition countries in the sample, nine have
an index value of 2 or more. In otlier words, % of transition countries 
have some measure of constitutional protection of CBI 
o in tlie group of nine countries with constitutional protection of CBI, tlie 
average value of index is relatively high at 3
The results are sunimarised in the following tables:
Table 4.8: Countries with constitutional protection of CBI
Index value Country
4 Czech Republic
Poland
Russia
3 Croatia
Estonia
Hungary
2 Lithuania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Source: constitutions of individual countries, author’s calculations
Table 4.9: Aggregate values for index of constitutional protection of CBI
European countries -  
27
Developed countries - 15 Transition countries -  12
Index
criterion
Average
value
number of 
countries
average
value
number of 
countries
average value Number of 
countries
1 0.74 20 0.67 10 0.83 10
2 0.22 6 0 0 0.5 6
3 0.22 0 0 0 0.5 6
4 0.22 0 0 0 0.5 6
Average
index
1.41 0.67 2.33
Source: constitutions of individual countries, author’s calculations
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This analysis shows that while constitulioiial protection of central bank 
independence does not exist in the developed coimtries of Western Europe, it 
has a relatively strong position in tiansition economies, being of particular 
importance in the four countries on which this thesis is focused. Czech Republic 
and Poland have the highest index value of 4, Himgaiy has the index value of 
three and Slovakia has the ivoakest level of constitutional protection of CBI 
(index value 2), Without constitutional protection, tlie government can legislate 
away central bank independence if it is willing to incur the political and 
economic costs of such a mo\e (see Goodman, 1991 and Forder, 1996 for 
analysis).
However, constitutional protection of CBI changes the situation. A 
constitutional amendment usually require at least a supermajority in the 
parliament, often a relercndimi or some other additional coiifimialion 
mechanism. Table 4.10 depicts these mechanisms for the four countries 
examined in tliis thesis and compares it witli the strength of CBI protection in 
the current constitution.
Table 4,10: Constitutional aniendnient mechanisms and CBI protection in 
the current constitution
Country Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Other mechanism
deterring
amendments
Index of 
constitutional 
protection of CBI
Czech
Republic
3/5 of all deputies 3 5 of deputies 
present
No 4
Hungary 2/3 of all deputies No upper chamber No 3
Poland 2/3 of deputies 
present
I '2 of deputies 
present
At least 30 days 
between submission 
and first reading
4
Slovakia 3/5 of all deputies No upper chamber No 2
Source: International Constitutional Law project and author’s calculations
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As table 4,10 shows, the majorities required for such a change are considerably 
higher than tlie standard law-passing majorities and this coincides with a high 
level of CBI protection in the constitution. Very few governments in the 
postcommunist histoiy of the region had a sufficient majority to amend the 
constitution.
Therefore, it can be said that particularly Czech Republic and Poland have a 
much stronger protection of central bank independence tlian the central bank law 
itself would indicate. This is important particularly with regard to the objection 
raised by Forder:
“Tl»e government can, in principle, legislate to change the basis on which the central 
bank operates... From this follows a serious complication for the statute-reading 
approach to the measurement of central bank independence. This is that the threat of 
legislation should be presumed to influence the behaviour of the bank”. (Forder, 1996, 
p. 46)
Forder is concerned with how the different probability in different coimtries tliat 
the independence can be legislated away influences the way central bankers 
behave. In this case, central bank independence protected by tlie constitution is a 
form of pre-commitment that any govemnient can find very difficult or even 
impossible to break even if it is willing to incur tlie political cost.
There has been only one attempt to substantially diminish central banlc 
independence since the current constitutions were passed -  in tlie Czech 
Republic in 2000 and 2001. The constitutional protection showed its importance. 
Even tliough tlie parliament passed changes in the central bank law reducing the
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independence of the central bank in several respects (while increasing tliem in 
otliers to satisfy the Maastricht conditions), the Constitutional Court declared 
several of them unconstitutional. In Poland, a new government which came to 
power in 2001, has hinted at changing the central bank law, but has not acted, 
partially in awareness of the constitutional limitations.
4.3.2 Checks and balances in ihe appointment process: political complexity) o f 
central bank appointments and political vulnerability o f  the central bank board
Another factor that is largely ignored in analyses of central bank law is 
importance of the actual appointment procedure of governor and other bank 
board officials. In Grilli el al. ( 1991), the criterion is based on whether governor 
and central bank board arc ..appointed by govermnent". (Grilli et al., 1991, p. 
368) Cukierman (1992) aims to be more sophisticated, but he offers five 
options^, focusing exclusively on the person of central bank governor, ignoring 
tlie rest of the board (see above).
The table 4.11 depicts current appointment procedures for central bank boards in 
our sample of four countries, with numbers showing niunber of officials in the 
given category.
® 1/ CEO appointed by bank board. 2- CEO appointed by council composed of members from 
executive and legislative branches as well as from CB board, 3/ CEO appointed by legislative 
branch (Congress, king), 4/ CEO appointed by executive branch (council of ministers), 5/ CEO 
appointed through decision of one or two members of executive branch (e.g. PM or minister of 
finance).
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Table 4.11: Appointment |)rocedures for central bank boards in Central
Governor Vicego '^cruors Executive
directors
Other board 
members
Czech Republic I -  President 2 - President 4 -  President -
Hungary 1- President on 
PM’s prop.
3 to 5 -  President 
on Governor’s 
proposal and PM 
approval
3 to 5 President 
on Governor’s 
proposal and PM 
approval
Poland 1- Lower House 
on President's 
proposal
3 by Lower 
House, 3 by 
President, 3 by 
Upper House
Slovakia 1 -  President on 
Govern menl'.s 
proposal and 
with
Parliament's
approval
2 -  President on 
Government’s 
proposal and 
with
Parliament’s
approval
2 - Government 
on Governor’s 
proposal
3 - Government 
on Governor’s 
proposal
Source: central bank laws of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
It can be seen that the appointment procedures vaiy together with the nimiber of 
veto players^. The procedures generally involve some of the following -  head of 
state, head of the executive or the executive, one or both legislative chambers 
and tlie central bank governor. The number of veto actors ranges from one to 
three. The following table depicts how many board members in the four central 
banks have 1, 2 and 3 veto players involved in their appointment.
Table 4.12: Composition of central bank boards in relation to number of
Type -  number of veto players in appoiiibiient Number of board members of such type
1 16
2 7
3 11
Source: own calculations, based on central bank laws of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia
The table indicates that there is more than one veto player for more tlian half of 
the appointments, which indicated tlie complexity of tlie appointment process. In
’ The number of actors who have the power to make or veto a nomination.
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all cases, where there arc tw o or three veto players, at least two are independent 
of each other, indicating the existence of checks and balances in the appointment 
process.
As already mentioned, Dvorsk> (2000) implies tliat tlie absence of governmental 
involvement and a low er number of veto players are beneficial by reducing the 
likelihood of gridlock and dcpoliticising the process. While the latter is doubtful, 
the fomier is likely as evidenced by the Central European experience.
Indices of legal independence traditionally include lengtli of term and manner of 
appointment as important factors though in the case of Cukiernian’s index, tlie 
focus is exclusively on the governor. This is misplaced as tlie power is usually 
vested with the bank board as a whole in most countries (and in all four 
comitries in our sample).''*
The focus on the length of term is based on tlie belief that it needs to be longer 
than an electoral cycle, thus giving top cential bankers an assurance they will 
not face reappointment by the same government in the same electoral cycle. This 
criterion does not take into account the fact that governor/bank board members 
facing reappointment are still \ ulnerable to political pressiues during the period 
tliat they perceive as ininicdialcly influencing their chances of reappointment. In 
several transition countries, such a period was artificially prolonged by the
A possible explanation is that Cukierman (1992) used the length of governor’s term of office 
as a proxy for length of term of the w hole board, but in that case, it is important to note that in 
several countries at least some members of the board have or had significantly shorter terms than 
the governor (Hungary, Slovakia).
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government, thus greatly increasing the political vulnerability of the central 
bank, (see Beblaiy, 2001 and Dx orsky, 2000).
In Slovakia, the bank board is supposed to have eight members. However, it has 
not been completely filled from its establishment in 1993 with the exception of a 
short period in early 2001. This increased its vulnerability and tMeatened its 
independence in several ways:
® there were several periods, when the bank did not have one of two 
vice governors (from April 1994 mitil May 1995, from July 1999 imtil 
March 2000, from Max 2001 until January 2002). Since vicegovernors 
are appointed by the president on the proposal of the govermnent after 
approval by the parliament, such periods presented an opportiuiity for the 
govermnent to play a game of can ot and stick witli central bank officials
® five positions on the board (apart from governor and vicegovernors) are 
filled based on the goxernor’s proposal and government’s approval. 
During tlie 1993-2Ü01 period, only two or lliree out of these five 
positions xvere usually filled. This also gave the government an 
opportunity to ‘play' a game of carrot and stick with central bank 
officials, particularly as at least txvo of these positions are defined in the 
law as positions of executive directors. It also put additional pressure on 
the central bank as the bank board had, at times, only five out of eight 
members. This is the minimum quorum necessaiy and tliis fact put 
additional pressure on the bank to accommodate the govermnent in its
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selection of banlc board officials. (An additional factor is that, in such a 
situation, any board niember has an effective veto as his/lier absence 
would mean that the board does not constitute a quorum.)
Similar situations also occurred in the Czech Republic, Hungaiy and Poland 
though to a somewhat lesser extent. However, only in the Hungarian case are 
there real similarities. During the conflict between the Orban govermnent and 
the Hungarian National Bank governor Siuanyi (after Viktor Orban became a 
prime minister in May 1998). a scenario similar to tlie Slovak experience was 
replayed. Under the Hungarian central bank statute, the governor proposes the 
vicegovernors, the PM approves them and the president appoints them. As tlie 
terms of individual vicegox crnors expired dining 1999'\  their positions were 
left unfilled as the prime minister refused to endorse the governor’s 
nominations.'^
Since the governor’s term xxas ending in March 2001 while the government’s 
term of office ended in May 2002, the political logic was clear: waiting witli 
appointments until March 2001 xvould enable the government to appoint a 
trusted governor (the Finance Minister Jarai was later appointed, as expected) 
who, iiitimi, proposed politically acceptable vicegovernors.
The similarity of the Hungarian and the Slovak case is also in the fact that the 
Hungarian central bank laxx stipulates the presence of five members as the 
minimum quoriun for the bank board. Betxveen December 1999 and March
” Gyorgy Szapary -  September 1999. Almos Kovacs -  December 1999
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2001, tlie board had only five members, thus again giving each member an 
effective veto power and making the central bank much more politically 
vulnerable.
In the Czech Republic, vacancies were limited to the first txvo montlis of Czech 
independence, with only one position left imfllled for a more extensive period. 
Another instance was an 8-month period when the CNB Governor Jozef 
Tosovsky became a caretaker prime minister until early elections. This, 
however, was not a case of political vulnerability of the central bank, but rather 
of its politicisation.
In Poland, there was a substantial period of political vuhierability and chaos 
after a fraud scandal in 1991 that led to the dismissal of top central banlc 
officials including the gox crnor. the arrest of some of them and their subsequent 
trial.'"' As a result, the NBP was without leadership between August 1991 and 
March 1992. This, hoxvever. w as not because of a political attempt to keep the 
central bank wlnerable. but due to a political stalemate, which led to two 
rejections of tlie president’s nominee for the governor’s position by tlie lower 
house of parliament.
It is not accidental that the possibility of gridlock is related to tlie niunber of 
veto players involved in the decision. In the Czech Republic and for most 
positions in Poland, the bank board appointments are made by a single person or
Reuters, 10/09/99: Hungary PM blocks central bank VP extension 
CTK, 18/02/93: President appoints members of CNB Banking Council
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institution. On the oüier hand. Hungary and Slovakia share a higher number of 
veto players, creating a higher likelihood of gridlock as well as a greater 
opportrmity to influence central bank behaviour.
4.4 Rule of laxv, personal independence and political role of central banks
Use of central bank laws and other statutes to assess central banlc independence 
is effective only when those statutes are adhered to. In other words, the rule of 
law is a necessary condition for central bank laws guaranteeing independence to 
be meaningful. As indicated above, rule of law in this case means not only 
adherence to the law, but also that the law is the rule-setting mechanism as 
opposed to other, more informal nonns. Accordingly, this section will focus not 
only on the mle of law in the ‘narrow’ sense of the word, but also on other, more 
infomial norms as far as they relate to personal independence of the central 
bank. Since these norms arc impossible to gauge from any written docimieiit, 
experience of tlie postcommunist decade will be used in tlie evaluation.
The fbiu comiti’ies have generally adhered to the rule of law thus defined. The 
only significant exception is Slovakia in the 1995-1998 period when the 
government of Vladimir Mcciar ignored several nilings of the Constitutional 
Coiut, which led the European Commission to state in 1997 tliat Slovakia did 
not at the moment fulfil the Copenhagen criteria of democracy based on mle of 
law. However, even during this period, this was an exception rather than a rule.
Reuters: 09/08/91: Poland's chief banker suspended amid scandal, Reuters: 21/09/91: Former
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A more interesting picture is provided if one looks, based on the experience of 
the 1990s, on infonnal norms governing central bank independence, particularly 
on personal issues. Three principal issues arise:
9 reasons for premature departure of lop central bank officials 
* politicisation of central banks 
® turnover of governors
As mentioned above, the rule of law in the naiTow sense of the word was not 
infringed during the 1990s in relation to the central banks. Therefore, premature 
departures refer to resignation or removal of top officials before the end of their 
tenu of office within the existing law. Reasons for premature departmes can be 
divided into the following groups:
1. Prematiue removal or resignation following a change of political regime. In 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the central bank governor (and 
usually other top officials as well) resigned or were removed following tlie 
fall of conimuiiism and establishment of new goveraiuents. None of the 
governors appointed before the political change began was in an office a 
year after the first non-communist govermnent was appointed. (In 
Czechoslovakia, Jozef Tosovsky replaced Svatopluk Potac, in Hungary  ^
Gyorgy Siuanyi replaced Ferenc Bartha and in Poland Wladyslaw Bakka 
replaced Grzegorz Wojtowicz).'^
Polish bank chief arrested in financial scandal
This was generally legal because those governors wore appointed under the laws passed 
during 1980s that did not have fixed terms of office.
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2. Prématuré removal because of political conflicts, using a passage of a new 
law. In Hungary, a new central bank law guaranteeing a high level of 
independence was passed in 1991. Even though the law did not provide in its 
transitional provisions lor new appointments, the government used its 
passage to remove the central banlc governor Gyorgy Suranyi by not 
reappointing him under the new law. The reason was that the governor had 
signed a petition critical of the govermnent. (Siklos, 1994) This was a 
measure on the verge of legality. The same step was explicitly included in 
tlie draft amendment to the National Bank of Poland Act prepared by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1995 during conflicts between the NBP Governor 
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Wall/. and the Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko.'® 
However, it was never passed.
3. Premature removal or resignation following a financial or other scandal. In 
1991, Grzegorz Wojtoxvic/., governor of the National Bank of Poland, was 
removed from his office together witli several otlier top bank officials in 
relation to a large-scale fraud scandal of tlie Art-B company. In 1994, 
Marian Tkac, the viccgovernor of the National Bank of Slovakia, was 
removed from his office for approving a payment of several million USD 
based on a fraudulent note and also following a disclosure that he had been 
an agent of the communist secret police. In 1997, Frigyes Harshegyi and 
Sandor Czirjak, two viccgovernors of the National Bank of Hungary,
^^ Reuters: 17/5/95, Polish central tears it may lose independence
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resigned following a financial scandal related to loss-making foreign 
exchange options deals.
4. Resignation under polilical pressure. There have been two cases, which can 
be clearly identified as resignations of governors under political pressure. 
The first is the case of go\ ernor of the Himgarian National Bank Peter Akos 
Bod, who resigned midw ay through his six-year term of office in November 
1994 after being appointed in December 1991. Jozef Tosovslcy, governor of 
tlie State Bank of Czechoslovakia and then of the Czech National Bank, 
resigned in November 2()0(), slightly more than two years into his second 
term as the CNB head. Both were forced to resign not because tliere were 
substantive disagreements about desirable monetary policy, but rather 
because of partisan confiict. In case of Bod, it was tlie perception that he was 
a political appointee of the previous government tliat caused the new Horn 
government to put enormous public and private pressure on Bod to resign. In 
case of Tosovsky% the reason was the perception by the heads of the two 
main parties in the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Milos Zeman and 
Chairman of tlie Lower House Vaclav Klaus, that the CNB mider Tosovsky 
was allied with their political opponents -  the President Vaclav Havel and 
tlie smaller political parties. In both cases, governors at first resisted public 
criticism and calls for their resignation by govermnent figures and resigned 
only when it became clear that their autonomy would be circumscribed in a 
relatively short period or that they would have to face a permanent conflict. 
In the case of Bod, several seats on the cential banlc board were soon to be 
vacant, so that either gox crnnient appointees would take a majority of seats
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on the board or the governor would have to wage a protracted battle witli the 
prime minister. In case of Tosovsky, he resigned when it became clear that 
an amendment to the central bank law would significantly limit its 
autonomy.
Therefore, there were several premature departures at the top of Central 
European central banks during the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. However, 
in no case can these departures be traced to conflicts about tlie monetary policy. 
In a minority of cases, the departure was related to scandals of a financial nature 
in which tlie top central bank officials were involved. It is worth noting though 
that in no case was the accusation of personal enrichment by the officials 
proven.
In the majority of cases, the changes were related to political conflict after a 
change of regime or government. Due to the maimer of tlieir appointment or due 
to their actions, many heads of central banks were perceived as partisan 
appointees subject to partisan conflict. Therefore, we now tmn to tlie 
politicisation of central banks during transition.
In the political science and political economy literature, a reason for policy­
makers to agree on central bank independence is to remove monetary policy 
from the political arena because there is a substantial degree of consensus on 
how it should be generally conducted. Consequently, policy-makers can agree 
not to make it a subject of partisan stniggle (see Cukiernian, 1994).
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However, to protect the legitimacy of their independent status, central banks 
should not be perceived by policy-makers or tlie electorate as being involved in 
partisan conflict. This was often not true in Central Europe diuiiig tlie 
postconimunist decade, partially due to patli dependence, but also due to tlie 
actions of central bankers themselves. As a result, central banks were politicised 
usually not because monetary policy xvas a matter of public controversy (tliough 
it sometimes was), but because lop bank officials (or the bank as a whole) were 
perceived as partisan actors by other partisan actors.
In Hungaiy, Gyorgy Suranyi was removed from his position as governor in 
December 1991 after he signed, logetlier with a large nimiber of other prominent 
intellectuals and professionals, a document called ‘Democratic Charter’. The 
charter was a public protest in response to a strategy paper by tlie then senior 
government party - Hungarian Democratic Forum -  headed by the then Prime 
Minister Jozsef Antall. This strategy document, leaked to the media, called for 
the governing party to consolidate its grip on power by taking control of key 
institutions, including state radio and television.'^
Suranyi’s successor was Peter Akos Bod, minister for trade and industry in the 
Antall govemnient and an Antall loyalist, who was perceived due to the manner 
of his appointment and the conduct of iiionetaiy policy as a partisan appointee. 
Therefore, when the opposition won the parliamentary elections in 1994, he was 
perceived as a partisan figure, which the government had a ‘right’ to remove.'^
Reuters, 3/12/91, Hungary's PM ilcfends removal of central bank chief
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After Bod resigned in November 1994, Suranyi became the governor again. He 
also reinforced the perception by partisan actors that he was a participant in the 
partisan conflict. During the 1998 campaign before parliamentaiy elections, the 
central bank analysed the economic program of tlie FIDESZ opposition party of 
the future Prime Minister Viktor Orban and sent the results to the then Prime 
minister, Gyula Horn, who had proposed Suranyi’s appointment. As a 
consequence, Orban staled in 1999 that while the monetary policy of the 
Hungarian National Bank "was in line with government expectations... he 
sought the civilised departure of Suranyi” .'^ A protracted dispute between the 
government and the central bank took place during late 1998, 1999 and 2000.
In Poland, Hanna Gronkicxx icz-Waltz was appointed the governor of the 
National Bank of Poland in 1992 at the proposal of Lech Walesa, Polish 
President from the anticommunist Solidarity Movement. After the 1993 
parliamentaiy elections and the 1995 presidential elections were won by the 
postcomniuiiist party and its coalition partners, she was perceived by others and 
herself as someone closely associated with tlie previous anticommunist 
govemnient, as evidenced b> her own statement in early 1996: “It’s a strange 
feeling to realise that one is the only person remaining from the previous 
Solidarity team”."®
Gronkiewicz-Waltz herself strengthened the perception of herself as a partisan 
actor by becoming a candidate for presidential elections in 1995 -  a decision for
Euronioney, 30/09/94, p. 185, Bod'.s battle for the bank
Interfax, 12/10/99, Orbrui seeks Suranyi’s civilised departure 
Reuters: 29/02/96, Isolated Polish central banker plans to slay on
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which she was criticised by both sides of the political spectnun. In tlie end, she 
was reappointed to her office by president Alexander Kwasniewski from the 
postconimunist SLD, against w hom she ran. The reasons for the reappointment 
were primarily related to her \ cry high credibility witli the markets and also witli 
the need of Kxvasniewski to find a compromise candidate that would be 
confiniied by the Loxver House, dominated again by the right wing parties after 
the parliamentaiy elections of 1997.
In tlie Czech Republic. Jozef I'osovsky was a consensual apolitical central bank 
governor imtil 1997 when he agreed to become a caretaker prime minister after 
the collapse of the Klaus gox crnnient. He has been since perceived by the two 
major parties -  Social Democrats and Civic Democrats - as the prime minister of 
President Vaclav Havel and the smaller political parties. In other words, he xvas 
not a consensual caretaker prime minister, but one who was perceived in a 
sharply partisan fashion. After he returned to the Czech National Bank fblloxving 
early elections of Jmie 1998. both major parties, which gained a large 
parliamentaiy’ majority in this election, sought to curb what they perceived as 
the power of central bank. The issue was also politically salient because of 
political conflict over xvho and what was responsible for the recession of 1998 
and 1999 -  whether the tight monetaiy policy of the central bank or the stalled 
reforms of the previous Klaus gox'ernment. Only in Slovakia was tliere no clear 
case of central bank politicisation.
During the postconimunist decade, central bankers xvere often perceived as 
partisan actors by other polilical actors. This created tlie perception that it was
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legitimate to involve them in partisan conflict and also to seek their removal (by 
legal means). Two principal reasons led to this situation.
One factor was political actions by central bankers themselves. By tliese actions 
they involved themselves in partisan conflict tliat went substantially beyond 
anything related to monetary policy and thus central bankers themselves became 
a ‘fair’ target of partisan conllict.
The second factor was path dependency. Once central bankers became involved 
in partisan conflict (and were sometimes removed because of it), tlieir opponents 
and/or successors were also perceived as partisan and something called “the 
cycle of revenge politics” by a Hmigarian banker was instituted.^' As a part of it, 
each incoming government would see it as its legitimate right to seek removal of 
central bank top officials it perceived to be on the other side of tlie partisan 
divide.
To quantify these thoughts, the methodology created and utilised by Cukierman 
(1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1995) is used to calculate the average lengtli 
of actual terms of office of central bank governors as well as changes of 
governor after a political transition for a different view on how to determine 
central bank independence. This view is based on the fact that the rule of law is 
not well-established in many countries and/or tliat many countries frequently 
undergo political upheavals which have significant influence on appointments 
and policy-making positions. They found tliat in developing countries, the
Euromoney, 30/09/94, p. 185. Bod's b.itlle for the bank
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turnover of governors has a stronger relationship with actual inflation outcomes 
than central bank independence measures based on the reading of statutes.
The following table presents the tmnover of governors in transitional countries 
for the period 1992-1999. The period was chosen because of data availability -  
Lybek (1999) contains data on tlie niunber of central bank governors in 
countries of the former So\’ict Union between joining the IMF (during 1992 for 
nearly all republics) and 1998. Since the Czech Republic and Slovakia became 
independent and members of IMF only on January 1, 1993, tlie period chosen 
for Central Emopean countries is slightly shifted from the beginning of 1993 
until the end of 1999, but is of the same length to allow comparability.
The Czech Republic presents a special case, where Jozef Tosovsky was tlie CNB 
governor during the whole period except for tlie time when he was a caretaker 
prime minister for eight months at the end of 1997 and in 1998. After this 
period, he returned to his position in the Czech National Bank. Pavel Kysilka 
was an interim governor of the CNB during that period, but he was never 
formally appointed a governor. Therefore, it is not clear whetlier tins should be 
coimted as one governor or three governors. Accordingly, the table shows a 
spread of one to tliree for the Czech Republic.
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Table 4.13: Number of governors and their turnover in transitional
countries, 1992-1999
Country Number of governors Turnover of governors 
(per annum)
Czech Republic 1-3 0.14-0.43
Hungary 2 0.29
Poland 1 0.14
Slovakia 2 0.29
Average of Central European 
countries
1.5-2 0.21-0.29
Average of Baltic countries 2.3 0.33
Average of Former Soviet 
Union, except for Baltic 
countries
2.7 0.38
Source: oivti calculations based on Lybck (1999) and publications of central banks in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slo\ akia.
It is clear from the data lhal the turnover of governors in coiuitries of Central 
Europe is ratlier low compared to other transitional countries, even if tlie Czech 
Republic is considered to have three governors during this period instead of one. 
This is true even if Central Europe is compared to anollier group of advanced 
transitional coiuitries -  the Baltic coiuitries. Therefore, the preliminary 
conclusion is that even if one looks at statistical indicators of central bank 
stability, tlie Central European countries as a group achieve the most stable 
results among the transitional countries.
It is more difficult to compare Central Eiuope with developed coiuitries. 
Cukierman (1992) shows the turnover indicators for most developed coiuitries, 
but they concern the period 1950-1989. Therefore, they are likely to be much 
lower than the indicators for a period of just seven years even if tlie actual 
turnover was the same. Overall, however, these results should be taken as 
illustrative and viewed with caution, due to the short period for which they were 
calculated.
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4.5 Central bank autonomy in exchange rate policy
For a small open economy, the framework for exchange rate management is of 
great importance for actual central banlc independence, but this is not reflected 
in any of the indices developed in the 1980s and early 1990s. One can find an 
explanation in Mas’s statement that in no country has the "exchange rate policy 
been turned over entirel)' to the central bank”, (Mas, 1994, p. 16) due to its 
political sensitivity and importance for overall economic policy. Even though 
this statement is not true, it is true for OECD countries on which research of 
central bank independence has concentrated. Since central bank independence in 
exchange rate policy is extremely rare or non-existent among these coimtries, 
creators of central bank independence indices did not include it into indices as it 
would have little explanatory power.
In tlie group of countries that the thesis is concerned with, complete central bank 
autonomy in determining exchange rate policy is not rare and inclusion of the 
foreign exchange rate in some form in measurements of CBI in transition 
countries is also frequent.
In Hmigarj' and Poland, it is the government tliat determines the exchange rate 
regime. The central bank’s poucr is in the fact that, by law, it has to agree witli 
tlie policy and in the fact that it carries out the every day foreign exchange 
decisions based on the policy (see Article 13 of the National Bank of Hungary 
Act and Article 24 of the National Banlc of Poland Act).
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On the other hand, central bank statutes in tlie Czech Republic and Slovakia 
stated until recently (based on the previous State Bank of Czechoslovakia Act) 
and without any caveats that the central bank "shall... state the exchange rate of 
the Czecli/Slovak crown in relation to foreign cuiTencies” (see Article 28 of 
National Bank of Slovakia Act and Article 35 of the Czech National Bank Act).
In tlie Czech Republic, these provisions were changed in the recent ainendnients 
aimed at making central banks laws conform with tlie Maastricht criteria. The 
central bank sets „after discussion with the government, foreign exchange rate 
regime, which cannot howe\ er threaten price stability". Such wording indicates 
that the central bank keeps the final word.
This difference in legal pro\ isions would not be important if informal rules were 
tlie same. Due to the political importance of foreign exchange decisions, there 
might be an imwrilten coinention that requires at least the approval of tlie 
govemment. Even if no such convention exists, it can be preferable for central 
banks to occasionally seek political cover for such decisions even if they have 
the autliority to do so. The reason is that changes in the exchange rate regime 
can be associated with a foreign exchange crisis and wider economic and 
political tumioil. In that case, joint decision is a way of protecting tlie central 
bank from subsequent government criticism.
A good example is the beha\ iour of the Czech National Bank during the foreign 
exchange crisis of May and .lime 1997. Wlien the decision was finally made to 
float the Czech crown, it was announced jointly by the central bank governor
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and prime minister. It was one of the very few times that the central bank sought 
govemment approval for centra! bank policy in the area of foreign exchange 
policy.
However, despite this exception. Czech and Slovak central banks repeatedly set 
exchange rate policy autonomously, occasionally despite government resistance. 
Their decisions can be divided into the following groups;
1. decisions to preserve a fixed exchange rate and to use foreign exchange rate 
interventions to preserve it. Both countries inherited the fixed exchange rate 
from Czechoslovakia, but in neither case did the governments of the 
successor states ever make decisions concerning its preservation. On the 
otlier hand, both central banlcs had to intervene to preserve the fixed 
exchange rate, very hea\ ily in Czech Republic in May 1997 and in Slovakia 
in the spring of 1997 and summer of 1998. In 1993, tlie National Bank of 
Slovakia even resorted to administrative measures that partially restricted the 
convertibility of the currency to defend tlie fixed exchange rate.
2. decisions to alter the fixed exchange rate and to float the cunency. Botli 
central banks took decisions that in crucial ways altered tlie fixed exchange 
rate regime and, in the end. took the decisions to abolish it. In neitlier case 
(witli the exception of the floating of the currency in the Czech Republic) 
was fomial govemment approval sought; on the contrary, there are instances 
in both countries where senior govemment figures publicly stated their 
opposition. In July 1993. the NBS devalued the crown by 10% despite
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statements by the then Finance Minister Julius Toth that "the banking 
coimcil cannot make a decision about the devaluation of the currency 
without consulting the Slovak government”. I n  February  ^ 1996, the Czech 
National Bank widened the band of the Czech currency peg from 1% to 15 
%, despite the public opposition of the then Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. 
There were other crucial decisions where there was no govermnent 
opposition, but government approval was not formally sought -  e.g. the 
repeated widening of the band in tlie Slovak case during mid-1990s or the 
Slovak decision to float the ciurency in October 1998.
3. decisions to intervene in the foreign exchange market after the currency was 
floated. Since the currency float (June 1997 in the Czech case, October 1998 
in the Slovak case), both central banks have infrequently, but repeatedly 
inten'ened openly in the foreign exchange market against the currency, but 
also in its support. In addition to that, they used covert intervention in the 
form of the direct purchase of foreign or domestic currencies from 
commercial banks. Again, in no case was formal approval or agreement of 
tlie govermnent sought in cither of the two countries.
The previous paragraphs ha\c demonstrated that central bank autonomy in 
foreign exchange policy or its lack mattered in tlie four coiuitries of our sample 
in the sense that Czech and Slovak central banks took decisions that were 
significant and in several cases openly opposed by tlie government. In Hungary 
and Poland, this could not have happened by definition. Such differences should
CTK, 15/02/93 - Opinions dilTcr on polcntial devaluation of Slovak currency
280
be taken into account when assessing the level of actual central bank 
independence. Unfortunately, the literature has little so far to say about tliis 
topic.
4,6 Conclusion
This chapter examined institutional constraints on policy discretion in the fomi 
of central bank independence. It conducted an in-deptli analysis of central bank 
independence in the four transition countries of our sample and used the results 
of the analysis to evaluate some of the underpimiings of theories on central 
bank independence. It proceeded in several steps.
First of all, it applied the two most frequently used indices of central bank 
independence, based on the statute-reading approach, to Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Results made it clear that the level of legal 
independence enjoyed by central banks in Central European countries has been 
very high from tire very start of transition. The indices showed that from early 
on during the transition period, central banks of the region became powerful 
political and economic players an played crucial roles in economic refomis and 
the preservation of macroeconomic stability during the following decade. The 
high level of legal independence was based on relatively long terms of office for 
its representatives, well-defined appointment procedures, definitions of 
monetary policy objectives, usually in terms of internal and external monetary
Institutional Investor, 3 1/5/96, p. 97; tosovsky's daring decision
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stability, general autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy and limitations on 
central bank lending to the go\ crûment.
In tlie late 1990s and early 2000s, major changes in central banlc law were 
passed in all four countries in order to achieve compliance witli tlie Maastricht 
Treaty. However, the need to satisfy the Maastricht criteria and to substantially 
amend the central bank acts opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ in the form of an 
opportmiity to change the statutes also in otlier ways. Political players in tlie 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia used it to weaken the actual autonomy of 
the central bank and the autonomy of its career officials from tlie current 
governing majority or even attempted to use it to weaken overall central bank 
independence.
In the next stage, the findings were evaluated in tlie light of interviews witli 
central bankers from both industrial and Cential European coimtries. The 
interviews identified as the key legal criteria of central banlc independence 
precisely those that the central banks in our sample generally enjoyed from the 
begimiiiig, confirming the high level of legal independence. The following parts 
of the analysis made for a picture that is much less clear-cut both in ternis of 
central bank independence in Central Europe and its overall theoiy.
The third stage, based on interviews and analysis, showed why legal indices of 
the variety utilised in the pre\ ious analysis are an insufficient and imprecise tool 
for measurement of actual central bank independence. It pointed to factual 
mistakes in calculation of indii idual country scores by other authors, badly or
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imprecisely phrased criteria w ithout clear interpretation, a fusion of positive 
observations of legal independence with normative views about what makes for 
better monetary policy and difficulty of the use of indices if the legal framework 
changes frequently and in a w ay which is not obvious. All of these should make 
one waiy of placing too much trust in the indices of legal independence and their 
validity. Rather than an authoritative evaluation of actual independence, they 
should be seen as a useful w ay of succinctly smnmarising main elements of the 
central bank legal fiamework in terms of its autonomy.
In the next stage, the chapter demonstrated that actual central bank 
independence in transition was substantially influenced by many other factors 
than tliose captiued by existing legal indices, quite apart from the 
metliodological and practical problems of the indices. It also attempted to 
expand oin luiderstanding not only of what happened in the countries concerned, 
but also what implications this has for the theory in general.
In order to achieve this, it first built on tlie theory of checks and balances in tlie 
theoiy of central bank independence, which is based on the view that existence 
of multiple veto points for passage of legislation is a way of strengthening actual 
CBI by making it more difficult and less likely that the independence, once 
granted, will be taken away. The chapter expanded the theory by adding a 
similar mechanism adopted in many transition countries -  the constitutional 
protection of central bank independence. Central bank indices are generally 
based on the statute-reading methodology, but they ignore the statute that is 
even more important -  the countiy’s constitution. In all but a few countries.
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constitutions are much harder to change tlian laws both politically (there is a 
resistance towards amending them ^'eiy often) and legally (higher quorum or 
even more complicated special amendment mechanisms). Therefore, inclusion 
of some fonn of central bank independence into a constitution confers a 
significantly higher degree of' protection and, consequently, a significantly 
higher degree of effective central bank independence.
This analysis showed that while constitutional protection of central banlc 
independence does not exist in the developed coimtries of Western Europe, it 
has a relatively strong position in transition economies, being of particular 
importance in the four countries on which this tliesis is focused.
The fifth stage of the analysis concentrated on another measure of central bank 
independence -  how frequently have governors of central banks changed during 
transition. According to a theory, in countries with weaker rule of law, actual 
appointments are a better indicator of independence (and govermnent control of 
monetary policy) than analysis of the legal framework.
Application of the methodology to Central European central banks showed that 
the situation can be much more complicated tlian that. While there were several 
premature departures at the top of Central European central banks during the late 
1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. these departures cannot be traced to conflicts 
about tlie monetary policy. In a minority of cases, the departlue was related to 
scandals of a financial nature in which the top central bank officials were
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involved. In tlie majority of cases, the changes were related to political conflict 
after a change of regime or go\ crnment.
In tlie political science and political economy literature, a reason for policy­
makers to agree on central bank hidependence is to remove monetaiy policy 
from the political arena because there is a substantial degree of consensus on 
how it should be generally conducted. Consequently, policy-makers can agree 
not to make it a subject of partisan struggle. However, to protect the legitimacy 
of tlieir independent status, central banks should not be perceived by policy­
makers or the electorate as being involved in partisan conflict. This was often 
not true in Central Europe during the postcommunist decade, partially due to 
path dependence, but also due to the actions of central bankers themselves.
As a result, central banks were politicised usually not because monetary policy 
was a matter of public control crsy (though it sometimes was), but because top 
banlc officials (or the bank as a whole) were perceived as partisan actors by otlier 
partisan actors. Therefore, partisan conflict between goveminents and cential 
banlcers and consequent changes among top central bankers have had no 
discernible impact on conduct of monetaiy policy.
The final element of the analysis focused on anotlier factor of great importance 
for actual central bank independence in a small open economy, but not reflected 
in any of the indices - the framework for exchange rate management. The 
chapter aigued tliat the reason is a universal absence of central banlc autonomy 
in these matters across industrialised coimtries. In this respect. Central European
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countries provide an interesting laboratoiy as two of them -  Czech Republic and 
Slovakia -  have central banks w ith high level of both legal and actual autonomy 
in detemiining the exchange rate regime. This laboratory shows that such 
autonomy can be significant for overall independence of the central bank.
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Chapter 5: The role of the exchange rate in monetary policy
5.1 Introduction
Foreign exchange rate policy in the so-called emerging markets, i.e. in more 
advanced and integrated transition and developing economies, and its place 
witliin tlie overall framework for monetary policy have been tlie subject of 
increasing interest and scrutiny during recent years, prompted by repeated and 
serious economic problems in many of tliese countries tliat were in some way 
related to ciurency issues. ( Flood and Marion, 1998; Goldfajn and Valdes, 1996; 
Liargovas, 1999; Mislikin. 1999; Obstfeld and Rogolf, 1995; Mussa et al., 2000)
This chapter contains analysis of developments of nominal and real exchange 
rates and their role in monetaiy policy of tlie Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia. It brings together various empirical results to fonn a imified 
explanation of tlie role of the exchange rate in monetary policy, with emphasis 
on actual behavioiu of monetarv authorities.
5.2 Framework for analysis of exchange rate strategies
This section sets the analytical stage for the following empirical sections in order 
to propose a framework for analysis of exchange rate choices and a resultmg 
classification of exchange rate strategies in Central Eiuope witli a view to 
application to otlier small open economies.
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Tlie proposed framework for analysis of exchange rate choices is based on three 
considerations relevant for Central European coiintiies: low inflation, 
predictability of nominal exchange rate and prevention of a real exchange rate 
misalignment.
The medium-term aims of monetary policy in accession countries during the 
1990s and in tlie 2000s can be simplified to:'
® low inflation, implying disinflation to a level fulfilling the Maastricht 
criteria and then consolidation of this achievement 
® prevention of a major real exchange rate misaligmnent tliat would lead 
tlie economy into a currency crisis or require painful adjustment to avoid 
an outright crisis
The choice of a ciurency regime and a foreign exchange rate strategy in tliese 
comitries, both in positive and normative tenus, has been and will continue to be 
largely deteniiined by answers to tlie following questions that influence tlie 
achievement of tlie objectives staled above:
o What is the speed of disinflation chosen to achieve the low inflation 
fulfilling the Maastricht criteria?
® What is the weight placed on tlie nominal exchange rate in the process of 
disinflation and then in consolidation of low inflation?
1 SeeNBP (1998). CNB ( 1999).
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® How risk-averse have policy-makers been about tlie prevention of real 
exchange rate misalignment, i.e. what levels do they consider dangerous 
and how prompt is the corrective action? (The issue is also related to 
management of capital inflows witli regard both to disinflation and 
external imbalance.)
Therefore, any exchange rate strategy chosen within the sample of coimtries 
studied can be fitted into a triangle of tlie following preferences of policy-makers 
witli regard to tlie exchange rate:
® low inflation
® nominal predictability
0 prevention of real exchange rate misaligmnent
D iagram 5.1: The triangle of priorities for an exchange ra te strategy
nominal predictabilitv low inflation
prevention o f real 
exchange rate
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Preferences for low inllalion and nominal predictability tend to be entwined. 
Wlien analysing the use of the foreign exchange rate channel in achieving low 
inflation in small open economies, what is usually meant is nominal exchange 
rate stability and predictability in the form of a fixed exchange rate (see De 
Grauwe, 1997 for textbook exposition). In such a case, a successful exchange- 
rate based disinflation strategy is inextricably linked, indeed fused, witli tlie use 
of the fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor.
It is, therefore, important to explain and emphasise why tliis has not necessarily 
been so in Central Europe. Autonomous price movements (particularly changes 
in relative prices" and in administered prices) have tended to cause domestic 
inflation to be higher than that of the anchor country under a fixed exchange rate. 
There are examples both in the Czech and the Slovak case, where even medimn- 
term nominal exchange rate stability and relatively high interest rates were not 
enough to bring inflation down to Gemian/US levels.
Therefore, emphasis on use of the exchange rate chamiel in tlie process of 
disinflation in advanced transition coimtries should not be automatically 
identified with a fixed nominal exchange rate. To bring inflation down to EMU 
levels, nominal exchange rale appreciation might be necessary. The speed of 
nominal appreciation tolerated or even encouraged by policy-makers depends on 
tlie desired speed of disinflation and also on tlie weight tliey put on tlie exchange 
rate in the disinflation process.
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Even tliough nominal appreciation is teclmically possible with a fixed exchange 
rate tluough revaluation, it is unlikely, particularly in coimtries with higher rates 
of inflation. For all countries but Hungary, a trend appreciation in tlie real 
exchange rate can be demonstrated for the 1993-2001 period, but the trend was 
extremely uneven during indii idual subperiods and the size of tlie trend differed 
significantly between countries. As there is a high level of uncertainty as to tlie 
sources as well as the size of the trend, it has been very difficult for policy- 
malcers to accurately estimate an equilibrium real exchange rate. This has made 
tliem be reluctant to institute an official revaluation and prefer a more gradual 
mechanism afforded by a floating currency. Therefore, nominal appreciation was 
allowed by tlie authorities only under the floating regimes.^ On the otlier hand, it 
should be noted tliat the nominal exchange rate can be and has been used as a 
tool o f disinflation even when it was depreciating, but depreciating more slowly 
tlian tlie inflation differential w ould suggest.
Therefore, priority  ^ ascribed to low inflation and to tlie role of the exchange rate 
in achieving it has been the first consideration of policy-makers in Central 
Europe in determining the exchange rate strategy. For a hypothetical strategy 
based solely on this consideration, achievement of low inflation primarily by
 ^See the menu cost effect and other tisynimetrio consequences o f  changes in relative prices (Ball 
andM ankiw, 1994; Fischer, 1981: lor application to transition see W ozniak, 1998).
 ^ Throughout tlie chapter, \vhcnc\cr appropriate, authorities are described as ‘allowing’, 
‘tolerating’ or ‘encouraging’ nominal appreciation. The terms are used in recognition that: a) 
authorities in countries with liberalised financial markets cannot fully control the path o f  the 
nominal exchange rate unless they are willing to sacrifice everything else, but b) their controLof 
interest rates and other policy insiniments beyond exchange rate interventions gives them a 
measure o f  control.
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stability or even appreciation of the nominal exchange rate would be tlie 
exclusive priority.
The second aspect of the cxcliange rate strategy is the priority placed on tlie 
achievement of nominal predictability, if not always stability, via exchange rate 
policy. If the exchange rate is to play tlie role of the nominal anchor, then it must 
be, to a large degree, stable and predictable, witli a limited flexibility. If potential 
exchange rate fluctuations arc significant in comparison witli tlie inflation rate, 
economic agents can no longer rely on tlie nominal exchange rate as the anchor 
for their expectations of price developments. On the otlier hand, an irrevocably 
fixed exchange rate with no flexibility (e.g. dollarisation) nialces for a very strong 
nominal anchor. Exchange rate strategies have to place tliemselves on a 
continuiuii between the two extremes.
For purposes of tlie analysis presented here, currency regimes are divided into 
tluee groups based on the extent to which tlie authorities actually allow their 
cunency to fluctuate together with their use of the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor. The category of no JJexibility contains hard pegs (currency boards and 
imions togetlier with dollarised regimes) as well as soft, fixed or crawling, pegs 
witli narrow bands of less than 2.5%. The category of limited flexibility contains 
fixed or crawling pegs with intermediate bands of 2.5% to 7.5% or tightly 
managed floating currencies. The category of managed flexibility contains pegs 
with wide bands of more than 7.5%, target zones, managed and more or less
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independent floats/ This classification is in line witli much of recent literature, 
e.g. Bofinger and Wollmershacuser (2001), Yeyati and Stiuzenegger (1999) and 
Reinliart and Rogoff (2002). that stresses de facto ratlier than de iure aspects of 
the exchange rate management.
Concern about vulnerability of the economy to a real exchange rate misalignment 
and its consequences has been the third consideration. Substantial misalignment, 
manifested in particular in unsustainable developments of the current accoimt of 
tlie balance of payments, can lead the economy into a currency crisis or require 
painful adjustment to avoid a crisis.
However, unsustainability is only clear ex post as a period of time can pass 
without major problems. Risk-averse policy-makers take steps to avoid entering 
tlie danger zone or remaining in it for an extended period of time. The extent to 
which tlie real exchange rate is seen as the key to tlie issue and whetlier nominal 
exchange rate depreciation is targeted in order to achieve real exchange rate 
stability (or even depreciation) depends on the overall monetary policy strategy. 
However, since the flexibility of the only other available major policy tool (fiscal 
policy) is quite limited, the foreign exchange rate has to be a significant part of 
tlie policy approach.'
“* A  fourth category -  unlimited lle.xibility -  could be added, but the experience o f  even the 
largest, closed econom ies shows that monetary policy authorities attempt to steer the exchange 
rate path once fluctuations begin to impinge on domestic intermediate and final monetary policy 
objectives. For small, open econom ics, this is even stronger and precludes benign neglect o f  the 
exchange rate.
 ^ On the other hand, it should be noted that even a financial crisis might not necessarily 
demonstrate that exchange rate policy in pmticular or macroeconomic policy in general should 
have been different. V incze (2001 ) argues that “if  risks are real and cannot be done away with by 
fiat, then is it not reasonable to assume that somebody must suffer sometimes, and that financial 
sector problems may indeed be part o f  the scheme o f  distributing risks (near) optimally?” (p. 6)
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At tlie same time, the issue of vulnerability is also linked to the effect of tlie 
exchange rate regime on capital inflows, particularly witli regard to tlie 
encouragement for inflows proi ided by fixed exchange rates and the non-linear 
relationship between such flow s and the perception of vulnerability.
Table 5.1 presents a matrix of potential exchange rate strategies. Strategies A-G 
combine a particular approach to nominal exchange rate flexibility witli the 
attitude of tlie autliorities towards the actual trend change in tlie nominal 
exchange rate. Strategies arc based on actual policy choices in Central Europe, 
where nominal appreciation was limited to currency regimes of managed 
flexibility, so two strategies combining no or limited flexibility witli nominal 
appreciation aie not included (these absent strategies were used, for example, by 
Western Germany during the Bretton-Woods era). Hard pegs are included in 
emuiieration of options for Strategy A for completeness even though tliey have 
not been used in Central Europe.
He attempts to define a 'bad' ei isi.s by one or more o f  the following conditions: real shocks are 
amplified, shocks responsible for Ihc crisis have nothing to do with fiindamentals, losses are not 
shared. He argues that crises experienced by Central European countries were not ‘bad’ crises: 
“Despite the fact that the financial systems were obviously not robust or efficient in these 
countries, the financial crises wore definitely adjunct to the very real troubles that plagued these 
economies. There seems to be no evidence that the financial sphere made things definitely 
worse”, (p. 15) What reinforces these view s is the fact that it is very difficult to distinguish 
radically different paths in terms o f  changes in unemployment, inflation or real wages as between 
countries, which had to float currencies under speculative pressure, (such as the Czech Republic 
in 1997 and Slovakia in 1998), countries, which had to change their macroeconomic policy, but 
continued to rely on a fixed exchange rate (such as Hungary in 1995) and countries such as 
Poland in 1999 and 2000. (which w ere proactive). In all the cases, i f  the fundamentals, evidenced 
usually by veiy high current account deficits, slow ing growth and/or stubborn inflation, were 
shaky, adjustment had to follow  and its costs did not differ fundamentally.
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Tabic 5.1; Matrix of potential exchange rate strategies, based on currency
Nom inal appreciation nom inal stability Nom inal depreciation
no flexibility Hard pegs (currency 
boards and unions 
together with dollarised 
regimes) as w ell as fixed 
soft pegs with narrow 
bands o f  less than 2.5% 
(Strategy A)
crawling pegs with 
narrow bands o f  less 
than 2.5% (Strategy
B)
Limited flexibility fixed pegs with 
intermediate bands o f  
2.5% to 7.5% or tightly 
managed floating 
currencies (Strategy (Z)
crawling pegs with 
intermediate bands o f  
2.5% to 7.5%  
(Strategy D)
managed flexibility Pegs with wide bands o f  more than 7.5%, target zones, managed and more 
or less independent floats (Strategy E-G)
To make tills analytical framework useful, exchange rate strategies utilised by 
individual countries at various points in time need to be placed into tlie triangle 
of priorities. This has been done by drawing a series of lines mnning parallel to 
sides of the triangle. One series of lines represents nominal appreciation, stability 
or depreciation and rims parallel to the side of the triangle that represents 
preference for low inflation. The otlier group of lines denotes no flexibility, 
limited flexibility or managed flexibility and runs parallel to the side of tlie 
triangle representing nominal predictability.
Individual strategies are placed at tlie intersection of lines. Distance of the 
intersections from the three sides of the triangle indicates priorit)^ placed on each 
of tlie tliree considerations by a given strategy. The further from a particular side, 
tlie less emphasis a strategy places on the priority. Therefore, the ordering of 
individual lines within a group was based on tlieir relationship to tlie tliird 
priority -  real exchange rate misalignment. For example, nominal stability places 
more emphasis on prevention of real exchange rate misalignment than nominal 
appreciation and tlie same applies to tlie relationship between nominal stability
296
aiid nominal depreciation. Similarly, managed flexibility places more emphasis 
on prevention of real exchange rate misalignment tlian limited flexibility and tliis 
is also true of limited flexibility vis-à-vis no flexibility. Consequently, Strategy 
G of tlie two outlying lines - managed flexibility and nominal depreciation - is 
placed at tlieir intersection. It is the closest one to the side of prevention of real 
exchange rate misaligiimenl and makes for the least chance of it.
Diagram 5.2: Exchange rate strategies and policy priorities
iippreciiitiim no Jlexibility
stability limitedflexibility
depreciation managedflexibility
nominal predictability low  inflation
prevention o f  REER 
misalignment
The following two sections present empirical findings on tlie behaviour of tlie 
nominal and the real exchange rates in Central Eiuopean countries during 1990s 
and early 2000s. Some of the I uidiiigs were already used in this section to set up 
tlie framework, but most will be used in the final sections. There, tlie empirical 
findings will be translated into analysis of the experiences of individual countries
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witli exchange rate strategies and a summaiy of the causes and consequences of 
tlie strategies tliemselves.
5.3 Nominal exchange rate
This section focuses on the role of the nominal exchange rate in monetary policy 
and inflation. Based on de\’elopnieiits in the sample of four countries, it makes 
tlie following argument:
o even emerging market economies can successfully constrain discretion 
over monetaiy policy williout resorting to hard pegs 
0 historically, soft pegs proved to be a successful nommai anchor for 
disinflation during early transition where tliere was no credible 
alternative
0 while formal fixed-bul-adjustable pegs are probably unsustainable in 
small, open economics that experience rapid integration into world 
financial markets, this docs not mean that a true exchange rate flexibility 
for small open economics is practiced or advisable 
o while official floating of the cuiTency entails a change in the behaviour 
towards less management of tlie exchange rate, small open economies in 
our sample are clearly concerned about the exchange rate and try to 
manage its development regardless of the formal regime
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In 1990 and 1991, all four countries began the transition witli a fixed exchange 
rate - an adjustable peg with a veiy narrow band (0.3 to 0.5%), reflecting tlie 
need for a strong nominal anchor.' .^ With tlie exception of Poland, this 
arrangement lasted unchanged in all countries until 1994-1995.
As tlie economy stabilised after the initial transition depression (1991-1993), 
pegs witli very narrow bands, high interest rates and gradually liberalised capital 
accounts induced mcreasiiig capital inflows begimiing in 1994. Tliis forced tlie 
coimtries to gradually allow the exchange rate some flexibility to deter at least 
some groups of speculators. This was done not by floating the currency, but via 
widening tlie fluctuation band. The chart 5.1 is a visual representation of tlie 
band duiing tlie 1993-2001 period. It shows that, witli the exception of Himgary, 
bands increased significantly during the period before eventual floating.
All countries widened the band to at least 2.25% between February 1994 and 
Februaiy 1996. Indeed, between May 1995 and January 1997, all countries witli 
the exception of Himgary widened the band to 7.5%. However, due to a need to 
preserve external balance and competitiveness, not only were bands widened, but 
changes of parities and regimes were also luideilaken. Both fixed-but-adjustable 
and crawling pegs were used before eventual floathig.
® The principal objective was not oiil\ lo decrease actual inflation -  which was very high only in 
Poland -  but to minimise the impact ol' repressed and potential inflation after price liberalisation 
and the initial devaluation.
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Chart 5.1: Band width for pegs, in% around the central parity, 1993-2001
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To understand these changes in policies, one needs to look again at the inflation 
record. Based on the previous experience in the 1970s and 1980s, higher initial 
inflation rates and deeper macroeconomic imbalances at the beginning of 
transition, Hungarian and Polish policy-makers thought it much more important 
than the Czech and Slovak policy-makers to stabilise the real exchange rate. 
(OECD, 1997, p. 30) This was done in the early transition period by ad-hoc 
devaluations of the adjustable peg parity. However, this approach significantly 
diminished the credibility of the peg and its effectiveness in being a nominal 
anchor. Therefore, both countries decided to switch to a crawling peg. In the case 
of Poland, this was done in late 1991. In the Hungarian case, the switch was part 
of a wider reform package in early 1995. The reduction in the rate of the 
crawling peg then progressed in line with the progress of disinflation (see chart 
5.2). Poland gradually widened the band to 15% until it officially floated the
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currency in April 2000. Hungary preserved its narrow band of 2.25% until May 
2001, when it was widened to 15%.
Chart 5.2: Rate of crawl in crawling peg vs. inflation
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The Czech Republic and Slovakia pursued a policy of rapid disinflation 
accompanied by a fixed parity exchange rate. This policy was successful at first. 
However, as the disinflation stalled from late 1995 until 1997, the fixed 
exchange rate entailed an ultimately unsustainable real appreciation and the 
currencies were floated in 1997 and 1998. Central banks in both countries, 
however, continued to occasionally influence the exchange rate directly through 
intervention.
For all four countries, though, the extent of the actual interference of the 
authorities in the movement of the foreign exchange rate cannot be measured by
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market interventions, nor can it be inferred from tlie official exchange rate 
regime. Changes in the interest rate -  tlie primary policy instriunent in developed 
coimtries and in the sample studied here -  could be and often were made with tlie 
exchange rate in mind and complement interventions in tlie foreign exchange 
market.
The ‘fear-of-floating’ argument by Calvo and Reinliart (2000), based on their 
empirical research, indicates significant difference between words and deeds, 
particularly in small open economies - many officially floating currencies exliibit 
behaviour much closer to pegged exchange rates tlian to ‘true’ floaters such as 
tlie US, Japan or tlie eurozone (and Germany before that).
To investigate tlie actual behaviour of tlie autliorities in Central Europe, we use 
metliodologies developed by Calvo and Reinhardt (2000) and by Bofinger and 
Wollniershaeuser (2001a).^ The methodology is based on evaluation of the 
volatility of foreign exchange rales, foreign exchange rate reserves and interest 
rates. The analysis is based on the assumption tliat, under truly floating foreign 
exchange rate regimes, the l ariance of tlie exchange rate should be relatively 
high, while the variance of foreign exchange reserves and interest rates should be 
relatively low. The opposite should be true luider foreign exchange rate regimes 
tliat overtly or covertly attempt to stabilise tlie foreign exchange rate.
’ The methodology developed by Hcinhardt and R ogoff (2002), focusing on parallel market 
exchange rates, is not used here because for the sample and the period studied, data from parallel 
markets are inferior to the information gained from regular currency markets due to the thinness 
o f  parallel markets for Central luimpean currencies and the high level o f  currency liberalization 
in the countries concerned. Additionally, Reinhardt and R ogoff (2002) contains a number o f
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Since it is veiy difficult to dcielop absolute beiicluuarks for comparisons, tlie 
results are compared with those countries widely considered to be free floaters -  
the US and Japan. The results are also compared witli countries identified in tlie 
literature as ‘fearful’ floaters, countries which, despite formally floating their 
currencies, conduct policies aimed at active stabilisation of the foreign exchange 
rate.
The results are shown in table 5.2. The results for Central European countries are 
divided into period according to their currency regimes. In tlie case of Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, there is a clear defining moment of transition from a peg 
to a floating currency -  May 1997 for the Czech Republic and October 1998 for 
Slovakia. For Huiigaiy, the period until April 2001 is one of a fixed exchange 
rate witli a relatively narrow band. Since the period from May imtil December 
2001 is too short for any meaningful analysis, results for Hungary mclude only 
one period from Januaiy 1993 luitil April 2001. In the case of Poland, the 
changes in the currency regime were quite gradual and tlie official moment of 
floating (April 2000) was not really the turning point. Therefore, tlie point of 
transition between a fixed and a floating regime was set for February 1998, when 
tlie band was widened to 10%.
The first set of cohmins analyses the developments of tlie exchange rate vis-à-vis 
tlie Deutscheniark (Euro since January 1, 1999) and tlie US Dollar. Numbers in 
cohmins show the percentages of monthly changes in tlie exchange rate tliat fall 
within 1% and 2.5% bands. In other words, 57% of monthly movements of tlie
assessments in their description ot'ol'Ucial cunency regimes in the countries concerned that seem
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Hungarian exchange rate vis-à-vis the Deutscheniark during the 1993-2001 
period was of less than 1%.
Table 5.2: Fear of floating -  true floaters, fearful floaters and Central
FX RA I ES FX RESERVES IN TEREST RATES
1“» 2.50% 1% 2.50% 0.25% 0.50%
Czech Republic 
FIX
DEM 61.34 94.23 17.31 32.69 35.3 51USD 40.38 75
Czech Republic 
FLOAT
DEM 56.36 92.73 10.91 41.82 58.2 76.4USD 18.18 63.64
Hungary
DEM 57.14 90.82 9.18 22.45 40.2 63.2USD 35.7 1 78.57
Poland FIX
DEM 31,15 85J25 18.03 31.15 39.34 60.66USD 36.07 83.61
Poland FLOAT
DEM 21.74 58.7 19.57 50 36.96 47.83USD 26.09 71.74
Slovakia FIX
DEM 55.88 92.65 7.35 23.53 14.3 25.4USD 36.77 83.82
Slovakia
FLOAT
DEM 56.41 92.31 11.11 30.56 48.7 64.1USD 30.77 58.97
Canada 68.2 93.6 15.9 36.6 36.1 61.8
India 82.2 93.2 21.6 50 6.4 15.9
Bolivia 72.8 95.9 8.1 19.6 16.3 25.9
M exico 34.6 63.5 13.2 28.3 5.7 9.4
Japan 33.8 61.2 44.8 74.3 67.9 86.4
U SA 26.8 58.7 28.6 62.2 59.7 80.7
L u w i i  vaiv.L4 w t i a v u  v i :  v < v iiiia t  u a iiK . uuLci cUiLi i v t i i u a i i v m i i
Note: 1993 - 2 0 0 1  period and ils subperiods for Central European countries, selected periods o f  
officially floating exchange rates for other countries
The second set of columns analyses developments of the foreign exchange 
reserves and the second one developments in interest rates. For the foreign 
exchange reserves, columns show the percentages of montlily changes that fall 
within 1% and 2.5% bands. In otlier words, 8.1% of monthly changes in the 
Bolivian foreign exchange reserves were of less than 1%, as opposed to 28.6% in 
the case of US foreign exchange reseives. For the interest rate, columns show the 
percentages of monthly changes tliat fall witliin tlie band of 0.25 and 0.5
at odds with other literature.
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percentage points. During the 1993-2001 period, 40.2% of months saw change 
in the Hungarian interest rate smaller or equal to 0.25%.
The results show that since they floated their cinrencies in 1997 and 1998, tire 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have exhibited a much smaller degree of 
fear of floating tliau the truly fearful floaters identified in the literature, but more 
fear of floating than Japan and the US. Therefore, tlieir floating regimes are 
much more tlian just pegs in disguise though tliey caiuiot be classified as free 
floats.
Floating was, in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, accompanied by a 
measurable change in the behai iom of tlie autliorities towards less intervention 
in tlie management of tlie foreign exchange rate. The Czech Republic exhibits 
significantly smaller number of changes in interest rates (a difference of 23-25 
percentage points), higher eount of changes in foreign exchange rates 
(differences of 2 to 5 percentage points vis-à-vis tlie Deutscheniark and 12 to 22 
points vis-à-vis the US Dollar) and an ambiguous development regarding foreign 
exchange reserves (changes of approximately 7 percentage points in botli 
directions). Poland exhibits counterintuitive higher number of changes in interest 
rates (a difference of 3 to 13 percentage points), but a significantly liigher 
number of changes in foreign exchange rates (differences of 10 to 28 percentage 
points vis-à-vis the Deutschcmark and 10 to 12 points vis-à-vis the US Dollar) 
and a lower nimiber of changes in foreign exchange reserves (a difference of 1 to 
19 percentage points). Slovakia exhibits significantly smaller iiiunber of changes 
in interest rates (a difference of 34 to 39 percentage points), slightly higher
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number of changes in foreign exchange rates (very small change vis-à-vis tlie 
Deutscheniark and six to 24 points vis-à-vis tlie US Dollar) and a decrease in 
number of changes in foreign exchange reserves (a difference of 4 to 7 
percentage points).Hungary, on the other hand, shows tlie least flexibility as 
could be expected from a foreign exchange rate regime with a fixed rate and a 
2.25% band.
Consequently, while changes in official regimes seem to have actual 
consequences, the distinctions are much less clear tlian tlie official definitions 
would suggest. The level of authorities’ intervention in the foreign exchange 
market usually differs with a different foreign exchange rate regime in tlie same 
coimtry, but comparisons of regimes between countries can be misleading.
The analysis of exchange rate developments can be usefully extended by 
rudimentary statistical analysis of veiy-short-term and short-term developments 
in tlie iioniinal exchange rate via daily and montlily change in foreign exchange 
rate values. The following charts and tables present the results.
Chart 5,3 shows the mean daily change in the foreign exchange rate vis-à-vis tlie 
DEM/EUR. Chart 5.4 shows the mean daily change in the foreign exchange rate 
vis-à-vis tlie USD. Chart 5,5 shows the standard deviation of the daily changes in 
the foreign exchange rate vis-à-\ is the DEM/EUR.
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Chart 5.3: Mean daily change of foreign exchange rate vis-à-vis DEM/EUR,
in%
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Source: Central bank data
Chart 5,4: Mean daily change of foreign exchange rate vis-à-vis USD, in%
0.06
USOHUF
-USOPOL
Source: Central bank data
Chart 5,6 shows the standard deviation o f changes in the foreign exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the USD.
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Chart 5.5; Standard deviation of daily changes in foreign exchange rate vis-
à-vis DEM/EUR, in%
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Chart 5.6: Standard deviation of daily changes in foreign exchange rate vis- 
à-vis USD, in%
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Source: Central bank data
Tables 5,3 and 5.4 contain statistical properties o f  the monthly foreign exchange 
rate series in our sample o f countries.
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Table 5.3: Statistical properties of monthly foreign exchange rate series, 
1993-2001, USD rate
C zech  R epublic H ungary Poland Slovakia
January 
1993 -  
February 
1996
February'
1996 -  
May
1997
May 
1997 -  
D ecenib  
ei-2001
.Ian nary 
1993 
April 
2001
Januaiy 
1993 -  
April 
1995
M ay 
1995 -  
February 
1998
February 
1998 -  
D ecem b  
er 2001
January 
1993 -  
Decem b  
er 1995
January 
1996 -  
Septerab 
e r 1998
October 
1998 -  
D ecem b  
er 2001
M ean -0.17% 0.93% 0.34% 1.31% 1.53% 1.20% 0.31% 0.10% 0.49% 0.87%
Median 0.03% 0.76% 0.93% 1.40% 1.39% 1.30% -0.25% -0.14% 0.51% 0.98%
M ax 2.61% 3.89% 9.59% 6.53% 6.49% 4.94% 7.37% 10.09% 2.98% 7.68%
Min -4.31% -2.52% -5.64% -4.46% -2.05% -1.67% -5.48% -3.98% -2.14% -5.01%
R ange 6.92% 6.40% 15.23% 10.99% 8.54% 6.61% 12.85% 14.07% 5.13% 12,69%
St.D ev. 1.56% 1.86% 2.95“o 1.88% 1.63% 1.35% 2,66% 2.24% 1.29% 2.76%
Source: Central bank data and Datastrcani, calculation by author
Table 5.4: Statistical properties of monthly foreign exchange rate series, 
1993-2001, DEM/EUR rate
C zech  R epublic H u n gary Poland Slovalua
January 
1993 -  
Februar 
y  1996
Februar 
y 1996 -  
May 
1997
May 
1997 -  
D ecem b  
er 2001
.lanuaiy
1993
A pril 2001
January 
1993 -  
April 
1995
May 
1995 -  
Februar 
y  1998
Februar 
y 1998 -  
D ecem b  
er2001
January 
1993 -  
D ecem b  
er 1995
January 
1996 -  
Septemb  
er 1998
October 
1998 -  
D ecem b  
er 2001
M ean 0.09% -0.07% -0.15% 1,00% 2.15% 0.36% -0.20% 0.42% -0.02% 0.21%
M edian 0.00% -0.05% -0.31% 0.65% 1.89% 0.00% -0.53% 0.10% -0.20% -0.14%
M ax 2.14% 4.23% 5,82% 11.27% 11.01% 3.59% 6.34% 5.70% 3.65% 7.39%
M in -1.47% -2.44% -4.46% -1.88% -0.81% -2.02% -5.58% -1.87% -2.53% -2.01%
R ange 3.61% 6.67% 10.28% 13.14% 11.82% 5.61% 11.93% 7.58% 6.19% 9.40%
St. D ev. 0.86% 1.73% 1.55% 1.71% 2.15% 1.47% 2.84% 1.48% 1.09% 1.70%
Source; central bank data and Dalaslroani, calculation by author
Charts and tables show quite similar developments in all countries botli in level 
and volatility of USD and DEM/EUR foreign exchange rates.
The most surprising result is the ambiguous impact of different foreign exchange 
rate regimes on measures of \olatilit}' (range, standard deviation) in individual 
coimtries, pointing to the fact that despite expectations of higher volatility imder 
more flexible regimes, the evidence is that this factor is of relatively small 
significance compared to other factors at play.
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Unsurprising, but quite helpful in interpretation of exchange rate developments, 
is ‘realignment’ of the Czech. Hungarian and Slovak cnrrencies from USD to 
DEM/EUR, confirmed both in daily and montlily data, as shown by 
decreasing/steady standard deviation of DEM/EUR rates and increasing/steady 
standard deviation of USD rates.
5.4 Real exchange rate and its role
This section explores developments in the real exchange rate in tlie Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Real exchange rate developments, 
particularly its equilibrium appreciation and actual appreciation during tlie 
transition process, play a key role in foreign exchange rate policy and its position 
witliin tlie overall framework for monetary policy and disinflation. ( Halpem and 
Wyplosz, 1997; Liargovas, 1999; Orlowski, 2000) The chapter on tlie monetary 
policy transmission mechanism also demonstrated the importance of botli 
nominal and real exchange rales for inflation developments in countries in tlie 
sample. The section shows that for real exchange rates in tlie sample of Central 
European coimtiies:
a a trend appreciation can be demonstrated for the 1993-2001 period
e tlie tiend was extremely uneven during individual subperiods
s tliere is a high level of uncertainty as to tlie causes as well as tlie size of
tlie trend
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•  consequently, it has been very difficult for policy-makers to accurately 
estimate an equilibrium exchange rate and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly
Chart 5.7 shows the development o f the effective real exchange rate in the four 
countries concerned.* It shows that while there have been major reversals, there 
is an overall tendency towards appreciation in all four countries.
Chart 5.7: Real exchange rate in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia
136
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“C2K
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Source: IFS
Visual inspection is insufficient though to find answers to two important issues: 
whether there has been a trend in the development o f the real exchange rate and 
what have been the developments in the volatility o f the real exchange rate. To 
achieve this, the nature o f  the series needs to be determ ined.
* The time series is trade-weighted and deflated by consumer price index. CPI-deflated real 
exchange rate is the only one available across the sample o f  countries for the entire period.
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Unit root testing shows that all real exchange rate series are non-stationaiy 
during tlie 1993-2001 period as a whole. In otlier words, real exchange rate 
behaviour caimot be characterised as stable -  i.e. mean-reverting witli a random 
white noise influencing actual outcomes in individual periods. The question that 
logically follows is: what is the nature of the real exchange rate series in tliese 
coimtries?
Table 5.5; Stationarity of real exchange ra te series, 1993-2001: test statistics 
of unit root tests^
Country Test value
Czech Republic -0.942525
Poland -0.136832
Hungary 0.640900
Slovak Republic -1.844409
1% Critical Value -3.4934
5% Critical Value -2.8889
10% Critical Value -2.5812
Source: IFS, calculation by author
Two principal options should be considered:
o the equilibriimi real exchange rate has been appreciating and the actual real 
exchange rate has been lluctuating in a well-behaved fashion around the 
trend. This would correspond to a stationary series witli a time trend. If tliis is 
so, then the time trend should be a significant variable and the detrended 
series should be stationary.
® Tests were also done tor shorter periods, with identical non-stationarity results. The only  
exception is Hungary during the regime o f  discrete devaluations between 1993 and early 1995. 
when the real exchatige rate was stationary at a 10% level (on the verge o f  significance on 5% 
level) -  in line with the oft'icial policy o f  stable real exchange rate.
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9 the equilibriimi real exchange rate has not been appreciating during tlie 
transition and irregularities in the real exchange rate have been caused by 
random elements. This would correspond to a non-stationary series following 
a random walk without drift. If this is so, then the series should not be 
stationary and should be a random walk without drift.
The tliird, more complicated option is a combination of tlie first two:
® the equilibriimi real exchange rate has been appreciating during tlie transition 
and tlie actual real exchange rate has been fluctuating in a randoni-walk 
fashion around the trend. This would correspond to a random walk series 
witli a drift.
Testing shows that for the whole period, all the real exchange rate time series 
(with the exception of tlie Hungarian real exchange rate) are stationary at a 10% 
level of significance after detrending/° all tlie coefficients are positive and tlie 
explanatory power of the trend is relatively high (see table 5.6 for data). This 
confirms tlie first option - the equilibrimii real exchange rate has been 
appreciating during the transition and the actual real exchange rate has been 
fluctuating in a well-behaved fashion around the trend.
Unit root test o f  residuals after regression on a constant and a time trend.
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Table 5,6: Stationarity of detrended real exchange rate series, 1993-2001: 
test statistics of unit root test
Country Unit root test statistics
Czech Republic -3 ,188084
Poland -2.722903
Hungary -1.404814
Slovak Republic -2.842205
1% Critical Value -3.4934
5% Critical Value -2.8889
10% Critical Value -2.5812
Source: IFS, calculation by author
Note: bold type signifies stationarity at a 10% level o f  significance, bold italics type signifies 
stationarity at a 5% level o f  significance
Analysis of residuals shows the influence of the crisis years 1997-1998 and in 
particular of the Russian crisis on real exchange rates in all countries, where, 
based on nominal depreciation, there was also real exchange rate depreciation. 
The conclusions are broadly iti line with tlie results of Liargovas (1999) and 
Orlowski (2000).
The literature offers several explanations for the trend appreciation (see 
Liargovas (1999) for a sun cy). but two rationales seem to dominate. One is 
related to initial imdervaluation in all countries (Richards and Tersmami, 1995; 
Halpem and Wyplosz, 1997). where the appreciation is seen as a return to 
equilibrium. The other is based on underlying structural changes in tlie economy. 
Halpem and Wyplosz (1997) fbrniiilate it most broadly: “The equilibrium 
appreciation is explained by rapid gains in efficiency once markets drive prices 
and allocation of resources", (p. 458) Even though tliis movement in the 
equilibrium rate is often associated witli the Balassa-Saniiielson effect, there are 
otlier factors at play, such as the ‘brand improvement’ effect (increases in 
intemational prices of domestically produced tradables due to gradual
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establislxiîient of repulaiioit and penetration of western niai'kets) and capital 
accumulation in the tradables sector. (Lipschitz and McDonald, 1990)
The Balassa-Samiielson (BS) effect, present in fast-growing countries, increases 
tlie equilibrium real foreign e.xchange rate due to differing productivity growtli in 
the traded and tlie non-traded sector. The Balassa-Samuelson effect has received 
most attention in the discussion of real exchange rate appreciation.(e.g. Szapaiy, 
2000). Thanks to a recent excellent survey on the topic in Central Europe by 
Kovacs (2002), there is a comprehensive review available.
For tlie Czech Republic, Bcncs and Klima (2002) find tliat most of tlie real 
appreciation since 1994 stems from the development of the relative price of 
tradables and tlie benchmark estimate for the BS effect over the 1994-2001 
period amounts to about 1.6 percent per amiimi. In Hungary, Kovacs (2002) finds 
a BS effect around 1.9% per amuuii.
Borowski et al. (2002) review an extensive body of work on tlie Balassa- 
Samuelson effect in Poland, w hich reaches disparate results for different period 
during 1990s - Simi-Reutter estimates the effect as 4.2% per amium, Jankowiak 
et al. (2001) puts it at 3.7% per annum. The highest value is found by Schardax 
(2001) at 9.4% per annum, while Dudek (2001) and Cipriani (2000) come with 
the lowest ones: 1.2% and 1.5% respectively.
For Slovakia, Hajnovic (2002) produces wdiat he calls a ‘guesstimate’ of 1-2% 
annually. Egert (2002) is c\cn more skeptical, concluding that the Balassa-
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Sainuelson effect should accoiml for 0% of the equilibrium real exchange rate 
appreciation for the Czech and Slovak Republics and for 1-3% aimual 
equilibrium real exchange rale appreciation for Himgary and Poland.
Liargovas (1999) demonstrates that tlie underlying reason for real exchange rate 
appreciation is crucial for assessing whether tlie appreciation is an equilibrium 
one. However, since it is \ cry difficult to estimate tlie level of initial 
imdervaluation as well as to accurately conclude what is tlie size of the Balassa- 
Samuelson effect, it is veiy difficult ex post and it was even more difficult at tlie 
time for policy-makers to know with any reasonable certainty to what extent 
movements in the real exchange rate (appreciation) represented changes in tlie 
equilibrium. As shown in the literature review, it has also been ratlier difficult to 
infer tlie equilibrium level from the balance of payments.
5.5 Experience of individual countries with exchange rate strategies
In section 5.2, we identified seven potential exchange rate strategies relevant for 
policy-makers in Central European coimtries during 1990s and early 2000s. 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 looked at actual developments in nominal and real exchange 
rates in Cential Europe. In this section, tlie use of the strategies by individual 
coimtries will be examined on the basis of all tliree previous sections.
The section shows tliat use of Strategies A tlirough D, associated with no 
flexibility or limited flexibility, occmred in discrete, clearly identifiable periods.
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This is not so with Strategics E through G. While it is obvious when a country
entered the policy space of managed flexibility associated with Strategies E |
tlirough G, tliere is no precise criterion to use in differentiating between managed I
flexibility aimed at nominal stability and managed flexibility tliat tolerated !
nominal appreciation as an clement of tlie disinflation strategy. !I
Therefore, when dealing with managed flexibility, the analysis of individual i
country experience looks at policy range ratlier tlian at individual strategies. It i
igenerally finds that, for managed flexibility, monetaiy policy strategies in |
Central Europe favoured nominal stability or appreciation. The policy-makers 
allowed sustained depreciation only when tlie exchange rates were finding 
equilibrium after the float.
In case of the Czech Republic, from the begimiing of transition until February 
1996, it used the strategy of nominal stability and no flexibility (Strategy A) in 
the fonn of a stable soft peg with a veiy narrow 0.5% band. The strategy placed a 
heavy emphasis on tlie disinl'lationaiy aspect of the exchange rate policy by 
providing a verj  ^ predictable (narrow band) and a ver)' stable (no change in tlie 
central parity) environment. In Februar)^ 1996, the band was widened to 7.5%, 
switching to the strategy of nominal stability and limited flexibility (Strategy C).
The wider band was supposed to preserve the stable enviromiient, but make it 
less predictable and thus discourage speculative capital inflows. The impact of 
tlie shift was limited as the interest rate differential vis-à-vis tlie anchor 
cunencies (DEM and USD) remained high compared to the band widtli and tlie 
central bank was reluctant to utilise the band fully.
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In tlie end, both strategies cumulatively entailed excessive real exchange rate 
appreciation, leading to the currency crisis of May 1997, which resulted in tlie 
floating of tlie Czech currenc) in June 1997. As mentioned above, managed 
flexibility involves shifts within a continuous range of exchange rate strategies 
rather tlian a stable, clear-cut. oiice-and-for-all choice. Based on the analysis of 
detailed minutes of the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank, two stages can 
be discerned.
During the first one, which lasted from the aflemiatli of the crisis in June 1997 
luitil early 1999, the central bank left tlie market largely on its own to find a new 
equilibrium rate after the shock of the crisis. The process involved sharp 
appreciations and depreciations botli in the nominal and in tlie real exchange rate 
and utilised the full spectrum of options. During this stage, the relationship 
between the exchange rate and the new inflation target was not at the forefront of 
policymakers’ agenda.
From early 1999 on, the central bank became much more actively involved in tlie 
exchange rate management. Its policy was based on tlie (valid) expectation of 
renewed capital inflows and the consequent pressures for appreciation. The 
central bank incorporated these expectations into its overall inflation targeting 
framework and acted against the appreciation only when it was too sharp or 
involved tlie tlireat of midershooting the inflation target. Therefore, tlie actual
" The Bank Board o f  the CNB is the lop policy-making body o f  the Czech central bank and it 
began publishing detailed minutes o f  its sessions simultaneously with its shift to inflation 
targeting in December 1997.
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strategy in this period is in the space between Strategies E and F (managed 
flexibility + nominal stability or appreciation).
Hungary, despite occasional changes in the exchange rate regime, persevered 
witli one exchange rate strategi -  Strategy B of nominal depreciation and no 
flexibility - from the beginning of transition mitil May 2001. The strategy was 
implemented at first via a fixed exchange rate with frequent minidevaluations, 
but was changed, in 1995. to a more predictable crawling peg. The approach 
reflected the Hungarian preference for real exchange rate stability and freedom 
of manoeuvre at tlie expense of a strong disinflationary role for tlie exchange 
rate.
At the end of tlie 1990s, the strategy reached its limits in terms of disinflation 
and, in 2001, the exchange rate band was widened to 15% and the crawl was 
stopped. At tlie same time, an ambitious inflation target was set for the years 
2001-2003. Hmigaiy is probably the most clear-cut example, in our sample, of a 
comitiy switching to managed flexibility' in order to allow nominal appreciation 
-  Strategy E. Between May 2001, when the band was widened, and December 
2001, the end of om reference period, the nominal effectiie exchange rate 
appreciated by 8% (compared to depreciation of 2% diuing tlie same period in 
2000).
Poland, due to initial conditions similar to Hungary, also followed tlie Strategy B 
of nominal depreciation and no flexibility at the beginning of tlie transition. 
However, it felt the need to increase the band width to 7% already in May 1995
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to deter speculators. The Strategy D of nominal depreciation and limited 
flexibility lasted from May 1995 until February 1998. Due to a relatively high 
level of inflation in the m id-1990s, even the looser peg provided a good nominal 
anchor.
In February 1998, tlie band w as widened to 10% (later extended to 12.5% and 
15% and finally abandoned in April 2000) and Poland thus entered the period of 
managed flexibility. At the time, the crawling peg was still in use and Poland 
implemented Strategy G of nominal depreciation and managed flexibility thougli 
witli a decreasing rate of depreciation. The inflation reached single digits during 
1998 and tlie central bank introduced a new policy framework -  inflation 
targeting -  with the aim to push inflation below 4% by 2003. All of this provided 
a new role for the exchange rate in monetaiy policy.
After tlie disinflation stalled during 1999 and 2000, monetary policy was 
severely tightened and the subsequent nominal appreciation in 2000 and 2001 
became one of the principal tools of disinflation. Therefore, the policy space 
between Strategies E and F was used with emphasis on Strategy E -  nominal 
appreciation witliin managed flexibility.
Slovakia is a rather similar case to the Czech Republic. From tlie beginning of 
transition until December 1995. it used the strategy of nominal stability and no 
flexibility (Strategy A) in the form of a stable soft peg with a very narrow 0.5% 
baud. The monetary separation IVom the Czech Republic m February 1993 led to
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one devaluation in July 1993 (10%), but otherwise the developments were nearly 
identical.
Slovakia shifted to Suategy C (nominal stability and limited flexibility) in 
December 1995 -  several months prior to the Czech Republic and as in the 
neighboiuring comitiy, the impact of tlie shift was limited. The size of the interest 
rate differential vis-à-vis the anchor currencies (DEM and USD) remained 
significant in comparison to the widtli of the band and, witli the exception of tlie 
last few montlis of the peg. the central bank was reluctant to utilise tlie band 
fully. The strateg)' lasted a year longer than in tlie Czech Republic, until it was 
also ended because of a currency crisis in October 1998.
After tlie Slovak cimency was floated in October 1998, the first year witnessed 
dramatic exchange rate changes. Beginning in late 1999, the central bank focused 
unambiguously on nominal stability. Therefore, the monetaiy policy was 
strongly dominated by Strategy F (managed flexibility' and nominal stability) 
though tlie bank allowed nominal appreciation to help disinflation when it 
believed tlie external balance was not llireatened. Compared to the other tliree 
Central European countries. Slovakia seemed to be most concerned about 
nominal appreciation.
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Diagram 53: Development of exchange rate strategies in Central Europe
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Diagram 5.3 visually summarises paths taken by the four Central European 
countries. Starting from different initial conditions, they gradually converged 
towards managed flexibility and nominal stability/appreciation.
5.6 Evaluation of Central European exchange rate strategies
This section presents evaluation of all individual strategies from A to G in 
alphabetical order. It looks, in detail, at both advantages and risks of each one 
and ties in country experience.
Strategy A - nominal stability + no flexibility: this exchange rate strategy is very 
strong on the nominal anchor function and provides a substantial contribution to
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disinflation, but makes the economy quite vulnerable. A soft peg witli a fixed 
parity usually requires higher nominal interest rates tlian in anchor currencies for 
successful disinflation'^ and so encourages capital inflows. A possible strategy 
with a fixed exchange rale is to attempt a rapid decrease in inflation with high 
interest rates and temporarily neutralise, via sterilised intervention, tlie capital 
inflows such a policy might attract. If disinflation progresses relatively quickly, 
interest rates can decrease and capital inflows sensitive to the interest rate 
differential will abate. The real exchange rate will appreciate to the extent of tlie 
temporary inflation differential.
This strategy was used by the Czech Republic and Slovakia until 1997/1998, 
resulting in an ultimate failure. The reason was limited success in bringing down 
inflation due to autonomous factors. This caused simultaneous appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, continuing capital inflows and high costs and limited 
effectiveness of sterilised intervention. In the end, this led to a currency crisis 
and an involuntary exit from the peg. In tlie environment of significant 
luicertainty about tlie equilibrium real exchange rate and risk aversion towards 
sustained external imbalance, the fixed exchange rate makes it difficult to adjust 
tlie nominal exchange rate and makes fiscal policy bear the whole brmit of 
adjustment and crisis prevention when the external imbalance is considered 
risky. Consequently, the strategy can be recommended for periods of relatively 
high inflation and limited financial integration with tlie world economy.
To achieve positive real inlcrcsl rales,
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Strategy B - nominal depredaikm  + no flexibility: exchange rate strategies based 
on a combination of nominal depreciation and no flexibility are strong on tlie 
nominal anchor function and make it easier to address vulnerability tlian for 
nominal stability, but they arc w eak on tlie disinflation front. There are two ways 
in which tliey can be implemented. The first one was attempted by Hungaiy 
during the 1991-1995 period, when it used frequent small devaluations to 
stabilise the real exchange rate and use the peg as a nominal anchor. 
Unsurprisingly, it was not successful with regard to tlie latter -  on the contraiy, 
expectations of future devaluations added to inflationary expectations. The 
second option is to use a crawling peg. This approach is similar to tlie flxed-but- 
adjustable exchange rate, but shifts the emphasis of foreign exchange rate policy 
from disinflation to crisis prei cntion by stabilisation of the real exchange rate (or 
at least a decrease in the speed of appreciation). Appreciation of tlie real 
exchange rate, such as there is. takes place tlirough nominal exchange rate 
depreciation and a higher inllation differential. This strategy allows much more 
fine-tmiing and gradualism in approaching disinflation. If disinflation is the 
principal policy target, it also requires higher nominal interest rates to balance 
tlie effects of nominal depreciation on price developments, thus leading to 
problems with capital inflows similar to those with the flxed-but-adjustable peg. 
This strategy was used by Hungary between 1995 and 2001 and by Poland 
between 1991 and 1995. It was \ eiy successful in preventing significant external 
imbalance and in very gradual disinflation to single-digit levels. The crawling 
peg makes tlie fiscal policy bear less of a biuden of adjustment and crisis 
prevention when the external imbalance is considered risky tlian the fixed-but- 
adjustable peg. It also makes it unlikely that it will have to be abandoned under
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pressure as the fixed-bul-adjustable regime. It should be noted that this strategy 
is, by nature, transitoiy. As the rate of crawl/mini devaluations slows down 
togetlier with the decreasing intlation, it leads to Strategy A or to a floating 
currency.
Strategy/ C - nominal stability - limited flexibility and Strategy D - nominal 
depreciation + limited flexibility/: these exchange rate strategies share tlie 
characteristics of analogous strategies witli no flexibility, primarily because tire 
only difference (increase in band width) was generally insufficient to change tlie 
underlying stiateg>'. Exchange rate strategies in tliis category still utilise the 
exchange rate as tlie nominal anchor and most comments on tlie previous 
category apply, but the wider band is applied to introduce more uncertainty, deter 
speculators and tlius deal with capital inflows. Ultimately, this approach proved 
to be transitoiy and largely ineffective. Such bands are generally too narrow to 
deter speculators if authorities are afraid to allow the actual rate to get too close 
to tlie edge of the band. If authorities make fiill use of the band, they can 
introduce a dangerous element of self-fulfiling prophecy of a ciurency crisis as 
tlie Czech and Slovak cases attest. The principal difference between tlie two 
strategies -  C and D -  is the emphasis placed by the latter on preventing real 
exchange rate misalignment.
Strategy/ E - nominal appreciation + managed flexibility/: this strategy makes for 
a strong role of the nominal exchange rate in disinflation. The exchange rate 
flexibility prevents excessive Milnerability, but creates potential for fluid, but 
sharp reversals in tlie nominal exchange rate. Under tliis scenario, the exchange
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rate lacks the role of a nominal anchor. A possible strategy is to let tlie nominal 
exchange rate appreciate and use the appreciation to reduce inflation. If this 
strategy is successful, tlie real exchange rate appreciates only to an extent that 
does not create dangerous external imbalances. Under this approach, 
appreciation of tlie real exchange rate takes place tlirough nominal exchange rate 
appreciation and rapid elimination of tlie inflation differential. Such a policy has 
been intemiittently used with relative success in all four coimtries.
On tlie otlier hand, this strategy is the one most strongly associated witli the 
possibility tliat the foreign exchange rate becomes a source of disturbance 
beyond the autliorities’ intentions as this strategy can easily lead to significant 
real exchange rate appreciation if inflation does not fall rapidly enough or if tlie 
nominal appreciation is veiy high. The strategy can be recommended if tliere is a 
strong Balassa-Saniuelson effect and/or high FDI inflows so tliat tlie equilibrium 
real exchange rate either appreciates substantially or tlie risk of a currency crisis 
is lowered.
Strategy/ F  - nominal stability managed flexibility/: even tliough this strategy 
aims at de facto stability of the nominal exchange rate, tlie lack of commitment 
makes it difficult for the exchange rate to seive as a nominal anchor. The 
exchange rate flexibility prei eiils excessive wlnerability so it can be seen as a 
less risky version of a soft peg with a narrow band, but one with an equal 
emphasis on the role of the nominal exchange rate in tlie disinflation. This is a 
strategy of rough stabilisation of the exchange rate to prevent major dismption to 
external balance and disinflation.
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Strategy/ G - nominal depreciation + managed flexibility/: this strategy 
concenti'ates heavily on the prevention of vulnerability and leaves out tlie role of 
tlie exchange rate as a nominal anchor. With tliis strategy, the exchange rate can 
still play some role in disinflation, if its rate of depreciation is lower tlian tlie 
inflation differential. The focus of the foreign exchange rate strategy is to 
neutralise the impact of the foreign exchange rate on inflation developments by 
its stobilisation witliin an infoniial corridor to prevent major disruption to 
external balance and inflation. Such a strategy is associated witli lower nominal 
interest rates than the previous one and is most appropriate when tlie level of 
capital inflows is relatively low . Its principal problem is tliat it provides no clear 
strategy for disinflation. As already noted. Strategies E tlirough G, rather tlian 
being discrete, clear-cut approaches, form a policy continuum.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the role of nominal and real exchange rates in monetary 
policy of Central European countries, bringing togetlier various empirical results 
to fomi a unified explanation of the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy 
in small, open transition economies.
Experience of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia confimis that 
soft pegs can be a successful nominal anchor during a period of limited 
integration witli world financial markets and tliere is probably no credible
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alternative for a nominal anchor for such countries short of a hard peg. On tlie 
other hand, it also shows that fixed-but-adjustable pegs are probably 
imsustainable in small, open economies once their integration into world 
financial markets gets imderii a>.
This being said, the experience of four Central European coimtries does not 
confimi the Tiollowing-ouf hypothesis, according to which the overall 
movement in foreign exchange rate regimes is towards corner solutions of nearly 
absolute flexibility or rigidity in the foreign exchange rate. The Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia consistently avoided corner solutions and pursued 
intemiediate foreign exchange rate regimes despite currency crises and periods 
of painful adjustment.
The range of regimes chosen b>’ these countries is a contimumi ranging from an 
officially floating foreign exchange rate where the interference of tlie autliorities 
is achieved chiefly via interest rate movements (Poland since 2000) tlirough 
official floats with exchange rate management via interest rate movements and 
limited exchange rate intenention (Czech Republic since 1998) and official 
floats with extensive foreign exchange market intervention (Slovakia since 
1999), official pegs with wide band and limited involvements in the foreign 
exchange market (Poland between 1998 and 2000, Hungary since 2001) and 
official pegs with wide band and extensive interference in the foreign exchange 
market (Czech Republic between 1996 and 1997, Slovakia between 1996 and 
1998) to narrow pegs with explicit and actual commitment to high levels of 
foreign exchange rate stability (Hiuigary, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic
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between 1993 and 1996), In this respect, tliere is no actual dichotomy between 
fixed and flexible regimes, but a continuous range of options/^
Wliile formal floating of the currency entails a change in the behaviour towards 
less extensive maiiagemeiil of the exchange rate, the small open economies in 
our sample have clearly been concerned about tlie exchange rate and tried to 
manage its development regardless of the formal regime. Distinctions in actual 
behaviour are much less significant tliaii the official distinctions between various 
regimes would suggest. The level of the autliorities’ management of the foreign 
exchange rate usually differs with a different foreign exchange regime in the 
same countiy, but comparisons of official regimes between coimtries can be 
misleading. True exchange rate flexibility for small open economies is iieitlier 
practised, nor advisable. Additionally, various foreign exchange regimes have 
had ambiguous influence on nominal volatility, not confirming tlie disrupting 
role of flexible exchange rales in the short-term.
Regarding tlie real exchange rate, the chapter demonstrated a trend appreciation 
for tlie 1993-2001 period in the foin countries, but with an extremely uneven 
trend and a high level of uncertainty as to tlie causes as well as tlie size of the 
trend. This showed the difficulty faced by policy-makers in accurately estimating 
an equilibrium exchange rate and adjusting their behaviour accordingly.
Based on tlie empirical findings, the chapter proposed a framework for analysis 
of exchange rate choices and a resulting classification of exchange rate strategies
" For more background on .specific countries and periods, see individual country sketches in
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in Central Europe with a view to application to otlier small open economies. The 
proposed framework was based on tlnee key considerations relevant for Central 
European countries, namely the emphasis on low inflation, preference for 
predictability of the nominal exchange rate embodied in the choice o f tlie 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor and prevention of the real exchange rate 
misaligmnent.
The priority to be ascribed to low inflation and tlie role of the exchange rate in 
tliis process have been tlie first consideration of policy-makers in Central Europe 
in detemiining tlie exchange rate strateg)% The second consideration is tlie choice 
of the nominal anchor and the subsequent achievement of nominal predictability, 
if not always stability. These two issues tend to be seen as one in small open 
economies - when analysing the use of the foreign exchange rate chaimel in 
achieving low inflation, what is usually meant is nominal exchange rate stability 
in tlie form a fixed exchange rate. The chapter shows why this is not so in 
transition countries and wh\ these two priorities need to be considered 
separately and can even sometimes be at odds. Concern about the real exchange 
rate misaligmnent and prevention of currency crises is tlie tliird factor.
Therefore, any exchange rate strategy chosen within the sample of countries 
studied can be fitted into a triangle of the following priorities for the exchange 
rate: swift disinflation, predictability of nominal exchange rate and prevention of 
real exchange rate misalignment. Nominal stability combined with no or limited 
flexibility are strategies strong on the nominal anchor function and provide
Chapter 2.
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substantial contribution to disiuflation, but make the economy quite vulnerable 
(unless tlie hard peg option is chosen as it was not in Central Europe). Nominal 
depreciation combined with no or limited flexibility are strategies strong on tlie 
nominal anchor function and make it easier to address vulnerability tlian for 
nominal stability, but they are weak on tlie disinflation front. Nominal 
appreciation combined with managed flexibility makes for a strong role of the 
nominal exchange rate in disinflation. The exchange rate flexibility prevents 
excessive vulnerability, but creates potential for fluid, but sharp reversals in tlie 
nominal exchange rate. Under this scenario, tlie exchange rate lacks the role of a 
nominal anchor. Nominal stability combined with managed flexibility can be 
seen as a less risky version of a soft peg witli a narrow band, but one witli an 
equal emphasis on the role of the nominal exchange rate in tlie disinflation. 
Nominal depreciation combined witli managed flexibility concentrates heavily 
on tlie prevention of vulnerability, with limited emphasis on disinflation, and 
leaves out tlie role of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.
331
Chapter 6: Domestic targets and their role in monetary policy
6.1 Introduction
Domestic targets -  targets for luoiietaiy policy expressed in terms of domestic 
monetary variables such as growth of monetary or price aggregates -  are an 
ubiquitous element of monetary policy frameworks. This chapter analyses their 
role in tlie monetary policy of Central European coimtries. It is divided into two 
pails -  one section deals with targeting money, the subsequent group series of 
sections focuses on targeting inflation. That distinction is, however, to some 
extent, in tlie eye of the beholder. Nonetheless, it is conceptually useflil and 
conforms to the standard classification of the various mechanisms for 
constraining the discretion of the authorities in monetary policy.
6.2 Monetary targeting
Monetary targeting assumes a predictable relationship between tlie growtli of a 
chosen monetary aggregate and the growtli of the price level as well as the ability 
of monetary policy to control the development of tlie monetary target chosen as 
the intemiediate target of monetary policy. However, after initial enthusiasm in 
the 1970s, monetary targeting proved to be unsatisfactory and has essentially 
been abandoned. Since Chapter 1 contains a more detailed analysis, the problems 
are only briefly summarised here.
332
The relationship between money and prices proved to be highly unstable. 
Targeting money seems to be. more than other regimes, subject to Goodliart’s 
law -  any observed statistical relationship in monetary policy breaks down once 
that relationship is used as a transmission/targeting mechanism. It also proved to 
be much more difficult than e.xpected for central banks to control tlie chosen 
monetaiy aggregates.
Despite these problems, which were well laiown by tlie early 1990s, all Central 
European countries used monetary targeting to some extent during the transition. 
The Czech Republic and Poland used monetaiy targeting in tlie form of M2 
targets in tlie 1993-1997 period and Slovakia used it between 1993 and 1999. In 
Hungary, M3 targets were used during the 1993-2001 period, but explicit target 
values were not officially announced.'
This section argues that despite both unpredictability in the development of the 
targeted variable (broad monc> ) and the authorities’ frequent disregard for tlie 
monetary taigets, the targets w ere useful for a variet)^ of reasons during fixed 
exchange rate regimes. They were abandoned only after a completely new 
framework combining an inflation target and exchange rate flexibility was 
introduced.
The first part of the section looks ex post at suitability of the four coimtries for 
monetary targeting. To assess this, the magnitude of velocity shocks and their
I Since the Hungarian M3 aggregate was quite similar to M2 aggregates in the other three 
countries, they will be ret'crred to as 'broad money' throughout the chapter.
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predictability need to be analysed, together with tlie role of monetary aggregates 
ill the transmission mechanism.
Table 6.1 contains rudimentary data on the magnitude of change in velocity of 
broad money in individual countries. Their visual representation is in charts 6.1 
tlirough 6.4
Table 6,1: Change in velocity of the broad money aggregate in Central
Country A\'era«o quarterly change
Difference behvcen 
ininiinuin and maximum 
value
Czech Republic 0.008848 0.057519
Hungarv 0.012799 0.048412
Poland 0.016954 0.314465
Slovakia 0.008536 0.069072
Source: IFS, central bank data
Note: 1995-2001 for Hungary and Poland
Czech Republic and Slovakia have experienced only limited movements and a 
modest overall shift in the velocity. On the other hand, Poland witnessed rapid 
decreases in velocity that accumulated into a radical and sustained change -  in 
seven years, tlie velocity nearly halved. In Himgaiy, jumps in both directions did 
not translate into a sustained moN'eiiient in eitlier one of them.
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Chart 6.1: Trend in broad money velocity in the Czech Republic, 1993-2001
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Source: Czech National Bank data
Chart 6.2: Trend in broad money velocity in Hungary, 1995-200r
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 ^ For Hungary and Poland, velocity is estimated beginning in 1995 due to unavailability o f  
reliable quarterly GDP data in 1993 and 1994.
335
Chart 6.3: Trend in broad money velocity in Poland, 1995-2001
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Chart 6.4: Trend in broad money velocity in Slovakia, 1993-2001
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In order to determine whether it was possible for policy-makers to predict these 
velocity shocks, the analysis focuses on the underlying trend of change in 
velocity, which should gh c a rough indication of the enviromnent in which the 
policy-makers had to work.
Charts show trends in velocity in all four countries between 1993 and 2001. The 
velocity data were seasonally adjusted and trends were estimated using a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter." With the exception of Poland, the trend velocity was 
quite stable, particularly during the period of fixed exchange rates. Chart 6.5 
confirms this point in an international comparison of six small open economies. 
Czech Republic, Huiigaiy and Slovakia experienced smaller changes in trend 
velocity'* tlian Denmark. Korea. Mexico or Israel during the same period. In 
Poland, on the other hand, the change in tlie trend was quite dramatic.
Table 6.2 looks at the issue of how much of the change in velocity can be 
explained by changes in the underlying trend. This is measured as r-sqiiared of 
tlie equation that regresses i ciocity of money on the Hodrick-Prescott trend. 
(Other trends -  linear or quadratic - produce similar results for each country.) 
The answer differs from a country to countiy. In Himgaiy, the trend was very 
weak, in Czech Republic and Slovakia, it was quite important, while in Poland it 
was exceptionally powerful.
 ^The smoothing parameter used in lillering was 1600, based on standard recommendation of the 
software (Eviews).
Measured as standard deviation of the trend series divided by the average value of the trend 
series.
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Chart 6.5: Change in trend velocity of broad money in eight small open 
economies between 1993-2001
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Table 6.2: Explanatory power of velocity trends in Central Europe
Country R-squared
Czech Republic 0.536523
Hungary 0.101674
Poland 0.951582
Slovakia 0.608849
Source: author
Taken together, the magnitude o f velocity change and the explanatory power o f  
the trend show that: in Poland the level o f unpredictability in velocity o f money 
was quite low; the opposite was true for Hungary; with Czech Republic and 
Slovakia being in the middle. To assess the role o f money in the transmission 
mechanism o f  monetary policy, we refer to the econometric review contained in 
Chapter 3. In Hungary and in the Czech Republic, broad money is neither 
influenced by nor does it influence other key monetary policy variables such as 
inflation and interest rates. In Slovakia, the role o f  broad money is limited to its
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impact on real GDP -  harcil>' a basis for the use of monetary targeting. Only in 
Poland does broad mone>' grow th lead to increases both in prices and real GDP.
These findings come together in the evaluation of suitability of individual 
countries for monetary targeting showm in table 6.3. The overall result is tliat for 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, velocity of money did not change 
dramatically, but the changes w ere difficult to predict and were associated witli a 
loose relationship betw^een broad money and inflation. In Poland, tlie actual and 
trend velocity of money both declined dramatically, but in a linear and 
predictable manner. Together witli an important role for money in the 
transmission mechanism of monetaiy policy, this made Poland more suitable for 
money targeting.
Table 6,3: Suitability of Central European countries for monetary targeting
Country Uiiprcdicfabiiitj' of the monetary aggregate
Role of money in
ti'aiismission
mechanism
Suitability for
monetary
targeting
Czech Republic Medium None Very low
Hungary High None Very low
Poland Low Strong High
Slovakia Medium Weak Low
Source: author
The second part of the section looks at actual behaviom- of the autliorities -  to 
what extent they actually achie\ ed tlie targets tliey set for themselves. Table 6.4 
demonstrates that targets were repeatedly overshot as well as luidershot, 
particularly in years of capital iiillows of unexpected magnitude.
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Table 6.4: Monetary targets in Central Europe and their fulfilment
Czech Republic Poland Slovakia
M2 growth in % M2 growth in bn of PLN M2 growth in %
Target Actual
outcome
Target Actual
outcome
Target Actual
outcome
1993 19 20.5 15 14.8 19 18.5
1994 12-15 21.5 15.5-16.9 21.4 13.2 18.6
1995 14-17 19.6 17.1 26.9 12.3 21.2
1996 11-17 18 23 30.5 11.6 16.6
1997 7-11 lO.I 27.4-28.6 39.8 10.7 8.8
1998 9.4 2.5
1999 6.0-8.8 10.7
Source: central bank data
As we can see, tlie targets were not adhered to most of the time. In practice, tliey 
were always overridden in the interest of the exchange rate target (see below). 
They also did not serve as a nominal anchor for the expectations of economic 
agents because they did not constitute a reliable source of infomiation on 
inflation developments.
Central European countries announced, from tlie very start of transition, some 
sort of annual inflation Target" even though its precise nature and standing was 
not quite clear mitil the introduction of formal inflation targeting in the late 
I990s/early 2000s. In some countries and in some periods, it was more of an 
inflation prediction; at other times, it leaned towards a target. Table 6.5 
demonstrates that countries were more successful in achieving tlieir inflation 
’targets’ tlian tlieir monetary targets. Monetaiy targets were rarely achieved, 
while tlie inflation ‘targets' w ere achieved most of the time.
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Table 6.5: Inflation ‘targets’ in Central Europe and their fulfilment
Czech Republic I^ oland Slovakia
Inflation growth in “u Inflation growth in % Inflation growth in %
Target Actual
outcome
Target Actual
outcome
Target Actual
outcome
1993 18 20.8 32.2 37.6 30.4 25.1
1994 10-12 10.2 23 22.5 10-13.2 11.7
1995 9-11 9.1 16.0 21.6 8-10 7.2
1996 decline 8.8 17 18.5 6-7.2 5.4
1997 decline 8.5 15 13.5 4.9-5.S 6.4
1998 5.Ô-5.9 5.6
1999 6.0-7.5 6.1
Source: central bank data
Comparison of monetary and inflation Targets’ also shows that success in 
achieving monetary and inflation Targets’ diverged in most years. As table 6.6 
shows, only in five instances out o f 17 were the outcomes in the same direction.
Table 6.6: Comparison of monetary and inflation ‘targets’ in Central
Czech Republic Poland Slovakia
‘targets’ ‘targets’ ‘targets’
M2 CPI M2 CPI M2 CPI
1993 overshot Overshot undershot overshot Undei-shot undershot
1994 overshot on tiu-gel overshot undershot Overshot on target
1995 overshot on target overshot overshot Overshot on target
1996 overshot on target overshot ovcMhot Overshot undershot
1997 on target on target overshot undershot Undershot Overshot
1998 Undershot on target
1999 Overshot on target
Source: central bank data
Consequently, the picture that emerges is one where monetaiy targets were 
neither adliered to, nor terribly useful in achieving inflation outcomes desired by 
policymakers. Where did their usefulness lie?
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The answer is linked lo the importance of fiscal considerations and tire lack of 
other indicators of the true stance of monetaiy policy. In the environment of 
incomplete privatisation of enterprises and banks as well luiclear financial 
relationships betiveen the central bank and the govermnent, monetaiy aggregates 
provided a better measure of fiscal and quasi-fiscal expansion than conventional 
fiscal statistics.
Wlienever monetaiy targets w ere used in Central Europe, they stood alongside 
exchange rate targeting in the form of a fixed exchange rate. (The only 
exceptions are short periods in the Czech Republic and Slovakia following tlie 
demise of their pegs.) The monetaiy targets were also important for central banks 
in their decision-making. While fixed exchange rates provided nominal anchors 
for outsiders, tliey provided little guidance for policymakers tlieniselves on how 
to set policy instruments to make the exchange rate sustainable or to achieve a 
targeted level of inflation. In this sense, monetary targets can be seen as a true 
intermediate target -  a variable influencing inflation that the central bank could 
control. However, this proved to be the case only witli high inflation and low 
capital inflows. Once inflation dipped below 20% and net capital flows became 
important in comparison with the overall money supply, monetary targeting 
became a bliuit instrument indeed.
On a similar note, a rapid capital outflow had a substantial dampening effect on 
monetaiy growth often without a corresponding effect on inflation as inflation 
was more influenced by currency depreciation and increased, inflation
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expectations (as evidenced by the Czech and Slovak experience in 1997 and 
1998).
After the exchange rate targeting was terminated either volimtarily or following a 
crisis, all four coimtries gradually shifted towards inflation targeting. In such an 
environment, setting and announcing monetary targets became much less 
relevant and the practice was discontinued.
6,3 Inflation targeting - introduction
Inflation targeting dispenses w ith a formal intemiediate taiget and attempts to 
target inflation directly. The boundary between inflation targeting and other 
monetaiy policy frameworks (such as money targeting and discretionary policy 
with an implicit anchor) is highly micerlain and frequently in tlie eye of the 
beholder. (Mishkin and Savaslaiio. 2001)
After several developed economies -  e.g. Canada, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Finland and Australia - adopted inflation taigeting in 
the early to mid-1990s and early evaluations indicated the relative merits of tlie 
new framework (see Almeida and Goodhart, 1998; Briuiila and Lahdenpera, 
1995 and Leiderman and Svcnssoii, 1995), it was rapidly instituted by many 
developing and transitional economies, which eitlier voluntarily or under duress 
gave up their fixed exchange rate. Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, 
Mexico and Poland are among developing or transitional economies tliat recently
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switched to inflation targeting, (e.g. Bogdanski et al., 1999; Carstens and 
Werner, 1999; Leiderman and Bar-Or, 2000; ICEG, 2002)
Green (1996), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999), assert 
that, in order to establish a distinct framework, tlie switch to inflation taigets 
should contain more than just a straightfoiward amiouncement of 
the precoiiimitnient to achieving a given quantitative target for inflation. Even 
though the experiences of individual countries differ significantly, the 
introduction of inflation targeting usually means:
® the amiouncement of an explicit, quantitative target for inflation. Such a 
target specifies the price index, the target level, the tolerance interval, the 
time frame and situations under which the target might not be adhered to. 
(Almeida and Goodhart. 1998; Leiderman and Svenssoii, 1995)
«> tlie absence of other monetaiy policy taigets or, at least, if there is a 
conflict, the clear subordination of otlier targets to achieving inflation 
aims (ibid.)
® an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary, long-term 
goal of monetary policy and increased conimmiication witli the public 
about the plans and objectives of policymakers (Bernanke and Mishkin, 
1997, p. 97)
® increased transparency of monetary policy (Bernanke et al., 1999, pp. 
297-8)
® increased discipline of monetary policymakers and their accountability 
for achieving inflation objectives. (Bernanke et al., 1999, pp. 24-5, 296-7)
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If these conditions are met, announced inflation targets can become credible 
nominal anchors and stabilise the inflation expectations of agents. The remaining 
problem is the missing intermediate target and the ability of policy-makers to 
achieve the direct inflation targets. Since the monetaiy policy lag is substantial 
and estimated to last usually between one and two years, this is usually resolved 
by setting targets for the horizon which is believed to be most influenced by 
current policy decisions. Additionally, many coimtries produce formal inflation 
forecasts for this horizon and by changing policy instruments to hit the target 
witliin the forecast framework effectively made the inflation forecast an 
intermediate target.
6.4 Introduction of inflation targeting in Central Europe
Almeida and Goodhart (1998) find that, in developed countries, inflation 
targeting has usually been implemented after the collapse of a fixed exchange 
rate regime or after a period of discretionary policy witli misatisfactory results. 
Even though introduction of inflation targeting in Central Eiuope could be 
formally explained in these terms, they do not really fit the circimistances. 
Inflation targeting in Central Europe can be better explained as a reaction to the 
loss of a nominal anchor and to institutional change resulting from EU and EMU 
preparations. The Czech central bank became the first transition central bank to 
introduce, in December 1997. an inflation targeting framework, to be followed 
by Poland, Hungary and, arguably, Slovakia.
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In May 1997, speculaÜN’e pressures forced the Czech crown off its peg and the 
currency was floated. There was no explicit monetary policy framework for the 
following six months. In December 1997, a new regime called inflation targeting 
was introduced by the Czech National Bank.
In Poland, tlie exchange rate was increasingly imable to provide a precise 
nominal anchor since 1995 when the central bank allowed its increasing 
flexibility within the 7% band around the central parity. During 1998, as the 
declining inflation approached 10% and the exchange rate band was expanded to 
10 and 12.5% around the parity and later even to 15%, the cential bank decided 
it was time for a new monetary framework. At the same, a new constitution and a 
new central bank law mandated a shift to price stability as tlie overriding 
objective of monetaiy policy as well as a new, more independent central bank 
board.
In Himgaiy, inflation targeting was introduced simultaneously witli the loosening 
of the exchange rate band to 15% and with anew central bank law that 
reinforced central bank independence and established price stability instead of 
internal and external currency stability as the central bank goal.
It is hard to determine precisely when the Slovak central bank switched to 
inflation targeting. In October 1998, the Slovak crown was floated after tlie 
National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) could no longer sustain a speculative attack 
against the peg. All through the rest of 1998 and 1999 until Januaiy 2000, M2
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was still officially used as the intermediate target, but the band for the growtli of 
this monetaiy aggregate was not achieved in either of these two years (Dufek and 
Odor, 2000, p. 30). On the other hand, during tire same period, NBS also 
annoimced as its provisional target a target concentrating on tlie measine of net 
inflation (55% of CPI with regulated and food prices excluded) and later 
specified also a headline inHation target, (see NBS, 1998) These targets were 
achieved in 1999.
The Slovak central bank finally imveiled a new monetaiy policy framework 
starting from Januaiy L 2000, which used a different concept of core mflation 
and can be classified as ‘proper' inflation targeting since it fulfils all the criteria 
mentioned above. M2 became only a monetary policy indicator and the only 
target is now tlie core inflation index. The framework in place during 1999 can 
be named ‘hybrid inflation targeting’, a term used for the German and Swiss 
monetary policy framework b>' Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et 
al. (1999).
In all four countries, therefore, inflation targeting was introduced simultaneously 
with the retreat of the previous nominal anchor -  the exchange rate. However, 
the disappearance of the exchange rate as the nominal anchor was not necessarily 
abrupt, or related to an exchange rate ‘collapse’, allowing even temporary 
overlaps, such as in Poland.
The institutional changes which increased central bank independence and set 
price stability as the overriding policy objective took place in all four countries
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between 1997 and 2001 and w ere related to the introduction of inflation targeting 
only in Hungary  ^ and Poland. A possible explanation is that while in these two 
coimtries inflation targeting w as introduced at the time chosen by policy-makers, 
in tlie Czech Republic and Slovakia currency crises and the collapse of the 
exchange rate demanded new nommai anchors regardless of the timing of wider 
institutional changes.
6.5 Inflation targeting -  design and implementation issues
The followmg table contains a brief overview of tlie cunent inflation-targeting 
framework in place in these three countries. These frameworks aie then 
described and analysed in more detail.
Table 6.7: Overview of inflation-targeting frameworks in the Czech
Country Medium- 
term target
One-year target Price index 
used
Inflation
report
Well-defined
exceptions
Czech
Republic
Yes -  2 % in 
2005
Yes CPI, but
regulated
prices
temporarily
excluded
Yes, quarterly Yes
Hungary Yes -  2 %  in 
the long­
term and 
below 3.5 % 
in December 
2003
Yes CPI Yes, quarterly No
Poland Yes -  below 
4 % in 2003
Yes CPI Yes, quarterly Yes, but not 
well-defined
Slovakia No Yes CPI, but 
regulated 
prices 
excluded
No No
Source: CNB, MNB, NBP, NBS
348
6.5.1 Choice o f price index for in (lotion targeting
In developed coiinlries, the target used in inflation targeting is often not tlie 
headline inflation, but some sort of core index measuring underlying inflation. 
Three groups of prices are often excluded from any core inflation index -  energy 
prices, food prices and interest paid (see table 6.8). The first two are considered 
too volatile and supply-driven to be included in tlie index measuring luiderlying 
inflation in the economy. The last is sometimes excluded because its inclusion 
could give a wrong signal about inflation -  if interest rates were increased, the 
inflation could also rise.
Table 6.8: Items excluded from CPI for inflation targeting
Country Index excludes
Canada Food and energy and indirect taxes
New
Zealand
Significant change in export and import prices, 
interest payments, indirect taxes
United
Kingdom
Mortgage interest payments
Sweden Nothing
Spain Nothing
Finland Taxes, subsidies and capital costs related to housing
Australia Interest payments, fruit and vegetables, oil, public 
sector prices and other volatile price items
Source: Bnmila and Lahdenpera ( 1995). p. 129 and Almeida and Goodhart (1998), p. 64
Wlien introducing inflation targeting, central bankers in transition coimtries had 
to face the following problem -  how to define a core inflation measure that is 
still relevant for economic agents, but can be effectively influenced by a central 
bank? As seen above, such a problem is faced and resolved, to a smaller degiee, 
by central banks in developed countries. However, the scope of the problem is 
quite different in transition countries.
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Due lo lower income per capiia, food and energy are responsible for a much 
higher share of consumer expenditure in transition economies tlian in their 
developed coimterparts. In transition economies, tliere was also another 
significant group -  regulated prices (usually utility prices) tiiat were at some 
point significantly below the cost-recoverj' level and needed to be rapidly 
increased to catch up with the rest of the price level. If food, energy and 
regulated prices (the two latter groups overlap) were all excluded from the core 
inflation index, the meaning of such measures for most economic agents would 
disappear as such an index would cover less than half of the overall CPI (see 
table 6.9). Its relevance in guiding inflation expectations would be much 
diminished if not obliterated.
Group of prices ( V.ech Republic Hungary Poland Slovalda
Food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco 32.7 30.2 35.8 31.2
Energy and/or regulated prices 23.2 25.2 15.7 20.5
Core prices 44.1 44.6 48.5 48.3
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: CNB, Hungarian Statistical Ol'licc, NBS, Polish Main Statistical Office
Siuiimarising, as Wynne (1999). Cogley (1998) and Johnson (1998) note, a core 
inflation indicator should fulfil three criteria, of which two are important for the 
discussion here: that it be a good indicator of current and future trends in 
inflation and, at the same time, a viable target for monetary policy.
There are three principal ways of dealing with tlie dilemma: use of headline 
inflation; exclusion of regulated and energy prices, but inclusion of food prices; 
use of a trimmed measure of inflation, in which a fixed percentage of the most 
volatile price changes is excluded from the core index (see Bakhshi and Yates, 
1999 and Biyan, Cecchetti and Wright, 1997 for general analysis).
350
The first option available lo central bankers is lo use headline inflation, 
disregarding the problems of controllability for the sake of its greater 
transparency and underslandabilily, and the high value placed on it by economic 
agents. The National Bank of Poland chose tliis measure, but in a rather vague 
explanation in its medium-term monetary? policy strateg}  ^ effectively reserved a 
right not to stick to the target if it contravened the core inflation development 
(see section on otlier issues). The problems with use of headline inflation were 
documented already in its first year in 1999, when the target was overshot 
precisely because some of the non-core prices, particularly food and energy, 
behaved imexpectedly. (NBP, 1999, p. 4)
The second option is a compromise between controllability' and meaningfulness - 
food prices arc included, but regulated prices are excluded. This creates a 
meaningful index from the public’s point of view, but still excludes tliose prices 
which are driven purely by political or regulatory decision. The Czech and 
Slovak central bankers chose this option. Its obvious risk is that due to the 
importance of food prices for the core inflation index (tliey account for 38% and 
40% of the core inflation index in, respectively, Czech Republic and Slovalda), 
any significant unexpected swings of these prices can render the target 
effectively meaningless, A good example is tlie Czech Republic in 1999, when 
the low food inflation accounted for 64% of the undershooting of the inflation 
target. (CNB, 2000a, p. i)
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Interestingly enough, no central bank chose the patli of trimmed indices, even 
tliougli research indicates that such an index would well capture the inflationary 
pressures in tlie Hiuigarian and Polish economy. (IMF, 1999a, p. 85 and IMF, 
1999b, p. 22) The reasoning is that technically complex measures would not be 
credible in the eyes of the population, (ibid. and Dufek and Odor, 2000, p. 30)
6.5.2 Other target issues - the target level, the tolerance interval, the timeframe, 
exceptions
Since the monetary policy lag is substantial and estimated to last usually between 
one and two years, the issue in setting inflation targets is how far into the future 
should they be aimed. Two cases need to be distinguished. If disinflation to the 
desired level has already been accomplished, then only a permanent corridor, 
which should provide boundaries for future inflation, needs to be set up.
If fiutlier disinflation is still to be achieved, separate medimn- and short-term 
targets should be set to proi'idc guidance for inflation expectations. A mediimi- 
term target (three-five years) acknowledges tlie monetary policy lag and anchors 
important medium- and long-term inflation expectations. However, to make the 
whole framework more specific and immediate, short-term targets (less than two 
years) should also be established, especially in case where wage contracts are 
negotiated annually (as they generally are in Central Europe).
The Czech, Hiuigarian and Polish inflation targeting aiTangeinents include both 
of tliese aspects and are well-defined. The problem is with the Slovak 
framework, where the mediuni-term horizon is missing (NBS aimoiuices only
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one-year targets in the December of the previous year).
In every framework, it is important not only to define the rules, but also the 
exceptions. Well-defined exceptions can actually increase the credibility of an 
inflation-targeting framework, if they are transparent and limited to truly 
exceptional situations. This is partially the Czech case, where four classes of 
exceptions are defined:
a. substantial shocks to world prices of raw materials, energy and commodities
b. substantial exchange rate shocks umelated to fundamentals and monetary 
policy
c. substantial agricultural shocks with resulting shocks to agiicultinal prices
d. emergencies and natural disasters with resulting supply and demand shocks
However, it can be argued that even though these exceptions are well defined, 
they are too broad and too likely to happen for them to be tnily exceptional (e.g. 
in 1998 and 1999 at least (a) and (c) were fulfilled witli a jump in tlie oil price 
and a fall in food prices).
The second-best solution is probably to specify no exceptions, which on one 
hand allows no room for manoeuvre, but by the very absence of exceptions 
makes it more likely that the promises made witliin the framework will be 
broken. This is the Slovak and the Hiuigarian case, where botli central banks 
count on tolerance bands lo lake care of unexpected swmgs.
Unclear reservations are the worst, since tliey diminish the transparency and
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accountability of the framework. The Polish inflation-targeting framework fits 
into tliis category, with the formulation in the medium-term monetary policy 
that: “despite the choice of CPI (as target), the impact of external factors not 
affecting core inflation will be commented upon in detail. The comments will be 
presented when specific policy decisions seem to be inconsistent, at first sight, 
with the direction of the discrepancy between the inflation target and the 
observed and/or forecast CPI lc\ el”. (NBP, 1998, pp. 10-11)
6.5.3 Multiplicity o f  targets
The essence of inflation targeting is that the central bank processes all available 
information tliat might be related to future inflation and bases its policy on a 
complex estimate of what inflation is going to be. Since this is a rather complex 
operation, the policy framework has to be as simple and transparent as possible 
to ensure that tlie framework is credible for economic agents. Therefore, for 
inflation targeting to be credible, two conditions should be, broadly speaking, 
fulfilled:
♦ the central bank might take into accoiuit many indicators of future economic 
developments, but in the end there is only one that matters: expected inflation 
(headline inflation or a chosen core measure)
• economic agents must be clear about what it is tliat the central bank is taking 
responsibility for and under what conditions it might deviate from its 
objectives
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In tills respect, both tlie Sloi ak and the Polish inflation-targeting framework are 
flawed. In Slovakia, the central baiilc now annomices headline inflation for the 
following year in terms of prediction’, while core inflation is “gradually 
becoming the target”. (NBS. 1999, p. 3) There are two problems witli tliis 
framework and its lack of clearness and transparency. First of all, it is not clear 
what is really the target at any given moment. There is also an issue of confusion. 
Wlien the central bank publishes its ‘prediction’ for headline inflation and 
‘target’ for core inflation, many agents are unable and/or luilikely to understand 
the difference and will very likely focus on the ‘prediction’ of headline inflation 
as a more understandable measure of future inflation. If this ‘prediction’ is not 
achieved or is updated too often (in Slovakia, the 2000 prediction was updated a 
month after its publication in December 1999 due to unexpectedly high changes 
in regulated prices), it might discredit the whole inflalion-targetmg framework. 
(For an example of confusion even among sophisticated market participants, see 
Toth, 2000, p. 5) This follows the problem with multiple targets in 1999, when 
M2 was still used as an intermediate target but, based on the central bank’s 
monetaiy program and its statements, many analysts thought the central bank 
was actually pursuing direct in Hat ion targeting. (Dufek and Odor, 2000, p. 30 
and Toth, 1999)
In tlie Polish case, the goal is clear -  headline inflation. However, it is not clear 
whether this is really the target or whether there are multiple targets. The Polish 
central bank inserted in its mcdiiini-tenn policy program a rather cryptic note 
(see above) which effectively means that if the headline inflation is not in step
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witli tlie target but core inflation is (or is heading in tlie other direction) tlie bank 
might not follow the headline inflation and will try to explain why.
In all tluee cases, there is an additional issue of multiple targets related to the 
exchange rate. All three economies are very open (tlie Czech Republic and 
Slovakia extremely so) and all three are used to some sort of exchange rate 
stability (fixed exchange rate for the Czech Republic until 1997 and for Slovakia 
imtil 1998, crawling peg for Poland until now).
6.6 Evaluation of inflation targets
The following table presents inflation targets for the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia and actual inflation developments. In Hmigary, tliere is only one year of 
inflation targeting to evaluate, in Poland and Slovakia, there are three and in the 
Czech Republic, there are four. The sample presents strikingly different pictures 
of the apparent success of inflation targeting. In Slovakia and Hungary, all 
targets were achieved, though that means only one in the case of Hungary. In the 
Czech Republic, all but one of the four targets were undershot, while Poland 
missed its three inflation targets, with two overshot and one undershot.
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Table 6.10: Inflation targets and actual inflation in Central Europe
Country Year Inilatiou measure Actual
inflation
Inflation target
Czech
Republic
1998 Without regulated prices 1.7 5.5-6.S
1999 Without regulated prices 1.5 4.0-5.0
2000 Without regulated prices 3.0 3.5-5.5
2001 Without regulated prices 2.5 2-4
Hungary 2001 Headline inilatiou 7.5 6-8
Poland 1999 Headline inilatiou 9.8 8-8.5
2000 Headline inilatiou 8.3 5.4-6.S
2001 Headline inilatiou 3.6 6-8
Slovakia 1999 Without regulated and food 
prices
10.8 9.1-12.7
2000 Without regulated prices 4.6 4.5-S.8
2001 Without regulated prices 3.2 3.2-5.3
Source: CNB. MNB, NBP, NBS
A more thorough view would note that the two less successful countries -  Czech 
Republic and Poland -  differ substantially in their performance. In tlie Czech 
case, every year brought a smaller disparity between tlie target and the actual 
inflation and both 2000 and 2001 results can be judged as satisfactory. 
Additionally, Czech inflation was consistently lower than the target, thus not 
casting doubt on the central bank’s anti-inflationary credibility. Overall, the 
actual experience and the perception were of monetary policy settling down 
gradually to a new regime. In Poland, tlie difference between actual inflation and 
the mid-point of the inflation target has not grown smaller. It was 2.6% in 1999, 
2.2% in 2000 and 2.4% in 2001. In the first two years, inflation was higher tlian 
tlie target, a situation that changed dramatically in 2001. These factors reinforced 
an impression of erratic policy and difficulty in controlling inflation.
Was it appropriate for tliese countries to introduce inflation targeting at this stage 
of the disinflation process? As Bernanke et al. (1999) note, “most inflation- 
targeting coimtries have chosen to adopt tlie new regime only after having had
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some initial success in lowering inflation from previously high levels”. 
(Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 288) The reason is that inflation targets are usually 
credible only if monetary policy had previously gained some credibility by 
lowering inflation.
This general scenario is true for all tluee inflation-targeting countries analysed in 
this paper -  after one or two initial peaks of inflation in the early 1990s, inflation 
was falling or stagnating betw een 1993 and 1997 in all three counUies. However, 
this similarity is deceptive and hides important differences. The disinflation 
process was quite different in Poland and Hungaiy tlian in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia.
In the cases of Poland and Hungaiy, the point of introduction of inflation 
targeting seems to have been relatively well chosen from the dishiflationaiy 
point of view. After a sustained period of inflation decreasing by 4 to 7 
percentage points every year, inflation targeting was introduced in 1998 and 
2001 respectively to lock in e.xisting gains and facilitate further disinflation so 
that inflation below 4% or 3.5% could be achieved by 2003. Since the rapid 
increases in regulated prices had largely already taken place in previous years, 
this ambition of monetaiy policy-nialcers could have been thwarted only by large 
external shocks. This contrasts sharply witli the situation in the otlier two 
inflation targeting countries.
Inflation targeting was introduced in the Czech Republic and Slovakia at tlie time 
when regulated prices not only constituted close to 20% of CPI, but at tlie time
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when they were being rapidly increased by governments from a very low base. 
For example, in December 1999. year-on-year headline inflation reached 14.2% 
in Slovakia, with core inflation of only 7%, but inflation of regulated prices of 
38.2%. The same is true for the Czech Republic in both 1998 and 1999 - the 
average net inflation in the period from Januarj' 1998 to December 1999 was 
2.8%, while regulated prices increased by an average of nearly 23%. In such an 
environment, inflation targeting focusing on underlying inflation risks becoming 
irrelevant for economic agents and the whole policy-framework can be 
discredited.
On the otlier hand, it can be argued that such a situation can serve precisely as a 
support for the introduction of inflation targeting. In Canada, it was tlie 
introduction of a new tax (a VAT-type GST) in 1991 that prompted the central 
bank to introduce inflation targets that would persuade the public that the one­
time increase in prices due lo this step would be nothing more than tliat. 
(Freedman, 1995, p. 21) If a central bank enjoys high credibility, as both tlie 
Czech and Slovak central banks undoubtedly did at the time of tlie introduction 
of inflation targeting (see OECD. 1998, p. 31 and OECD, 1999, p. 63), inflation 
targeting at the time of significant price hikes can prevent one-time changes from 
spilling into permanent inflation expectations.
This argiuiient, however, is not fully applicable in this case because increases in 
regulated prices to a cost-recoicry level in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
were not one-time events. They have occmrcd repeatedly over the course of five- 
six years between end of 1997 and early 2003.
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Discussion of disinflation and inflation targeting focusing on the role of 
regulated prices, however, captures only one of two important issues related to 
disinflation in Central Europe. The other is tlie persistence of moderately high 
single-digit inflation. The C/.cch Republic and Slovakia swiftly achieved single- 
digit growth in consumer prices by the end of 1994 and early 1995. However, 
further progress to a low lc\ el w as much more difficult (the apparent success of 
Slovakia in achieving 5-6% inflation in 1996 and 1997 was primarily due to a 
politically-motivated freeze on increases in regulated prices). Indeed, after 
achieving their lowest level in 1995 and 1996, prices began to rise gradually in 
1996, 1997 and 1998 in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As analysts of the 
Czech National Bank noted, inflation expectations were stuck at tliis moderate- 
but-not-low level and particularly after the cinrency pegs were broken, the 
resurgence of inflation was a real threat. (CNB, 1999, p. 1)
It was in this environment that both central banks of tlie fomier Czechoslovakia 
decided to introduce inflation targeting. Therefore, it can be said that while there 
was a relatively ambitious long-term target of price stability' in the Czech case, 
the true motivation in both countries was to lock in existing inflation gains 
tlireateiied by overheating of the economy, depreciation of tlie currency and 
increases in regulated prices.
Therefore, it seems that both central banks took a high risk in adopting their 
inflation targeting frameworks. However, the risk paid off in both countries, 
because repeated substantial increases in regulated prices did not translate into
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increases in luiderlying inflation and both countries experienced disinflation in 
the underlying price indices simultaneously witli high inflation of administered 
prices. Indeed, “one of the most important benefits of the inflation targeting has 
been the increasingly efficient formation of expectations, which has reduced the 
costs of disinflation”. (Hrncir and Smidkova, 2000, p. 532)
The use of inflation targeting is questionable at a time when there are significant 
structural changes going on in the economy and when the working of the 
monetaiy transmission mechanism is still relatively unclear. One of the principal 
advantages o f inflation targeting is that it creates a more transparent policy 
framework and improves communication between policy-makers and economic 
agents. A single inflation target makes for a clear commitment by tlie central 
bank and allows it (if it enjo> s high credibility) to anchor public expectations. 
However, for inflation targeting to be successful and credible, there needs to be a 
clear link between the monetary policy pursued by central bankers and resulting 
inflation. In other words, the central bank must be able to control and be 
perceived as controlling the underlying inflation process.
These conditions were not fully met in Central Europe at tlie end of tlie 1990s 
and, as the chapter on the monetary policy tiansmission mechanism indicates, the 
chaimels of policy transmission are often blocked or weakened. Therefore, the 
introduction of inflation targeting was, in many ways, premature.
However, such an evaluation ignores the fact tliat monetaiy policy has to operate 
daily and if central bankers do not wish to pursue a fully discretionar)' policy.
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tliey have to institute some framework for monetary policy. The rest o f the tliesis 
shows that neither money nor the exchange rate could continue to function as 
nominal anchors in the medium-term, so the choice was between inflation targets 
and discretionaiy policy. The choice has not been a sharply delineated dichotomy 
as some sorts of inflation targets were announced even before and Slovakia has 
practised inflation proto-targeting. In such a continuum, a ‘proper’ inflation 
targeting strategy is more suitable because if monetary policy is not perceived as 
successful, tlien inflation targets will be discredited anyway, while in case of 
success, tlie credibility gains are lower.
6.7 Inflation targeting - influencing the behaviour of the central bank
Wlien assessing the effects of the introduction of inflation targeting, it would be 
wrong to ignore the influence of the new monetaiy policy framework on policy­
makers themselves. As noted b> Almeida and Goodliart (1998), the introduction 
of the inflation targeting framework often has important consequences for the 
central bank itself. Three groups of changes in the central bank that often go 
hand-in-hand with inflation targeting can be distinguished;
® changes in the transparency and execution of monetary policy
® changes in the accountability of the central bank.
This section looks at whether such an effect was at work in Central Europe and 
what were tlie results. As far as transparency of monetary policy is concerned, all 
tliree inflatioii-taigeting central banks have made great improvements in tliis
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respect during the relevant period. Even before, they had already been legally 
required to inform the public and the parliament about monetary policy, but 
inflation targeting resulted in improved openness of policy-making in the 
following areas:
1. Inflation targeting meant the introduction of inflation reports in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, but not in Slovakia. In Hungaiy, such reports were 
introduced prior to tlie introduction of inflation targeting.
2. It also meant that central banks opened up their deliberation procedures more 
and all the central banks began lo publish detailed minutes of board meetings. 
The National Bank of Poland went even fiurther and began to publish how 
individual board members N oted.
3. The introduction of core indices themselves increased the transparency of the 
monetary policy stance, especially at a time of great changes in regulated 
prices and great volatility in prices tliat are driven by supply side factors.
Introduction of formal inflation forecasts as focal points of the decision-making 
has significantly enhanced both policy-making and its transparency. Table 6.11 
contains a brief summary of inflation forecasting systems in individual countries. 
It shows that in the Czech Republic and Hungaiy, the central banks started to 
publish inflation forecasts on a quarterly basis, which they had not before tlie 
inflation targeting was introduced.
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Table 6.11: Main features of inflation forecasting systems in Central
Transparency Procedure Output Horizon,
frequency
Models Condi tionalit 
yCzech
Republic
Quarterly 
publication of 
coniprehensiv 
e forecasts
Discrete 
involxcment 
of policy 
makers
Point 
estimate 
and range
6-8
quarters,
quarterly
Structural 
models, 
partial 
equations, 
expert info
Both
conditional
and
unconditional
Hungary Quarterly 
publication of 
com prehen six’ 
e forecasts
Itcrali x'c. 
stepwise 
inx'olxcinent 
of policy 
makers
Point
estimate
and
fanchart
6-8
quarters,
quarterly
Partial
equations,
expert
info,
simulation
models
Conditional
Poland Quarterly 
publication of 
backxvard 
looking 
analysis
No
inx'olxcmcnt 
of policy 
makers
Point
estimate
and
scenarios
4-6
quarters,
monthly
Structural 
model, 
partial 
equations, 
expert info
Both
conditional
and
unconditional
Slovakia Annual
publication,
monthly
updates
Iterative, 
stepwise 
inx'olxement 
of policy 
makers
Range 4 quarters, 
monthly
No
models,
mostly
expert
judgement
n/a
Source: Homokaiid Jakab (2002)
The introduction of inflation targeting thus provided a stimulus to increase the 
transparency of monetary policy and commimication with the public. The shift 
has been particularly significant in the Czech Republic and Himgary, to a lesser 
degree in Poland and least pronounced in Slovakia, which has not formally 
introduced inflation targeting. This parallels the finding by Almeida and 
Goodhart (1998), where they find tliat though the "trend towards more open 
communication has been worldwide... such greater opemiess has gone fiuther, 
faster in [inflation targeting | countries”. (Almeida and Goodliart, 1998, p. 114) 
The otlier aspect of changes in the commimication and position of central banlcs 
due to the introduction of inflation targeting is accoiuitability. Accountability 
means not only that:
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1. a central banlc has lo explain its actions to the public and tliose with a 
democratic mandate lo gONCrn. Inflation targeting generally allows for 
increased accoiuitability of this kind by putting emphasis on the final goal -  
inflation
2. but also that those entrusted to execute monetaiy policy can be penalised if 
they do not succeed in achieving their targets.
In this respect, it is important to distinguish two kinds of independence -  goal 
and instrument independence. The former means that a central bank is free to set 
its targets, while the latter iiu olves targets set outside the central bank (with the 
central bank free to achieve these goals by any means it sees as fit).
Inflation targeting does not presuppose goal independence as the target can be 
decided by the government. However, inflation targeting requires instrument 
independence -  othenvise, the bank cannot be held aecoimtable for tlie results of 
monetary policy. For example, central banks in New Zealand and the Bank of 
England (since 1997) have been independent in their instruments, but their goals 
have been set by the gON ernmcnt. However, the Bank of Spain became goal 
independent at the same time that it began to pursue inflation targeting.
Goal independence is usually associated witli low accountability because if the 
central bank is free to set its ow n targets, it makes little sense to punish it for not 
achieving them. The Czech. Hungarian, Polish and Slovak cential banks are 
highly goal independent.
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There are no provisions for o\ erriding the decisions made by the central bank. 
Board members can be recalled only for a criminal act or other serions 
misconduct unrelated to monetary policy and boards approve the budgets of their 
respective central banks, so there is no effective mechanism to punish poor 
perfonnance, except to change the law. In Poland and the Czech Republic, the 
high constitutional protection of central bank independence means that even this 
would be very difficult to achieve.
Therefore, the accomitability of central bankers in Central Europe is relatively 
low and the introduction of inflation targeting has not changed tlie situation. In 
this respect, the situation is \ cry similar to that of tlie German and Austrian 
central banks before EMU, on which all foin banks were consciously modelled. 
(Siklos, 1994) However, as pointed out in BIS (2000), this is a rule ratlier than an 
exception in most industrialised coimtries, even those that practise uiflation 
targeting. The only exception is New Zealand, where the governor of tlie central 
bank can be punished for not achieving the target. (BIS, 2000, p. 4)
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the role of domestic targets in the monetary policy of 
Central European coimtries in order to complete tlie set of chapters focusing on 
how policy-makers in Central Europe constrained tlieir discretion in designing 
and implementing monetary policy.
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It found that, in practical policy-making, it is difficult to delineate the real 
meaning of monetaiy or inflation targets into several, easily distinguishable 
categories. The role and understanding of monetaiy targets changed dramatically 
in a given country, depending on whether they were used in conjunction with 
fixed exchange rates, inflation targets, both or neither. At the same time, central 
banks in the region have long been in the habit of announcing quantitative targets 
for inflation, but the perception of targets changed dramatically when tliey 
became tlie only or the dominant form of publicly annoimced commitment by the 
monetaiy autliority. This gradual development of inflation targets from a 
‘targetish’ indicator to a true target is well documented for Chile (see Mishkin, 
2000) and several developed countries (see Bernanke et al., 1999).
With regard to monetary targets, the chapter attempted to explain a paradox - 
targets tliat were announced for many years, but that were not very useful in 
achieving inflation outcomes and frequently disregarded by the very 
policymakers who set them. The answer lies in the fact that monetaiy targets 
were used in Central Europe together with exchange rate targeting. Fixed 
exchange rates provided nominal anchors for outsiders, but they provided only 
limited guidance for policymakers themselves on how to set policy instruments 
to make the exchange rate sustainable or to achieve a targeted level of inflation. 
In this sense, monetaiy targets can be seen as a true intermediate target -  a 
variable influencing inflation that the central bank could control. However, tliis 
proved to be the case only with high inflation and low capital inflows.
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After the exchange rate targeting was terminated either volmitarily or following a 
crisis, all four countries gradually shifted towards inflation targeting. In such an 
environment, setting and announcing monetary targets became much less 
relevant and the practice was discontinued. In all four coimtries, therefore, 
inflation targeting was introduced simultaneously with retreat of tlie previous 
nominal anchor -  the exchange rate. The use of inflation targeting is 
questionable at a time when there are significant structural changes going on in 
the economy and when the working of tlie monetary transmission mechanism is 
still relatively unclear. One of the principal advantages of inflation targeting is 
tliat it creates a more transparent policy framework and improves communication 
between policy-makers and economic agents. A single inflation target makes for 
a clear commitment by the central bank and allows it (if it enjoys high 
credibility) to anchor public expectations. However, for inflation targeting to be 
successful and credible, there needs to be a clear link between the monetaiy 
policy pursued by central bankers and resulting inflation. In otlier words, the 
central bank must be able to control and be perceived as controlling the 
underlying inflation process.
These conditions were not fully met in Central Europe at the end of the 1990s 
and the introduction of inflation targeting was, in many ways, premature. 
However, such an evaluation ignores the fact that if central bankers do not wish 
to pursue a fully discretionary policy, they have to institute some framework for 
monetaiy policy. Neither money nor the exchange rate could continue to function 
as nominal anchors in the medium-temi, so tlie choice was between inflation 
targets and discretionaiy policy. The choice has not been a sharply delineated
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dichotomy as some sorts of inflation targets were aimoimced even before and 
Slovakia has practised inflation proto-targeting. Inflation targeting can become a 
lesser evil, preferable to discretionaiy policy or otlier, discredited frameworks. 
Technical difficulties understandable for countries undergoing rapid structural 
change and with a limited predictability of transmission of policy impulses made 
for a long period of ‘practice shooting’ in Czech Republic and Poland, before the 
new framework became credible. Experience of Central Europe shows tliat it 
particulaily difficult to fine-tune inflation targets when the economy is facing 
a dramatic cyclical reversal, resulting in massive undershooting or overshooting 
of targets. The experience also shows tliat central banks tend to construct their 
inflation models, after introduction of inflation targeting, in an asymmetric way 
that puts more emphasis on the upside risk of higher-tlian-targeted inflation.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
In tlie concluding chapter, the two strands of tlie thesis are brought back together. The 
first one deals with findings explaining monetary policy and its underpinnings in four 
Central Eiuopean countries. The second section uses these findings to evaluate several 
existing hypotlieses and some new ones concerning monetary policy in middle- 
income economies tliat are highly open and financially integrated. In tlie final section, 
these conclusions are used to look ahead towards challenges in tlie nm-up to tlie HU 
and EMU entiy.
7.2 Explaining monetary policy in Central Europe
For monetary policy, tlie general goal was to secure macroeconomic stability as a 
basic precondition for successful transition to a market economy and, in its more 
advanced stage, to achieve disinflation and overall nominal convergence with the 
EU/EMU coimtries, taking into account need for sustainable growtli. In this section, 
we look at factors underpimiing monetaiy policy, consequences for policy-malcers and 
their reactions.
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7.2.1 Factors influencing monetary policy in Central Europe during transition
Different initial conditions and expectations in individual countries 
Even tliough Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland officially started transition at tlie 
same time hi tlie 1989-1990 period, tlieir initial macroeconomic and microeconomic 
conditions differed substantially, which had important effect on futiue developments.
The heritage of Czechoslovakia was overall macroeconomic stability. The country 
had been a bulwark o f fiscal and monetaiy prudence durmg communism and tlie early 
transition policies confmned this trend. Restrictive monetaiy and fiscal policies 
accompanied tlie start of reforms, ensuring tliat inflation fell rapidly after tlie hiitial 
one-time jump caused by price liberalisation. On tlie otlier hand, tlie private sector and 
private economic activity' were much less developed compared to Hungaiy and 
Poland.
In Hmigaiy, economic reforms introduced before tlie end of communism included 
price liberalisation, which had taken place in a very gradual manner since tlie 1960s. 
hi 1989 and 1990, Himgary inti oduced a modem tax system. On tlie other hand, the 
oveixiding policy objective of the 1970s and 1980s was to placate tlie population by 
increases hi tlie standard o f living, which were not necessarily based on productivity 
or output growtli, and tliat led to a rapid accmnulation of debt and intemiittent 
financial problems.
In Poland, tlie begimiing o f a transition meant a half-dismantled command system and 
an economy on the verge of hyperinflation. The imbalances in tlie economy.
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particularly on tlie fiscal and quasi-fiscal side, were enormous. Poland had a very high 
debt, which it was not able to fully service. Due to liigh inflation, the economy 
suffered from extensive dollarisation and demonetisation. On tlie positive side, 
Poland had tlie most developed private sector from all Central European countries.
Ability to achieve overall rapid structural adjustment and successjul transition 
Despite wildly varying initial macroeconomic conditions, all four coimtries have been 
generally able to implement rapid reforms and achieve successfiil structural 
adjustment. Transition has been a period of relative political stability, beginning with 
a regime change in the late 1980s. when political change was negotiated witliout 
major setbacks or conflicts.
Stability persisted tliereafter m most coimtiies, with governments serving one or two 
4-year terms and with early elections or major changes in governing coalitions an 
exception rather tlian a rule. The Czech Republic was governed essentially by tlie 
same centre-right coalition from 1992 until 1998, when it was replaced by a minority 
left-whig government, which was confmned in power by tlie parliamentary elections 
in Jmie 2002, but chose to include two smaller centrist parties in order to gain 
a majority status. After tlie first free elections in 1990, Himgaiy had a conservative 
right-wing government, which was then replaced, in 1994, by the government of die 
postcommunist party. The government changed agahi towards tlie right whig hi 1998 
and again back to tlie postcommunists in 2002. Poland, despite several personal 
reshuffles, changed government coalitions only following elections -  from a right- 
wing one between 1989 and 1993 to a left-wing one in tlie 1993-1997 period, back to 
tlie right wing between 1997 and 2001, followed again by the left-wing govenmient
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since 2001. Slovakia experienced a turbulent period after its independence leading to 
early elections in 1994, which was lollowed by four years of a nationalist goveriunent 
and a mixed pro-Western coalition during tlie 1998-2002 period, which largely 
remained after tlie 2002 elections. E\ en tlie break-up of Czechoslovalcia in 1992 took 
place based on negotiations and necessary constitutional approval without the 
political, economic, not to mention military, tumult accompanying such steps 
elsewhere
A strong factor in favour of political stability and rapid structural reforms has been tlie 
pull of potential membership in multilateral institutions -  tlie European Union, NATO 
and OECD. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became OECD members in 1995-6, 
witli Slovakia joming in 2000. Czech Republic, Hungaiy and Poland became NATO 
members in 1999, with Slovakia signing tlie accession agreement in 2002. All fbui" 
counti'ies became EU members in the first wave of eastwards expansion hi 2004, after 
starting the negotiations hi 1997 and 1999. The European Union in paiticular exerted 
hifluence over both histitutioiis and policies.
Expectations and pressures ofjiiture EU/EMU membership 
The imcertain, but ever-present expectation of EU and EMU membership influenced 
monetary policy in tlie countries studied during the whole transition -  specifically 
shice tlie Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991. The expectation of EU and EMU 
membersliip has tlius presented a clear exit strategy for monetaiy policy-malcers.
These requirements were important in hifluencing institutions of monetary policy. 
Medium-term policy frameworks adopted hi Central European countries since 1998
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strongly reflected tliese needs and largely defined mediiun-term inflation targets in 
line with expected EU entiy in the 2003-2004 period and tlie EMU entry two-three 
years later. Central bank laws were all changed between 1997 and 2002 to fit the 
requirements tliough the changes did not have major impact on tlie level of legal or 
actual independence.
EMU membership is also linked to fulfiliiig specific performance criteria, tliat largely 
determined monetary and fiscal policy targets in acceding countries during late 
transition, such as 1.5% maximum inflation differential and 2% maxhnum long-term 
interest rate differential vis-à-vis the EMU coimtries as well as 3% of GDP maximum 
fiscal deficit and 60% of GDP maximum level of debt, not to mention a 2-yeai" 
waithig period in tlie ERM-2 system.
High level o f  trade and financial openness together with limited instruments o f  
adjustment
High and increasing level of economic openness has been one of the key factors 
underpinning monetary policy in Central Eiu opean economies. While in case of trade, 
transition period built on already significant trade flows inlierited from tlie communist 
period, financial flows started from a very limiting regulatory enviromnent and 
correspondingly low base and increased rapidly. In terms of regulatory enviionment, 
the countries studied covered the same path to liberalisation m 12 years that tlie 
developed coimtries took 50 post-war years to achieve.
Except for Poland, all four economies could be characterised, in ternis of trade, as 
small open economies even prior to tlie beginning of transition. Transition brought
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both reorientation of trade from former CMEA markets to EU markets and significant 
growtli in trade volume.
In terms of financial flows, early 1990s were a period of limited financial integration 
witli tlie global economy, which enabled these countries to run, to a certain extent, a 
distinct foreign-exchange and interest-rate policy. However, as tlie transition 
progressed, the level of autonomy and possible divergence between tliese two policies 
quickly declined as evidenced both by the capital inflows and tlie currency crises 
experienced.
In mid-1990s, several factors induced capital inflows beyond what could be easily or 
profitably absorbed. As these economies stabilised after die initial transition 
depression, had credible fixed exchange • rates, high interest rates and gradually 
liberalised capital account, they faced enormous and increasing capital inflows. This 
was accompanied by current account deficits as tlie hiflows financed increase in 
imports both for investment and consumption puiposes.
Such developments hicreasingly created conflicts between die goal of price stability 
and tlie existence of a fixed exchange rate anchor and also made for problems hi 
external balance. Domestic and foreign shocks could and did lead to substantial 
outflows and a foreign exchange crisis, particularly if accompanied by the perception 
tliat die situation was luisustainable. This was die case hi Hungary in 1995, Czech 
Republic in 1997 and Slovakia in 1998.
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Even though floating currencies adopted in Central Europe between 1997 and 2001 
relieved tlie problem to a certain extent, capital inflows persisted. The ability of 
policymakers to counter tlie effect of capital flows was stymied by tlie limited scope 
for fiscal adjustment.
All four countries started the period of transition witli a very high ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP. The level of goi'eniment revenue differed, with Czechoslovakia 
running a more consen^ative fiscal policy, resulting hi higher taxes compared to 
Hungary and Poland which used seigniorage to finance tlie fiscal deficit quite 
extensively in the early 1990s. These very different hiitial conditions converged 
during tlie 1990s and early 2000s into a rather similar pattern of moderate to high 
fiscal deficits due to tlie following reasons:
® tlie priority attached to lowering of tlie tax burden from its very high hiitial 
level
® tlie need to finance tlie costs of transition
® the Ihiiitations placed on the fiscal deficit by tlie emergence of twin deficits 
and prospective Maastricht criteria
In tliis respect, it is necessarj' to point out tliat official fiscal data were, for a long 
time, practically useless in gauging the fiscal stance due to extensive use o f state- 
owned banks, off-budget funds, and govemment guarantees. Some o f these 
operations, albeit not included in fiscal accounting by governments, were roughly 
calculated by tlie IMF in its estimates, but much of tlie expenditure (especially by 
state-owned banks) was left off-budget in any estimate. The problems were resolved
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only in tlie early 2000s by the privatisation or abolition of many off-budget 
institutions and tlie consolidation of the rest into fiscal data in preparation for the 
application of Eurostat ESA 95 criteria for measuring the fiscal deficit. Therefore, any 
fiscal data need to be treated with utmost caution and cannot be used meaiiingfiilly for 
econometric analysis.
Dysfunctional structure o f  the financial sector and peculiarities in relationship 
between the real economy and the financial sector
During most of tlie communist period, central banks and commercial banlcs in tlie 
region existed only in name and had no effective role in credit allocation. Despite 
rapid institutional changes, the financial sector has lacked the maturity and depth to 
ensure smootli transmission of monetary' policy impulses. The problem was not 
necessarily in tlie formal level of intermediation though it was low in Poland and, to 
some extent, hi Hungary', but in insolvency of individual banks and tlie banking 
system as a whole. Consequently, impact of interest rates on credit was limited due to 
highly interest-inelastic lending policies of banks burdened by nonpeiforming loans 
and tlie certahity about future bailouts. The solvency challenge was exacerbated by 
structural liquidity problems.
Delayed privatisation of banlcs as well as political imwillhigness to hnpose a hard 
budget constrahit on certain groups of enterprises combined to create a situation 
where lending was often driven by political considerations and the group of corporate 
borrowers were highly differentiated in terms of botli liquidity and solvency. At tlie 
same time, households in all four countries were not dependent on bank fmancing as 
lending to households continued to develop quite gradually hi all foin countries. Witli
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tlie exception of Hungar>', only very late 1990s and early 2000s brought about a 
change in tliese problems by bank restructining and privatisation. In Hungary, tlie 
whole process took place several years earlier.
Inflationary pressures unrelated to monetary and fiscal policies as such 
A radier idiosyncratic factor influencing monetary policy in Central Europe during the 
transition period was an uncommonly large role of factors influencing price 
developments tiiat have been unrelated to monetary or fiscal policies as such. Both 
regulated prices and supply-determined prices, such as food and commodities have 
had a much higher share of the consumer basket diaii in developed economies, 
niakhig much of the price development directly luiresponsive to monetary policy.
The four countries started Uansition with a combination of structural deficiencies hi 
the economy and price regulation that led to imbalances in relative prices and, 
especially hi fomier Czechoslovakia, to prices that did not clear die market and led to 
demand-supply mismatch. The result was a low price level and a burst of inflation 
upon price liberalisation that continued to reverberate for much of transition. Shifts in 
relative prices accompanying the adjustment process created an upward and persistent 
pressure on hiflation hi tiansilion countries above and beyond die direct influence. 
This does not mean diat monetaiy policy was powerless to coiuiter tiiese pressures, 
radier that it could not counter them directly.
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7.2.2 Consequences fo r  the monetary policy-making environment
High level of openness to trade and to financial flows, togetlier witli frequent lack of 
fiscal disciplme led, in all four coiintiies, to vulnerability and a need for periodic 
adjustment to dangerous fiscal and external imbalances. The adjustment took place 
eitlier tlnough a flnancial/cinrency crisis or an austerity package prior to a potential 
crisis, witli outcomes that are often difficult to distinguish.
It is rather difficult to distinguish radically different patlis in terms of changes in 
luiemploymeiit, inflation or real wages for countries, such as tlie Czech Republic in 
1997 and Slovalda in 1998, which had to float currencies under speculative pressure; 
countries such as Himgaiy in 1995. which had to change tlieir macroeconomic policy, 
but continued to rely on a fixed exchange rate; and countries such as Poland in 1999 
and 2000, which were proactive in crisis prevention and increased tlie exchange rate 
flexibility on tlieir own. In all the cases, if tlie fundamentals, evidenced by very liigh 
current account deficit, slowing growth and/or stubborn inflation, were shaky, 
adjustment had to follow and its costs did not differ fimdamentally.
Initial conditions, iiiflationaiy' pressures unrelated to monetaiy and fiscal policies and 
fiscal looseness m some countries led to a high initial and often continumg level of 
inflation, wliiie tlie Maastricht criteria and medium-temi policy frameworks adopted 
by tlie countries required achievement of low inflation. Due to high levels of financial 
opemiess and otlier factors, monetaiy policy in tliese countries faced a paradox not 
luiusual in small, open economies — while the overall objective has been related to 
disinflation, tlie actual policy has been driven primarily by considerations of external
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(im)balance. The reason is that imbalances between aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand tended to lead to tlie deterioration of tlie current account. Inflationaiy impact 
was felt only later when measures taken to address tlie current accoimt problems 
caused increased inflation. In economies with a longer histoiy of such problems (in 
particular Himgaiy, to some extent Poland), awareness of the issue caused a spill-over 
of external imbalance directly into heightened inflation expectations.
In tlie environment of substantial capital inflows, changes in tlie interest rate were not 
always available as an effective instrument to combat tlie problem as tliey raised fiscal 
debt service and/or accelerated capital inflows, tlius often worsening radier tiian 
improving die problem. At die same time, experience of Czech Republic and Slovalcia 
show tliat domestic confidence was the key to a currency crisis. While die crises in 
bodi comitries were set off by speculative attacks from non-residents, diese were 
successfully seen off. It was the second-round pressures caused by die domestic 
corporate sector and households, which became too strong and forced die currency 
into a managed float.
Overall, inflationaiy pressures not diiectly related to monetaiy or fiscal policy and 
imeven impact of monetaiy policy on real economy led to a radier scrambled 
transmission mechanism, which had to rely largely on manipulation o f exchange rate 
and wages to manage inflation. The general statement contains differences between 
individual countries as well as between periods.
The Czech Republic provides indications of the effects of both die interest rate and 
die nominal exchange rate on inflation, though the impact on output is ambiguous. In
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Hungary and Slovakia, botli nominal and real exchange rate shocks have a negative 
effect on prices. In Poland, a positive interest rate shock causes nominal exchange 
rate appreciation, which in turn decreases prices. In Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovalda, wage mcreases lead to price increases.
Usefulness of monetaiy' aggregates in policy-makhig requires both existence of a 
relationship between tlie aggregate as the intermediate target and tlie final target -  
inflation - and predictabilit)' in how that relationship develops. For tlie Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, v elocity of money did not change dramatically, but 
tlie changes were difficult to predict and were associated witli a loose relationship 
between broad money and inflation. In Poland, tlie actual and trend velocity of money 
botli declined dramatically, but in a linear and predictable manner.
Consequently, predictable monetary policy transmission mechanism m Central 
European comitries has existed for some time, but because of specific transition 
factors and general featiues of small open economies, the exchange rate channel 
seems to be dominant, while the more traditional interest rate chaimel is much less 
widespread. Wages seem to play a fairly important role in detennining inflation in 
Central European countries, which explains why incomes policies (even tliough 
largely misuccessful) were assigned such an important role by the autliorities, 
especially in tlie first half of the transition period. As transition progressed, monetary 
policy began to relate more and more on interest rates as tlie key policy instnmient. 
Policy-making in tlie monetary area was accompanied by an unusually high levels of 
uncertainty regarding both the parameters of tlie economic model and actual values of 
variables in tlie model.
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Due to reasons explained above, policy-makers found it difficult to accurately 
measure fiscal stance and its potential impact on inflation. Due to tlie luiique character 
of tlie transition recession and subsequent structural change, output gaps were very 
difficult to estimate and, in all likelihood, developed quite dynamically. One point of 
luicertamty was particularly salient for monetary policy. Even tliough it was clear that, 
in all countries, substantial appreciation of tlie real exchange rate took place, there 
was considerable luicertaiiity' about the equilibrium real exchange rate. Wliile a lüîely 
trend appreciation can be demonstrated for the 1993-2001 period for the comitries hi 
tlie sample, tliere is a high level of uncertainty as to causes as well as to the size of tlie 
trend, which made it veiy difficult for policy-makers to accurately estimate an 
equilibrium exchange rate and adjust tlieir behaviour accordingly.
7.2.3 Reaction by monetary policymakers
Reaction of policy-makers in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to the 
environment described in the previous sections can be veiy rouglily subsmned under 
tlie heading ‘discretion constrained b>’ a strong nominal anchor and real exchange rate 
considerations’. Constramed discretion, a term originally used by Bemanke et al. 
(1999) to describe inflation taigeting, is redefined here more broadly to delineate 
flexible monetary policy strategies that, however, impose limitations by use of an 
explicit and visible nominal anchor botli to manage expectations and to constrahi 
discretion o f policy-malvers and. at the same time, take into consideration tlie real 
exchange rate. In tlie countries studied, such an approach was used to balance the 
imperative o f disinflation with external constraint on monetary policy.
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Approach of Central Emopean countries was consistently based on high levels of 
central bank independence and avoidance of hard pegs. At the same time, tliey have 
not practiced true exchange rate flexibility. This policy strategy largely worked and 
shows, as furtlier analysed in tlie following section, tliat even emerging market 
economies can successfully constrain discretion over monetaiy policy witliout 
resorting to hard pegs. Coimtercyclical policy was not a part of tlie package (witli tlie 
exception of Poland). Monetaiy policy seems to have reacted to inflation and 
exchange rate developments, but not to output. It also does not show much influence 
on tlie development of output.
hiiplenientation of this broad strategy has had different forms over time and in each of 
the comitries. Nonetlieless, solutions chosen were remarkably consistent in answers to 
two basic questions: what anchor? how to achieve credibility?
Direct mstruments of monetaiy policy coupled witli tight regulation used during early 
transition were soon replaced by gradual liberalisation and reliance on soft peg as the 
key policy instnunent, which proved to be a successful nominal anchor for 
disinflation during early and mid-1990s when there was no credible alternative. Since 
fixed exchange rates, especially with narrow bands, do not provide much guidance for 
every-day policy in tlie envhonment of gradual financial liberalisation and mtegration 
witli external financial markets, monetary aggregates were used as a supplementary 
tool to guide policy.
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During the second half of 1990s and early 2000s, reliance on soft pegs as nominal 
anchors was replaced by gradual shift to management by interest rates and switch to 
inflation targets as the nominal anchor. During tliis process, exchange rate bands were 
progressively widened and finally abandoned (witli tlie exception o f die veiy wide 
Hungarian band).
In this context, inflation targeting can be seen principally as a policy packaging that 
made it possible to achieve disinfiation requiied by die Maastricht criteria using high 
interest rates and tolerance for nominal exchange rate stability/appreciation as one of 
die principal tools of disinflation. At die same time, while official floating of 
currencies contained a measurable change in the behaviour of aiidiorities towards less 
management o f die exchange rate and tolerance for larger exchange rate movements, 
concern about excessive fluctuations in nominal and real exchange rates has reniamed 
and continued to influence policy actions.
In addition to approaches shared by all four countries, diere were important 
differences related primarily to different macroeconomic conditions and resulting hi a 
divergent approach to real exchange rate management. Even diough a trend 
appreciation in die real exchange rale can be demonstrated for die 1993-2001 period 
in all four countries, die size of the trend differs dramatically. Therefore, Hungary and 
Poland, two comitries widi worse initial conditions and a history of recmring external 
constrahit, used die crawlhig peg and minidevaluatioiis during die period of fixed 
exchange rates to decrease die speed o f appreciation and micromanage it, while Czech 
Republic and Slovakia relied on their ability to lower inflation dramatically to make 
die real exchange rate appreciation less direatening. The latter brought about currency
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crises, but without significant measurable costs for the economy compared to tlie 
preventive approach of the other two countiies.
7.3 Lessons for theory of monetary policy in highly open middle-income 
economies
This part of tlie concluding chapter focuses on tlie second aim of the thesis -  to shed 
light on underdeveloped economic theory on monetary policy in less developed, but 
liighly open and financially integrated market economies. Experience of Central 
European coimtries provides some answers to tlie question o f how to constrain 
discretion in monetary policy pursued in such economies, about tlie role of tlie 
external constraint in policy-making and about tlie relevance of domestic policy co­
ordination and credibility. The findings can be divided into tliree areas, each of which 
deals with one aspect of monetaiy policy in a highly open and financially integrated 
middle-income economy :
* constraining discretion in policy-malciiig 
® role of publicly annoimced targets and of tlie external constraint 
® importance of domestic policy co-ordination and credibility
7.3,1 Constraining discretion in policy-making
Mislikin and Savastano (2001), in their analysis of monetary policy strategies in Latin 
American comitries dming 1990s. come to tlie conclusion that tlie debate about 
monetary policy and monetaiy policy frameworks in emerging market comitries
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“should be over what is the best way to constrain discretion over monetary policy”, 
(p. 45) In tlieii* opinion, some countries, e.g. Chile, have a sufficiently robust set of 
political and economic institutions to be able to constrain discretion on tlieir own, 
witliout irrevocable commitment that effectively takes away policy autonomy from 
domestic autliorities. Unfortunately. this is not tlie case for all emerging market 
economies and if domestic institutions cannot successfully constrain discretion, then 
dollarisation or hard pegs are probably the only possible solution according to this 
view.
Kuttner and Posen (2001) provide, to a certain extent, an empirical answer to tlie 
question arising from Mishkin and Savastano (2001): under what conditions can 
discretion be constramed? They argue tliat a combination of domestic targets and 
central bank independence can bring about, in terms of inflation and output stability, 
similar results as a very hard peg.
Analytical framework presented by Mishkin and Savastano (2001) and Kuttner and 
Posen (2001) is particularly valuable in two respects:
® it shows tliat the various elements of a commitment by monetary autliorities 
are not duplicatoiy or coiiiradictoiy, but interdependent in contributmg to tlie 
goal o f constraining discretion 
o it provides an instiunient for analysis of effectiveness of various combinations 
by making tlieir objective -  constraining discretion -  explicit and showing tliat 
various combinations can achieve similar results
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Hie summary o f Central European experience can be divided into tlnee areas:
® tlie combination of institutions aimed at constraining discretion is not a simple, 
two-dimensional, discrete matrix of a given level of central banlc 
independence and publicly announced targets 
® our understanding and evaluation of botli central bank independence and
targets would greatly benefit from more sopliistication based on in-depth 
analysis of individual couiitiy experiences ratlier than quantitative panel 
studies
® a set of feasible combinations develops largely in line witli development of
financial and factor markets and tlieir integration witli global markets
The combination of institutions aimed at constraining discretion is not a simple, 
discrete matrix with two dimensions of a given level of central bank independence 
and targets. First of all, any such niatiix would need to be multidimensional to 
accomit separately for exchange rate, monetary and inflation targets. More 
importantly, any attempt to divide either category into discrete pieces is likely to be 
more misleading tliaii helpful.
For example, tlie Central European experience shows tliat tlie current taxonomy of 
exchange rate regimes is simplistic, discrete and misleading. The exchange-rate 
reality is a fluid continuum of differing words and deeds. The difference between a 
soft peg with a wide band and a highly managed float is minuscule -  indeed, during 
tlie second half of 2001, Slovakia with an officially floating rate was much more 
active in its management than Hungaiy with a 15% band around fixed exchange rate.
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At tlie same time, there are many examples of changes too small to require a change 
hi any category, but witli importanl policy consequences, such as Polish gradual 
expansion of its exchange rate band from 7 to 12.5% durhig the second half of 1990s.
Official regimes can be particularly misleading because of the ‘fear of floatmg’ 
phenomenon, where countries with regimes tliat are ostensibly flexible are m fact 
liiglily managed tlnough foreign exchange market mtei*ventioii or interest rate policy, 
hi Central Europe, we find that fear of floatmg exists in the sense tliat analysis of 
interest rate, exchange rate and international reserve movements indicates actual 
behaviour under ostensibly flexible regimes tliat is akhi to monetary pohcy mider 
fixed exchange rate regimes. On the otlier hand, we find tliat words do matter to some 
extent -  a clear change of regime from fixed to flexible entailed a shift in behavioiu to 
less fear of floating.
The real meanmg of money or inllation targets is also difficult to pin down into 
several, easily distinguishable categories. The role and imderstanding of monetary 
targets changed dramatically m a given country, depending on whetlier they were 
used hi a conjunction with fixed exchange rates, hiflation targets, both or neither. 
Central banks hi tlie region have long been in the habit of amiouncing quantitative 
targets for hiflation, but perception of targets changed dramatically when they became 
the only or the dominant fomi of publicly amioimced commitment by the monetary 
authority. This gradual development of inflation taigets from a ‘targetish’ indicator to 
a true target is well documented for Chile (see Mishkin, 2000) or several developed 
comitries (see Bemanke et al., 1999).
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A detailed analysis of central banlc independence in Central Europe shows tliat 
traditional indices of legal independence often do not capture several important 
features tliat crucially determine the actual independence, ranging from teclmicalities 
tlirough exchange rate independence and constitutional status to political actions of 
central bankers themselves. Secondly, it is clear from tlie previous discussion that our 
understanding and evaluation of both central bank independence and targets would 
greatly benefit from more sophistication, based on in-deptli analysis o f individual 
country experiences rather than quantitative panel studies. Findings of tlie thesis point 
to tlie followhig conclusions.
Experience of Central Eiuope validates both Mishkin and Savastano (2001) and 
Kuttner and Posen (2001) in their principal argument. All foiu comitries in the sample 
were able to disinflate and to grow without resorting to hard pegs because tliey were 
able to develop institutions that effectively constrain discretion over monetary policy 
tlirough development of highly independent, technically capable central banks and 
tlieir combination witli a variety of publicly amiounced targets. As tlie experience of 
1990s and early 2000s indicates, there is no mherent weakness in Central Europe that 
would prevent tliese countries from successfully nirming their own monetary policy.
Experience of Central Europe also disproves a need for long-term build-up of central 
bank credibility among economic agents. Despite numerous huge internal and 
external shocks, tlie Czech Republic and Slovalda were able to disinflate rapidly 
below 10% by 1994, using an exchange-rate-based stabilisation. Gradual disinflation 
pursued by Himgaiy and Poland was mandated by initial conditions and weak fiscal 
position ratlier tlian high sacrifice ratios per se.
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At tlie same time, all countries, with the possible exception of Slovalda during tlie 
1999-2001 period, relied on a combination of independent central banks and publicly 
amiounced targets to anchor expectations of agents. Even in Slovakia during this 
period, where tlie central bank refused to officially coimnit itself to a framework, it 
put emphasis on inflation targets it announced and was successful in achieving. In 
other words, monetary policy authority that, via portfolio of promises, delivers a clear 
and understandable nominal anchor tliat it is independent enough to deliver, is 
sufficient to generate credible monetaiy policy even in emerging market economies.
Thirdly, a set o f feasible combinations develops in Ime witli development of financial 
and factor markets and their integration witli global maikets. The general experience 
of Central Europe is that, luitil 1994, mtegration witli global financial markets was 
low and it was not only possible, but to some extent even necessary to combine high 
and increasing central bank independence witli two intermediate targets/nominal 
anchors for monetary policy - exchange rate and monetary targets. In tliis respect, 
monetary targets were more of an intermediate goal and the exchange rate fitted more 
into a definition as a nominal anchor. Beginning in 1994, financial integration and 
resulting moimting capital flows made the bifurcation of monetary policy 
progressively imteiiable. In countries witli initial fiscal difficulties, i.e. Hungary and 
Poland, absence and/or slow development o f financial markets put pressure on central 
banks to monetise much of tlie deficit in early 1990s despite high legal independence.
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7.3,2 Role ofpublicly announced targets and o f  the external constraint
Monetaiy policy in small open economies has traditionally been concerned with both 
external and internal macroeconomic balance. In case of transition economies, 
concern focused on the relationship between tlie speed of disinflation and die 
vulnerabihty to a flnancial/cuirenc) crisis.
Macroeconomic imbalances manifested diemselves primarily tiirough external 
imbalance radier dian increased inflation, which arrived later as external imbalances 
were resolved via currency devaluation/depreciation or odier policy actions. At the 
same time, interaction between exchange rate and inflation m Central Europe 
confmiis die hypothesis of a shorl-term inverse relationship between real exchange 
rate and inflation developments under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.
Therefore, real exchange rate appreciation served die overall objective o f disinflation, 
but if it went too far, it led to currency depreciation and the opposite effect. These 
problems, togedier with political costs of a crisis, can explain why high current 
accoimt deficits and potential/actual currency crises dominated monetary policy in all 
four countries. The actual importance and damage of crises that came widi overly 
long pegs can be overstated though. It is difficult to trace any significant medium- 
tenn economic costs from the limited cuirency crises experienced by die Czech 
Republic (1997-1999) and Slovakia (1998-1999) compaied to more orderly responses 
by Hungaiy (1995-1996) and Poland (1999-2001). Crises served as manifestation of 
existmg risk and triggers for further restructuring o f die real economy. Therefore, it 
can be argued that die cost of pegging for too long is probably low.
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Wiüiiiî such a framework, it is much easier to understand changes in targets publicly 
amioimced and pursued by policy-makers in Central Europe. The two key overall 
developments were the gradual shift of emphasis from exchange rate targets to 
domestic targets and (within domestic targets) a shift from monetary targets to 
inflation targets. Starting from an early combination of exchange rate targeting 
supplemented by monetaiy targets, monetary taigets were increasingly ignored until 
tliey were officially abandoned in late 1990s. Exchange rate targeting encountered 
difficulties m achieving disinflation below 10% and has been, at first, supplemented 
and tlien replaced by inflation targeting conibmed witli a more or less managed float. 
Wliat generalisations can one make from these developments?
If one evaluates a foreign exchange regime based on its overall perfonnance, fixed- 
but-adjustable pegs with iianow bands served their purpose in early to mid-1990s and 
should not be ignored by countries that are not yet highly financially mtegrated. On 
the otlier hand, for small open, financially mtegrated economies, fixmg tlie exchange 
rate officially or by tight management facilitates capital inflows and high deficit of tlie 
current accomit. Additionally, fixed exchange rates can allow govenmients to 
combme, for 2-3 years, expansionary fiscal policy and stable ciurrency/inflation.
Secondly, even tliough Central European experience confiniis tliat soft pegs witli 
narrow bands are no longer a viable option for countries tliat are highly financially 
integrated, this by no means confirms the hollowmg-out/bipolar hypothesis tliat only 
free floats or very hard pegs are siislainable for small open economies.
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Since soft pegs witli narrow bands are not sustainable and benign neglect is not an 
option for these countries, the policy choice was between a variety o f hai'd peg 
(dollarisation, currency board) or incomplete flexibility arrangements. Even a more 
flexible exchange rate does not always fulfil expectations of its advocates that it 
provides an immediate reaction to changes in fundamentals and, especially, to an 
unsustainable fiscal policy. (Mishkin. 1999)
Regarding monetary targets - tliey are likely to be problematic in an environment of 
rapid financial innovation and structural change due to unexpected changes in 
velocity or low influence on inflation development. Experience o f Central Europe is 
tliat tliey can be effectively used in conjunction with a fixed exchange rate, serving 
more as an internal guide of sustainability of monetary policy and tlie fixed exchange 
rate than a policy target per se. After all four countries were forced off or chose to 
abandon tlie soft peg, tliey gradually abandoned monetary targets and switched to 
inflation targeting.
Inflation targeting can become a lesser evil, preferable to discretionary policy or 
otlier, discredited frameworks. Technical difficulties miderstandable for countries 
imdergomg rapid stmctural change and witli a limited predictability o f transmission of 
policy impulses made for a long period of ‘practice shooting’ in Czech Republic and 
Poland, before tlie new framework became credible. Experience of Central Europe 
shows tliat it particularly difficult to fine-tune inflation taigets when tlie economy is 
facing a dramatic cyclical reversal, resulting in massive undershooting or 
overshooting of targets. The experience also shows tliat central banks tend to 
constiuct tlieir inflation models, after introduction o f inflation targeting, in an
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asymmetric way tliat puts more emphasis on tlie upside risk of higher-tlian-targeted 
inflation.
Despite tliese limitations, inflation targeting became tlie dominant policy framework 
and its gradual success improved its credibilit)'. Still, it provides a cautionary example 
to consider when introducing inflation targeting in coimtries where energy, food and 
regulated prices are a major part of consumer prices.
Central European experience belies fmdiiigs by Gerlach (1999) that inflation targeting 
tends to be adopted in countries with low cential bank independence and/or not with 
open economies. This idew contains an implicit assumption tliat inflation targeting 
replaces missing independence or nommai anchor provided tlirough management of 
the nominal exchange rate.
7.3.3 Co-ordination o f  monetary and fiscal policies
Findings from tlie Central European experience concerning co-ordmatioii of 
macroeconomic policies suggest a number of hypotheses, some of tlieni in accordance 
witli conventional wisdom, other quite counterintuitive and some just largely left 
unexplored so far in tlie literature.
The Central European sample demonstrates tlie well-laiown fact tliat certain factors 
wholly or partially beyond the power of central bank -  especially fiscal policy -  are 
crucial to actual mediimi-term success of a given monetary framework and to low 
inflation.
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On tlie otlier hand, the sample of Central European countries does not confirm tlie 
hypotliesis put forward by Worrell (2000) tliat policy-makers in small open 
economies, especially the developing ones, frantically tiy to avoid overt conflict m the 
fear of undermining confidence. Slovakia during tlie 1996-98 period as well as during 
tlie year 2002 and Poland in the 2001-02 period experienced a ratlier public conflict 
between fiscal and monetary authorities and we were unable to detect any distinct 
effect of tlie conflict as such rather than sustainability/misustainability of policies on 
expectations or macroeconomic developments.
The second counterintuitive findings is tliat tlie importance of contagion and external 
factors in currency crises should not be overestimated. While contagion from tlie 
Asian and Russian crisis seems to be tlie triggering event for local crises in Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, it was the decision by domestic agents to speculate against tlie 
cinrency that made tlie floating and subsequent depreciation inevitable. At tlie same 
time, expectation of devaluations in Hungary in early to mid-1990s by domestic 
agents became tlie key in increasing inflation expectations Therefore, a hypotliesis 
wortli exploring is tliat while external events can act as triggers for crises and pressure 
on the currency, it is the domestic credibility which matters hi the end for countries 
where an overwhelming majority of financial assets is held by domestic institutions.
Even tliough monetisation of fiscal deficit early in transition as a major factor in 
inflation performance seems quite conventional, experience of transition provides a 
slightly more nuanced conclusion. In addition to fiscal consolidation, it is tlie 
development of deep and liquid financial markets tliat co-determines tlie ability of
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central bank to achieve low inflation. Without tliem, even a modest deficit can cause 
problems and vice versa.
Anotlier unexplored area is that official fiscal data often provide a distorted picture 
due to differing methodologies and off-balance-sheet items. Additionally, fiscal 
policy m itself can be quite conservative and still contribute to problems during a 
period of capital inflows, especially if the dynamics are expansionary. It needs to be 
said tliat tlie real policy issue is not whetlier fiscal policy is too loose, but how tight 
does need it to be to support overall policy objectives and whetlier the required 
tightening is feasible.
7.4 Concluding remarks -  relevance of the thesis for policy challenges on the 
road to single currency
The tliesis examined monetary policy in Central Europe during the period spamiing 
years 1993 tlnough 2001. Two years have passed and the year o f its submission - 
2004 -  is also tlie year when all four coimtries enter tlie European Union. Membership 
in the EU will bring new challenges for policymakers in all areas, but particularly so 
in tlie area of monetary policy. All new member states, luilike tlie UK or Demnark, 
have taken on tlie obligation to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and join tlie single 
currency (i.e. tliere is no opt-out). At tlie same tune, tliere seems to be a strong 
internal desire to adopt euro, both by central banks and govenmients. Does tlie tliesis 
contain findings relevant to monetary policy of EU member states on the road to 
single currency?
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Factors unique to the transition ha\ e significantly influenced conduct of monetary 
policy during 1990s and early 2000s. but are now largely spent. Inflationary pressures 
unrelated to monetary or fiscal policy, a dysfunctional financial sector and other 
transitional distortions in the monetary' policy transmission mechanism have been 
weakening progressively and can be now seen as tlie tlihig of tlie past. Lessons based 
on tliese idiosyncrasies are not necessarily relevant anymore and can be even 
misleading. Emphasis on implementation of monetary policy primarily tlirough 
interest rates and continuing development of teclinical capacity have become 
dominant.
On tlie otlier hand, strong and independent central banks combined with a domestic 
target or a soft peg have shown themselves to be a good way of constraining 
policymakers’ discretion in the Central Europe and a good basis for future 
convergence witli tlie eurozone. Inflation targeting will in all likelihood continue to be 
tlie target tliat complements central bank independence within tliis established 
framework. This conjecture is based not so much on its (now universal) adoption by 
tlie four countries, but on tlie fact that the logic that led to its adoption will be even 
stronger after tlie accession. The Maastricht criteria require convergence of inflation 
and long-term interest rates to the eurozone levels and inflation targeting is the most 
direct instrument for policy-makers to fulfil the criteria.
There are, however, two other factors tliat complicate the picture. One is fiscal policy. 
Its importance for achievement of monetary policy goals can hardly be overstated and 
was a subject of much debate in the thesis, which however confirmed tliat tlie penalty 
for profligate governments is often long in coming, especially mider fixed exchange
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rate regimes. The EU membership and the ambition to join the eurozone should 
alleviate some of tlie problems experienced by monetary policymakers. First of all, 
measurement of tlie fiscal position has now become much more transparent and will 
continue to be calculated by Eurostat wiüim the framework of the economicy policy 
co-ordination. More importantly, one of the Maastricht criteria is tliat, for tliose witli 
tlie ambition to join tlie EMU, fiscal deficit should not exceed tlie 3% of GDP limit. 
This has already become a ke>’ goal in fiscal strategies of Central European 
governments. It is not clear what impact tlie recent fiscal transgressions of existing 
members of tlie eurozone (Germany and France) will have on credibility and 
application of tlie criterion to applicants, but tliere is no indication tliat tlie pressure on 
fiscal consolidation will slack.
The finding of tlie tliesis that is most disquieting for monetary policymakers on tlieir 
road to tlie EMU is tliat procedures for entry into tlie monetary union might require a 
potentially inconsistent combination of fixed nominal exchange rates, disinflation and 
sustainable real exchange rate. Prior to adoption of tlie euro, currency of a member 
state must spend at least two years without devaluation in ERM-2, tlie second version 
of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. After tlie 1992 crisis, the ERM-2 band 
was widened to 15%, but that might still prove to be insufficient, especially when 
even a much smaller divergence from the central parity tlian tlie band allows 
stimulates speculation about how central banks would resolve conflicts between 
inflation targets and iniperatii'es of the band. The fact tliat tliree out of four Central 
European countries, have adopted and kept a formally floating currency even in 
expectation of tlie EU and ERM-2 membership is a testhiiony to tlieir aversion to soft 
pegs (even very soft ones). Their experience tells them tliat inconsistencies introduced
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into the policy framework by ERM-2 will be not only potential, but can easily have 
serious consequences. Unlike other lessons, this one becomes more relevant as 
transition-specific factors weaken.
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